Commit Graph
11 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Marc-André Bombeck db08f6c175 fix(01-05): serialize MCP refresh families
- lock and rotate refresh families inside one database transaction
- revoke CAS losers and insert successors before commit
- sign refresh artifacts only after committed state
2026-07-29 13:50:14 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 51f5f43957 test(01-01): preserve explicit transaction contract
- keep the red transaction-client call aligned with the planned signature
- isolate the concurrent documentation commit from MCP test content
2026-07-29 13:43:27 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck cc8567d82f docs(01-02): complete PWA and SSRF red contracts plan
- document expected cache-isolation and transition-form failures
- record preserved public and redirect behavior
- capture atomic task commits and verification evidence
2026-07-29 13:42:30 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 38501f6574 test(01-01): specify transactional refresh rotation
- require one transaction for rotation and successor insertion
- pin CAS-loss revocation and insertion rollback semantics
2026-07-29 13:40:03 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 0f2b548138 style: apply prettier 3.9.1 formatting
Mechanical reflow from the prettier 3.9.1 bump; no behaviour change.
2026-06-28 19:26:16 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 3c6cb8b08d fix(mcp): record why a client fails to resolve at /authorize
CIMD client resolution swallowed every fetch failure as ssrf_blocked and
/authorize logged a bare invalid event, so an unreachable metadata host
was indistinguishable from a genuine SSRF block and the consent flow
returned invalid_client with no diagnosable cause.

Split the resolution failure into ssrf_blocked (a real private-host
refusal) and fetch_failed (timeout / connect error), carrying the
concrete SafeFetchError kind and cause as a short non-secret detail.
Thread the resolution reason and detail into the authorize.invalid
annotation behind a pinned meta shape, and cache a resolved CIMD
document for up to 24h so the consent flow does not re-fetch on every
hit.
2026-06-28 15:18:12 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 01e2373255 feat(mcp): identify the authorization-server issuer per RFC 9207
Advertise authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported in the
authorization-server metadata and echo the iss parameter on every
authorization response — both the success redirect carrying the code and
the access_denied error redirect. A client can now pin the response to
this server's issuer and reject a code substituted by a look-alike
authorization server in a multi-server deployment.

Additive and backward-compatible: existing clients that ignore iss are
unaffected; PKCE S256-only, audience binding, redirect-URI exact match
and the rate limits are untouched.
2026-06-28 01:00:45 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck fb986bc09d merge: bring the MCP server onto the v1.23 base
Combine the remote MCP server (stdio + remote /mcp + OAuth 2.1 + read
tools + deep-value reads + a confirmed, audience-bound write surface)
with the v1.23 account-security line (MFA, known/trusted devices,
free-text note encryption).

- schema: keep every v1.23 User relation (MFA, known/trusted devices)
  alongside the McpOAuthConnection relation; the MeasurementSource enum
  carries the MCP value.
- api-handler: the MCP audience guard (a token scoped to
  health:read/health:write is bound to /mcp and refused a REST write)
  and the step-up MFA helpers coexist.
- maintenance queues: register the MCP token-cleanup sweep next to the
  note-encryption backfill and key-rotation queues; shift it to 04:00
  so the two daily discovery ticks do not collide.
- migrations: renumber the MCP migrations to 0206/0207 so they follow
  the v1.23 chain (0199-0205).
- MCP mood writes route the note through the v1.23 at-rest cipher.
2026-06-28 00:52:04 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 6de61de010 feat(mcp): add a confirmed, audience-bound write surface for logging measurements and mood
Register two write tools — log_measurement and log_mood — only for a
health:write-scoped session; a read-only session never sees them advertised.
Each write mirrors the proven Telegram capture path (same range guard,
canonical unit, cache invalidation and rollup recompute) pinned to the MCP
source, and is idempotent on a hashed externalId derived from a client key, so
a retried call is a no-op rather than a duplicate.

Because the remote wire is stateless (no elicitation), the tools carry a
protocol-level confirm gate: without confirm:true they write nothing and
return the exact record they would write plus an instruction to confirm the
value with the user and re-call with the same idempotency key. Commits run
under a tighter per-credential write budget on top of the per-binding request
limiter.

Harden the resource-server audience binding: a token whose scopes are all in
{health:read, health:write} is bound to the MCP surface and refused on every
REST write/delete. A health:write token therefore admits the in-process MCP
write tools only and can never become a general REST write credential; admin
stays unreachable (cookie-only). Refuse, by construction, any medication, lab,
delete/update, or data-export tool on this surface.
2026-06-27 17:38:42 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 22eb9cba0d fix(mcp): close OAuth 2.1 resource-server gaps before the remote surface ships
Harden the remote MCP endpoint and the in-repo OAuth bridge against the
adversarial review of the milestone branch. The two ship-blockers made the
"read-only, revocable" promise false; the rest tightened the surface.

Audience binding at the resource server: a token whose only grant is the new
`health:read` scope is the MCP read credential. The REST edge now accepts it on
safe (read) methods and refuses it on writes/deletes with 403, so a connector
token can read over `/mcp` and GET routes but can never POST/DELETE the record
despite a "read-only" consent. The `/mcp` resolver is unaffected.

Revocable, theft-detectable refresh tokens: refresh artifacts now anchor to a
persistent connection row. Revoking a connection stops every future refresh and
kills its access tokens; a replayed (already-rotated) refresh is treated as
theft and revokes the whole connection. Connections surface in settings as the
unit a user can disconnect. The old access token is revoked on rotation.

Also: fail closed on the OAuth/`/mcp` surface when no canonical origin is
configured and mark the discovery documents non-cacheable; honour the global API
kill-switch on `/mcp`, `/token`, `/authorize`, and `/register`; cap the CIMD and
registration body reads while streaming instead of after; show the verified
client origin on consent; validate CIMD redirect-URI schemes; assert same-origin
on the consent POST; and add a daily prune for expired connector tokens.

New migration 0195 adds the connection anchor and links access tokens to it.
2026-06-27 15:09:11 +02:00
Marc-André Bombeck 7ec3bf0dad feat(mcp): add an OAuth 2.1 authorization-server bridge for remote connectors
Let a remote MCP client (Claude.ai, ChatGPT) self-register and connect to
the `/mcp` endpoint over OAuth 2.1 + PKCE, bridged onto the existing `hlk_`
Bearer model — no parallel identity store.

- Discovery: RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata and RFC 8414 Authorization
  Server Metadata at `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` and
  `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` (added to the proxy allowlist).
- `/api/mcp/oauth/authorize` — consent gate backed by the existing session;
  a code is only issued on an authenticated POST decision, never on a GET.
- `/api/mcp/oauth/token` — authorization-code and refresh-token grants with
  mandatory PKCE S256, single-use codes, and rotating refresh tokens. The
  access token is an ordinary short-lived `hlk_` token scoped `health:read`.
- `/api/mcp/oauth/register` — RFC 7591 DCR fallback; CIMD (SEP-991) is the
  preferred path and resolves client metadata through `safeFetch`.
- Audience binding (RFC 8707): every token is bound to the canonical `/mcp`
  resource URI; a mismatched `resource` is rejected at authorize and token.
- The grant artifacts (code, refresh, DCR client id) are HMAC-signed,
  self-describing, and domain-separated; the central log redactors scrub
  them plus the PKCE verifier.
2026-06-27 14:27:09 +02:00