Add an opt-in "remember this device" at the second-factor step. On opt-in
a random token is minted, set in an httpOnly+Secure+SameSite=Strict cookie,
and only its HMAC hash is stored in a new TrustedDevice table. A later sign-in
from the same browser still requires the password (factor 1); a matching,
unexpired trusted device lets the login skip factor 2 only.
The token is never accepted for step-up — a trusted-device login does not stamp
mfaVerifiedAt — so a stolen device cookie cannot reach a destructive action.
Trusted devices are listed and revocable from the security surface, are revoked
wholesale when the second factor is removed or the user signs out everywhere,
and cascade away on account deletion. A recovery-code login never trusts the
browser. Migration 0204 adds the table (and the instance-wide mfa_required
policy column that the enforcement work reads).
Record the very first device a user is ever seen on silently. The
new-device sign-in alert only carries meaning once there is an
established device to contrast against, so an empty device ledger
establishes the baseline without firing a notification; alerts begin
with the second distinct device. Registration's silent first-device
behaviour is unchanged.
Also extend the destructive-action step-up to treat a registered
security key as an active second factor, matching requireFreshMfa, so a
key-only account cannot delete or reset without a fresh factor.
Add the user-facing account-security surface in Settings:
- Active sessions (closes#64): GET /api/auth/me/sessions lists each browser
login with a coarse device label, masked IP, resolved location, the sliding
last-active stamp, and the current-session marker. DELETE the collection
signs out everywhere else (keeps the current session, revokes other sessions
and native refresh tokens, leaves API tokens alone); DELETE one revokes a
single session, scoped to the owner so a foreign id 404s.
- A sliding last-active stamp on the session, written throttled and
fire-and-forget off the request-resolution path.
- Security activity: GET /api/auth/me/security-activity, the shared read over
the audit log filtered to sign-ins, second-factor changes, password changes,
session revocations, exports, and deletions, with masked IPs.
OpenAPI regenerated for the new endpoints.
On a completed sign-in (password, second-factor, or passkey) from a device or
location not seen before, send one notification through the dispatcher cascade,
honouring the user's per-channel preferences via a new SECURITY_ALERT event
type. Dedupe on a one-way, per-user fingerprint: a SHA-256 over the userId, the
coarse User-Agent family, and a country/ASN-level geo signal, stored in the new
user_known_devices ledger (migration 0203). The first sighting of a fingerprint
alerts and records; later sightings only bump last-seen and stay silent. The
raw User-Agent and IP are never persisted — only the salted hash and a coarse
label. Registration records its device silently so a fresh account does not
alert on its own first session. The whole path is fire-and-forget and never
blocks or fails a sign-in.
Check a newly chosen password against HaveIBeenPwned through the k-anonymity
range API: only the first five hex characters of the SHA-1 digest leave the
host, the suffix is matched locally, and Add-Padding hides the bucket size.
A confirmed match is rejected so a fresh credential is never a known-breached
one; the check fails open, so an unreachable HIBP never blocks the operation.
Covers registration, password change, and admin reset. Existing passwords are
never retroactively blocked at login.
Also lands the six-locale strings for the password-breach notice and the
account-security surfaces that follow.
One-shot prettier pass so the new format:check gate starts from a clean
baseline. Formatting only — no behaviour change. Generator-owned and
vendored artifacts stay untouched via .prettierignore.
Encode the admin invite QR as a clean /invite/<hlv_token> universal-link
that the iOS app intercepts via the AASA wildcard matcher. Add the
matching web route as a thin, shape-validated redirect onto the existing
register flow, and open the path on the public allowlist so an
unauthenticated scanner reaches it. A malformed token segment is
indistinguishable from no invite — no database hit, no enumeration
oracle. The token is never logged.
A typed apiFetch wrapper owns the envelope unwrap, the ok-check and the
error read for every client call — two hundred call sites across the
app migrate onto it and a lint rule keeps raw api fetches out for good.
The legacy timezone helpers fold into the tz module and test fixtures
drop personal names.
Invites move into their own admin section with a real ledger: status
badges, expiry, uses, a redemption history of who joined when (new
redemption table, revocation is now soft so history survives), and an
honest one-time link/QR moment. The assistant self-context grows
structured fields for conditions, allergies and focus — encrypted like
the free text — merges age and gender from the profile into one fenced
prompt block, and asks up to three targeted follow-up questions that
surface as tappable chips above the coach composer. A fourth nudge
trigger gently suggests a check-up when the self-context is stale and
the coach is actually in use.
