Wrist temperature, cardio recovery, sleep score, breathing
disturbances, strain/load, and the rest of the v1.10/v1.18.1
metric-status-registry ids were already resolvable through
compare_metric / get_metric_baseline / detect_changepoints (an exact
registry-id or display-name match), but sat off the Coach snapshot
inventory entirely — so list_metrics, the measurements-inventory
resource, and search never advertised them. A discover-before-fetch
assistant, which the server's own instructions direct, could never
learn they existed.
Adds a fixed, reviewed allowlist (MCP_METRIC_STATUS_DISCOVERY) plus a
metricStatusDiscoveryRows() presence probe, mirroring the existing
MCP_CLINICAL_SIGNALS pattern: one grouped presence query, appended as
supplement rows to list_metrics and the inventory resource, and merged
into the same probe search already runs for the v1.25 clinical
signals. fetch(id) now hydrates these ids via the baseline read the
same way it already does for clinical signals.
Add three grounded read tools, each a thin façade over an existing
server-authoritative engine (no new analytics, userId from the session):
- get_medication_schedule: next-due / overdue per active medication via
the canonical recurrence engine (computeDisplayDue), with as-needed
flagged and no scheduled due time.
- get_integration_status: per-provider sync health (connected, last sync,
reauth-required/failing) from the integration-status ledger, so a user
can see why their data is stale. No secrets or tokens.
- get_preventive_care: the user's already-configured Vorsorge reminders
with their persisted next-due dates and an overdue flag; it surfaces
configured reminders only and invents no screening logic.
Each declares an output schema, read-only annotations, and {present:false}
on absence. Page the search tool across the full assembled result set
(the prior 200-row scan made later items unreachable even through the
cursor) and give each result a per-item deep link where an id exists.
Bridge the five already-built, grounded Coach retrieval tools the
inventory already advertised but the wire was missing — closing the
advertise-but-missing self-inconsistency — each a thin wrapper over the
existing read with the same gates and present:false contract. Add a
multi-metric fan-out that loops the single-metric read, and a per-analyte
lab-history mode on the labs read. Declare a structured output schema on
every remaining tool so structured content validates for both a miss and
a hit. Page the large reads (search, lab history, multi-metric) behind an
opaque cursor. Return plain-text, citation-ready summaries from fetch
with per-item deep links instead of a JSON dump.
Register two write tools — log_measurement and log_mood — only for a
health:write-scoped session; a read-only session never sees them advertised.
Each write mirrors the proven Telegram capture path (same range guard,
canonical unit, cache invalidation and rollup recompute) pinned to the MCP
source, and is idempotent on a hashed externalId derived from a client key, so
a retried call is a no-op rather than a duplicate.
Because the remote wire is stateless (no elicitation), the tools carry a
protocol-level confirm gate: without confirm:true they write nothing and
return the exact record they would write plus an instruction to confirm the
value with the user and re-call with the same idempotency key. Commits run
under a tighter per-credential write budget on top of the per-binding request
limiter.
Harden the resource-server audience binding: a token whose scopes are all in
{health:read, health:write} is bound to the MCP surface and refused on every
REST write/delete. A health:write token therefore admits the in-process MCP
write tools only and can never become a general REST write credential; admin
stays unreachable (cookie-only). Refuse, by construction, any medication, lab,
delete/update, or data-export tool on this surface.
Expose four read-only relational tools and one prompt over the MCP wire,
each a thin re-export of an existing server-authoritative engine — no new
statistics, no new business logic:
- get_correlation: the FDR-controlled, lag-aware association between two
named metrics, selected out of the existing correlation discovery the
Coach and the insight route already run. Descriptive, never causal.
- compare_metric: two metrics over the same trailing window, or one metric
across two trailing windows, computed over the WMY rollup readers with a
delta only when both sides share a unit.
