P2-1. The list GET now issues a documentContentIndex lookup and unions a
content-token OR branch when a search term is present, so the existing route
test gains the mock + the third OR branch in its where assertion. Fix the
backfill test's findFirst mock signature under strict tsc.
P2-1. Unit tests for the token scheme (whole-word match, stopword drop,
de-accent, no plaintext at rest, subkey follows the active key), HKDF subkey
derivation, the suggest route (drafts only, writes nothing, provider-gated),
the summary route (session-only, budget+audit only), the index route (vision
transcribe→upsert, text posts OCR text, provider/local-OCR gated), and the
backfill (no-provider/no-consent no-op, indexes, budget-reached resume).
The registry entry for InboundDocument.contentEncrypted gains a codecField
marker: the column now holds two layouts (base64v1 string codec | binary2
binary codec), recorded per row, and its rows are up to cap-sized blobs.
scan/rotate walk such a column with id-cursor pagination (25 rows per
page — never an unbounded blob findMany) and re-encrypt each row under its
OWN codec; an unknown codec value is counted as an error and the row left
untouched, same fail-closed posture as a missing key. The walk is
idempotent, so an interrupted run resumes on re-invocation with the
already-active rows skipped.
Both rotation paths share the logic: the admin-triggered pg-boss job via
rotateCorpus() and the CLI (scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts), which now
calls the shared batched walk for this column. The registry guard test
keeps schema, registry, and script in lock-step as before.
Unit coverage over a mocked 500-row corpus asserts the batch boundedness
(take + advancing cursor per page), both-codec rotation, per-row
fail-closed on unknown codecs, and interrupted-run resume.
Task: W1-T11.
Encrypt MedicationSideEffect.notes, MedicationDoseChange.note and
MedicationInventoryItem.notes with AES-256-GCM, closing the last plaintext
PHI columns left after the v1.23 note-encryption rollout. Add the three
*Encrypted Bytes columns (migration 0208), register them in the encrypted-
column rotation set, route every read/write through the note cipher, and add
a transactional fail-closed boot-time backfill for legacy rows. Plaintext
columns drop in a later release once the backfill reports zero remaining rows.
Require a fresh second factor on password change for MFA-enrolled accounts,
matching the existing step-up on MFA-disable and recovery-code regen. Redact
free-text note values from the Zod validation excerpt that can reach a wide
event.
Add a read-only admin Encryption section that surfaces what the rotation
tooling computes: per encrypted-column rows-per-key-id, legacy-key row
counts, and overall rotation progress, plus a 'safe to drop the legacy
key' state once every column sits on the active key. GET
/api/admin/encryption/status drives it and returns only key ids and
counts — never key material. A shared scan over the canonical encrypted-
column registry backs both this view and the rotation run. Cookie-only
admin.
Wrap GET /api/measurements/:id through shapeMeasurementNotes like the list,
create, and update paths already do, so the encrypted note column is decrypted
into notes and the raw ciphertext is stripped from the response. Harden the
rotation-coverage guard to require both the field literal and the model
delegate, so a same-named encrypted column whose table is not rotated is caught.
Lay the account-security and data-sovereignty substrate for v1.23. No
user-facing behaviour yet — schema, crypto registry, redaction, and the
note-encryption data path only.
Schema + migrations:
- 0199 — User totp_secret_encrypted / totp_confirmed_at / mfa_enforced /
passkey_upgrade_nudge_dismissed; Session mfa_verified_at / last_active_at;
Passkey last_used_at. All additive, nullable / defaulted.
- 0200 — mfa_challenges (single-use step-up ticket; only the ticket hash is
stored, so no session or token is ever minted before the second factor),
mfa_recovery_codes (Argon2id at rest), webauthn_mfa_credentials (second-factor
keys, kept separate from passkeys, which remain the passwordless-primary set).
- 0201 — mood_entries.note_encrypted + measurements.notes_encrypted (BYTEA),
matching the existing free-text encrypted-note convention.
Free-text health notes:
- New writes encrypt the mood / measurement note into the *_encrypted column and
null the legacy plaintext column; reads prefer the ciphertext and fall back to
plaintext only for not-yet-migrated rows, via a single read/write helper.
- A boot-time job migrates existing plaintext rows in an idempotent,
transactional, fail-closed pass (encrypt, then null the plaintext, per row in
one transaction; safe to re-run; a row with content is never left both-null).
- The legacy plaintext columns are kept this release and dropped in a follow-up
once the backfill reports zero remaining rows — the same boundary the
key-rotation playbook uses before dropping a legacy key.
Crypto coverage:
- Register the three new encrypted columns and wire them into the key-rotation
script so a rotation never orphans them.
- Extend the observability and log redaction denylists so TOTP secrets, MFA /
recovery / backup codes, and export passphrases never reach a wide event.
One-shot prettier pass so the new format:check gate starts from a clean
baseline. Formatting only — no behaviour change. Generator-owned and
vendored artifacts stay untouched via .prettierignore.
The rotation script omitted the four v1.18.1 clinical-spine note columns
(LabResult.noteEncrypted, Biomarker.contextEncrypted,
IllnessEpisode.noteEncrypted, IllnessDayLog.noteEncrypted) plus a longer
pre-existing tail (Nightscout/Polar/Oura credentials, the KVNR field, the
health-profile and cycle-day-log payloads, InsightNarrative content).
Rotation reported zero legacy rows while these still held old-key
ciphertext, so dropping the legacy key left them permanently
undecryptable (decrypt is fail-closed).
Introduce src/lib/crypto/encrypted-columns.ts as the canonical registry of
every reversibly-encrypted column, drive the rotation script from it, and
add a guard test that cross-checks the registry against every encrypted
column in schema.prisma and asserts the script references each one. A new
*Encrypted column not wired into rotation now fails CI by construction.
Marc-André Bombeck