Every workflow action is pinned to a commit SHA, dependabot auto-merge
is limited to patch and minor updates behind the now-required status
checks on main, and the audit, Trivy and ESLint gates block instead of
warning. The published image finally carries its build SHA and build
timestamp so the version endpoint can prove which commit is running.
The API-token HMAC key fails closed under 32 characters, compose pins
the database minor and denies privilege escalation, and the changelog
drops working-note references in favour of neutral wording.
Harden the native auth-token surface against four confirmed findings.
- /api/auth/logout was a no-op for a bearer credential: destroySession only
clears the cookie, leaving an Authorization: Bearer hlk_ token live until
expiry. When the request carries a bearer, also flip the matching
ApiToken.revoked and revoke its paired refresh-token sibling. Cookie path
unchanged.
- A browser spoofing X-Client-Type: native was handed a 60-day refresh token
in the JSON body. Gate refresh-token issuance on a new
isCookielessNativeCaller check (no Mozilla UA, no inbound session cookie),
so the secret reaches genuine cookie-less native callers only and never
alongside a browser session. The iOS native path is unaffected; a spoofing
browser falls back to the short-lived access token with no refresh.
- Refresh-reuse revoke trusted the stored row's deviceId, so a stolen token
replayed under a fabricated X-Device-Id confined the revoke to the
attacker's own id and left the victim's family live. On a present-but-
mismatched deviceId, escalate to the user-wide family revoke (a real device
never changes its id mid-family). The matching-id and null-id cases keep
their existing scope.
- Tighten the auth:refresh rate limit from 60/15min to 10/15min, aligning the
high-value rotation endpoint with the passkey-verify tier.
Add coverage for each: logout revokes bearer + sibling, a cookie/Mozilla
caller never receives a refresh token, a device-mismatch replay triggers the
wide revoke, and the cookie-less native path still gets its refresh token.
(cherry picked from commit 14dcdefc5f40855305d8aaf573d073faebc61476)
Add an optional German insurer institution number (IKNR, 9 digits) to
the user profile, alongside the existing insurer name and KVNR. The
IKNR is a public registry identifier for the institution, not a
per-person quasi-identifier, so it is stored plaintext, matching
insurer_name rather than the encrypted KVNR column.
The profile GET echoes the field; PATCH/PUT accept it via Zod —
optional, empty string maps to null, and a non-empty value must be
exactly 9 digits (422 otherwise, no checksum). The write is built
field-by-field. /api/user/profile gains an OpenAPI registration with
the profile read/write schemas.
Migration 0102 adds the nullable column, NULL-defaulted, forward-only.
v1.5.1 patch. Fixes the silent login failure self-hosters hit on
plain-HTTP origins that aren't localhost — the bundled Docker image
runs NODE_ENV=production, so every cookie carried Secure, and modern
browsers drop those on http://10.x.x.x style origins. The session
cookie never made it back to the browser, /api/auth/me returned 401,
and the login page reloaded.
New SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE env var with three values:
- unset (default) — flag follows NODE_ENV === "production" (unchanged)
- "false" — never set (LAN / VPN / Tailscale-only opt-out)
- "true" — always set (pnpm dev fronted by HTTPS)
Shared helper at src/lib/auth/secure-cookie.ts replaces four scattered
literals across session, codex device-start, and withings connect.
Six unit cases pin the decision matrix.
OpenAPI spec generator now reads info.version from package.json so
the drift gate stays meaningful instead of catching every release bump.
Default behaviour unchanged for HTTPS-fronted deployments.
Robustness sweep, perf hotspots, full localization, coach gate
cascade closure.
- /api/dashboard/summary cold-mount 4.6 s → ~500 ms via DAY-bucket
sparkline + 60 s response cache.
- Coach API gate inventory test surfaced and closed two orphan
routes (chat[id] GET+DELETE, chat-message feedback POST).
- Cross-tz fast-path runtime guard falls back to live for users
more than ±3 h from UTC; proper bucket minting stays v1.5.
- es / fr / it / pl coverage 27 % → 63 % (~3 400 new strings) plus
three medication-cluster placeholder restorations.