- get_metric_baseline: where today's reading sits against the user's own
usual range (median ± robust deviation) plus the strongest lagged driver,
reusing the metric-page baseline builder. Honest-null below the learning
floor — never a fabricated range.
- detect_changepoints: level shifts over the rollup tier via a small in-repo
CUSUM binary segmentation with a high firing bar.
- doctor_visit_summary prompt: a structured, grounded visit-prep summary
assembled from the doctor-report data path so the numbers match the
exported PDF, with the grounding framing injected once — data and context
only, no diagnosis or verdict.
Every tool returns values, units, reference bands and provenance, declares
read-only / non-destructive / closed-world annotations plus an output schema,
and reports { present: false } for absence. All reads stay session-narrowed
and read-only; the existing security posture is unchanged.
Harden the remote MCP endpoint and the in-repo OAuth bridge against the
adversarial review of the milestone branch. The two ship-blockers made the
"read-only, revocable" promise false; the rest tightened the surface.
Audience binding at the resource server: a token whose only grant is the new
`health:read` scope is the MCP read credential. The REST edge now accepts it on
safe (read) methods and refuses it on writes/deletes with 403, so a connector
token can read over `/mcp` and GET routes but can never POST/DELETE the record
despite a "read-only" consent. The `/mcp` resolver is unaffected.
Revocable, theft-detectable refresh tokens: refresh artifacts now anchor to a
persistent connection row. Revoking a connection stops every future refresh and
kills its access tokens; a replayed (already-rotated) refresh is treated as
theft and revokes the whole connection. Connections surface in settings as the
unit a user can disconnect. The old access token is revoked on rotation.
Also: fail closed on the OAuth/`/mcp` surface when no canonical origin is
configured and mark the discovery documents non-cacheable; honour the global API
kill-switch on `/mcp`, `/token`, `/authorize`, and `/register`; cap the CIMD and
registration body reads while streaming instead of after; show the verified
client origin on consent; validate CIMD redirect-URI schemes; assert same-origin
on the consent POST; and add a daily prune for expired connector tokens.
New migration 0195 adds the connection anchor and links access tokens to it.
- Add the `search` + `fetch` retrieval pair with the exact ChatGPT wire
shapes (`{id,title,url}[]` and `{id,title,text,url,metadata}`), backed by
the same server-authoritative reads and returning real deep-link URLs into
the web app for citations. Without these the server is invisible in
default-mode ChatGPT.
- Annotate every read tool `readOnlyHint`/`destructiveHint:false`/
`openWorldHint:false`; structured tools also declare an `outputSchema` and
return `structuredContent`. Omitting the hints is a validation error in the
connectors.
- Reject a cross-origin browser request to `/mcp` with 403 (DNS-rebinding
defense) and point the 401 `WWW-Authenticate` at the resource metadata.
Bridge the existing transport-agnostic MCP server factory to a Next.js
route at /mcp using the SDK's Web-standard Streamable HTTP transport, so a
remote client can connect with a manually-minted hlk_ Bearer token. The
same tool/resource layer the local stdio transport serves is reused
verbatim — no duplicated tool logic.
The route owns four gates in front of the transport:
- Auth: Authorization: Bearer hlk_… resolved by the same validator the
HTTP edge uses, so revoked/expired/scope semantics never drift. A cookie
is never consulted, so the cookie-only admin boundary stays unreachable
here regardless of token scope.
- Rate limit: the Postgres limiter keyed by the <userId>:<tokenId> binding
(mcp:<binding>), so a single shared credential cannot drain the account.
- Module gate: a new opt-in mcp module, OFF by default. With it off the
endpoint answers 404 and reveals nothing — a self-hoster who never opts
in gets zero new exposure. The Modules settings hub renders the toggle.
- Transport: a fresh stateless server + transport per request.
Read-only by construction (only read tools are registered) and same-origin
by construction (no CORS headers). The proxy lets /mcp skip the page cookie
redirect since it authenticates by header, mirroring the webhook surfaces.
Marc-André Bombeck