- IANA timezone validation closes the User.timezone self-DoS
regression the new dashboard SQL would have surfaced.
- Unit suite 4520 → 4524.
See CHANGELOG.md for the full set.
Consolidated hotfix landing the findings from a six-axis audit
covering mobile security, UX + accessibility, code quality + docs,
README + discoverability, web performance, and mobile-deep responsive
behaviour. None of the changes break the public API or the existing
data shape; every fix is additive and SAFE under the v1.4.34.x web
freeze. Full audit reports live in `.planning/round-audit-*.md`.
Security
- Password rotation now wipes API tokens + refresh tokens in the
same `$transaction` as session revocation. A stolen iOS Bearer no
longer survives a user-initiated password change or an admin reset.
- `/.well-known/` proxy bypass tightened to an explicit-allowlist
`Set`. Stale `/api/auth/codex/callback` PUBLIC_PATHS entry dropped.
- HSTS gains `preload`. Withings host removed from the global CSP
and gated to the integration's own routes.
- `getClientIp` warns once per process on `TRUST_PROXY_HOPS`/XFF
mismatch + exposes a tagged helper for tighter universal buckets.
- Service worker rejects off-origin notification-click URLs. Offline
fallback body switched to a locale-neutral icon. Manifest gains
`scope`, `id`, `display_override`.
UX + accessibility
- i18n leaks closed on Dialog/Sheet close-X, ChartSkeleton's loading
announcement, and the notifications-section breadcrumb.
- Focus rings on bottom-nav, the More overflow button, and the
mobile top-bar user menu.
- Tap-target floor: Input / NativeSelect / Select / DateTimeInput
switch to `h-11 sm:h-10`.
- Admin chip-strip auto-scroll-into-view (matches v1.4.33 settings).
- List-page subtitles visible on mobile.
- Insights empty-state CTA vocabulary normalised so the link opens
the right measurement form (was silently failing for
BODY_TEMPERATURE / BLOOD_GLUCOSE / PULSE).
Mobile-deep
- `viewport.themeColor` reacts to light/dark mode.
- TopBar + Coach FAB reserve safe-area-inset-top / -bottom for
notched iPhones.
- Sonner toaster switches to `theme="system"`.
Code quality
- `SESSION_SECRET` dropped — the env var was documented as required
but never read by code. Three secrets, not four. Self-hosters
upgrading can delete the existing line.
- `toJson<T>()` helper consolidates seven Prisma JSON-cast sites.
- `db-compat.ts` gains a header docstring naming it the
schema-bootstrap path.
- Passkey response types adopted from `@simplewebauthn/server`;
`any` + eslint-disable pragmas drop out.
- Zero-TODO CI gate added at `.github/workflows/no-todo-markers.yml`.
Documentation + discoverability
- README rework: How-it-compares matrix, Apple Health + AI Coach
promoted to standalone Key-Features bullets, status block, latest
release + GHCR badges, OpenAPI pointer, three-secret Quick Start.
- openGraph + twitter cards now carry `images` and a
`summary_large_image` Twitter card.
- GitHub repo metadata: description tightened from 290 to 156
chars + keyword-front, `homepageUrl` flipped from a personal
tenant to the demo site, six generic / PII-adjacent topics
swapped for six high-intent ones.
- Five new user-facing docs: `docs/self-hosting/getting-started.md`,
`docs/self-hosting/reverse-proxy.md`,
`docs/integrations/apple-health.md`,
`docs/integrations/withings.md`,
`docs/integrations/ai-providers.md`.
- `docs/README.md` clarifies the docs tree as internal playbooks
vs the user-facing `docs.healthlog.dev` site.
Pre-1.4.23, a replay attempt on a single device's stale refresh token
revoked every refresh token the user owned — signing them out of every
device. The legitimate two-device case (iPad + iPhone, one drops into
airplane mode and rotates) hit the same code path. v1.4.23 scopes the
blast radius to rows matching the offending refresh row's deviceId so
only the suspect device is signed out.
Legacy tokens issued before v1.4.23 carry deviceId=null and fall back
to the wider revoke — a safety hatch we keep until the last 60-day
refresh token from the old policy expires.
The native-client routes already forward X-Device-Id on every refresh,
so the legitimate path always carries a deviceId. A missing deviceId
on a replay is itself a suspicious signal, hence the conservative
fall-through.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(crypto): G2 — encryption-key versioning + rotation CLI
Adds backwards-compatible support for ENCRYPTION_KEYS (JSON map of
{ "id": "<key>" }) plus ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID. Ciphertext format is now
"<keyId>.<base64payload>"; legacy bare-base64 ciphertext still decrypts
under the synthetic "v1" id derived from the existing ENCRYPTION_KEY.
scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts re-encrypts every encrypted column on
User / WithingsConnection / AppSettings with the active key. Idempotent —
rows already on the active id are skipped.
Why: enables zero-downtime rotation when a key is suspected leaked,
without forcing every encrypted row through a single big-bang rewrite.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): G4 — native-Bearer UA gating + rotating refresh tokens
Web callers (UA contains 'Mozilla/') keep the legacy 90d Bearer when they
explicitly opt in via X-Client-Type: native. Native callers (HealthLog-iOS,
HealthLog-iPad, n8n, Health-Connect, unrecognised UAs) now receive a 24h
access token plus a 60d rotating refresh token in the login response.
New /api/auth/refresh endpoint atomically validates + rotates the refresh
token (one-time-use), revokes the previously paired access token, and
audit-logs every refresh + revoke. Reuse of an already-consumed refresh
token revokes the entire family for the user/device — defence against a
stolen refresh token.
Migration 0025_refresh_tokens adds the table; the only DDL is CREATE
TABLE so it is forward-compatible. Down migration documented at
docs/ops/migrations/0025-down.sql.
Why: the V3 audit (still-V2-A) flagged that 90d tokens are too long for
native callers when refresh-token rotation is now table-stakes for mobile
apps. Web flows are unchanged so existing browser sessions keep working.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(infra): G3 — web/worker container split via HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE
Adds a tiny startup gate (src/lib/process-type.ts) so the same Docker image
can run as web-only, worker-only, or 'all' (default — single-container,
backwards compatible). assertSubsystemEnabled() refuses to boot the
reminder worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web, preventing accidental
double-cron when an operator splits the deployment.
docker-compose.yml ships the optional app-worker service block commented
out so 'docker compose up' keeps working out of the box; uncommenting it
+ flipping app to HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web is the only change to scale
HTTP horizontally. Healthchecks are isolated per service so neither
startup deadlocks the other; both wait on db: service_healthy.
docs/self-hosting/scaling.md walks through when + how to split.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(jobs): G1 — daily off-host encrypted backup to S3-compatible storage
New pg-boss queue 'data-backup-offhost' runs at 02:30 Europe/Berlin, dumps
each user's measurements + medications + intake events + mood entries,
encrypts the JSON under a SEPARATE key (BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, isolated
from the application ENCRYPTION_KEY), and uploads to any S3-compatible
target via @aws-sdk/client-s3.
Wire format documented in docs/ops/backup-restore.md:
magic "HLBK" || version 0x01 || iv(12) || authTag(16) || ciphertext
The worker prunes objects older than BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS (default 30);
operators are encouraged to also configure a bucket-level lifecycle rule.
Admin endpoint POST /api/admin/backup/test issues a 1-byte PUT+GET
roundtrip and returns endpoint + bucket + per-call latency. Credentials
are never returned.
scripts/restore-backup.ts downloads + decrypts a single object so
operators can verify the chain end-to-end without standing up a separate
restore harness.
Why: GDPR Art. 32 + V3 audit "data durability" — without an off-host copy
the only line of defence against a Postgres volume loss is the in-DB
DataBackup model on the same host. Separate-key isolation means a leak of
the application encryption key does not also expose every user's archive.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(multi-tenant): address review findings — rotation coverage, hard decrypt errors, web/worker gates
Multi-agent review on PR #135 caught several CRITICAL + HIGH issues that
would have shipped silent data corruption or weakened the threat model:
Encryption + rotation
- scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts: stop selecting `bugReportTokenEncrypted`
(column doesn't exist in the schema; the script crashed on the AppSettings
step). Add the three encrypted columns it was missing —
NotificationChannel.config, PushSubscription.p256dh, PushSubscription.auth
— so rotating to a new key actually re-encrypts every encrypted row.
Without this, dropping the old key id from ENCRYPTION_KEYS would leave
notification channels and web-push subscriptions permanently
undecryptable.
- src/lib/crypto.ts: refuse to silently fall back to the active key when a
legacy bare-base64 row is decrypted but no v1 entry is configured. Throws
a clear "Restore ENCRYPTION_KEY (or add a v1 entry to ENCRYPTION_KEYS)
and run scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts before removing it" so an
operator who pulled the v1 too early notices immediately instead of
hitting opaque GCM tag errors.
- docs/ops/encryption-key-rotation.md: full step-by-step + rollback note +
troubleshooting section. Spells out that rotation is a forward-only
operation and what to do if the rollback path is needed.
Web / worker split (G3)
- src/proxy.ts: refuse HTTP traffic with a 503 +
X-HealthLog-Process-Type: worker header when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=worker.
The worker container (which still runs `node server.js` for now) no
longer accepts requests, so a misrouted client gets a clear hint instead
of a partially-served response.
- src/instrumentation.ts: short-circuit before importing the reminder
worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web — avoids the noisy
"[instrumentation] CRITICAL" stderr line we emitted on every web boot.
- /api/version added to PUBLIC_PATHS so the compose healthcheck doesn't
silently 302-redirect through the auth gate (the prior wget treated the
login page as a 200 success and would never notice an unhealthy backend).
Refresh-token rotation (G4)
- src/lib/auth/refresh-token.ts: reuse-detection now revokes ALL active
refresh tokens for the user, not only those scoped to the same deviceId.
An attacker who rotated without an X-Device-Id header would otherwise
keep their family alive on the no-device branch. Defence-in-depth.
- revokeRefreshToken() also revokes the paired access token so a leaked
access token cannot outlive the refresh-token sibling that the caller
just killed (logout-on-device).
Off-host backup (G1)
- src/lib/jobs/offhost-backup.ts: drop the worker-side DeleteObject path.
Retention is the bucket's lifecycle-policy job; the worker keeps a
PutObject + GetObject grant only. A compromised worker can no longer
wipe the backup history. Per-user errors are now surfaced as Wide
Event warnings + a structured failures[] array on the report so an
operator can tell which user failed and why.
- scripts/restore-backup.ts: schema-validate the decrypted payload before
writing to disk, plus an optional --user-id=<id> flag that refuses to
proceed unless the dump's userId matches. Prevents silent
cross-tenant restores when an operator points the script at the wrong
S3 key.
Idempotency
- src/lib/idempotency.ts: the leak-guard already blocked `hlk_`
(access-token prefix); also block `hlr_` so a future caller wrapping
the new /api/auth/refresh endpoint with withIdempotency() can't
accidentally cache a freshly-issued refresh token.
Migration / schema
- prisma/migrations/0025_refresh_tokens/migration.sql: wrap in a single
transaction; switch to CREATE { TABLE | INDEX } IF NOT EXISTS so a
partial-deploy retry is a no-op instead of "relation already exists";
guard the FK ADD with information_schema lookup for the same reason.
- Schema replaces the single-column `@@index([deviceId])` with a
composite `@@index([userId, deviceId])` (every lookup also filters on
userId; the old index would never have been used). Comment on
accessTokenHash corrected to HMAC-SHA-256.
Container / ops
- Dockerfile: install tzdata + ENV TZ=Europe/Berlin so the daily
pg-boss schedule (`30 2 * * *` Europe/Berlin) actually fires at 02:30
Berlin instead of silently falling back to UTC on the alpine base.
- docker-compose.yml: tighten the healthcheck to `wget --spider` (matches
the Dockerfile HEALTHCHECK style, doesn't pipe the body), pass through
BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS so a custom retention env reaches the container.
- .env.example: document every new env var added in this PR
(HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE, ENCRYPTION_KEYS, ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID,
BACKUP_S3_*, BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS) with
comments and the all-or-none semantics for the backup block.
491 tests still green, typecheck clean.
* chore: retrigger CI
---------
Co-authored-by: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds vitest unit tests covering the four zero-coverage webhook /
monitoring surfaces external systems hit. Each test mocks at the module
boundary (per existing project pattern in src/app/api/auth/login/
__tests__/native-token.test.ts) and asserts on actual call arguments
— no test theatre.
Per-file line coverage:
- src/lib/auth/audit.ts 100.00%
- src/app/api/withings/webhook/route.ts 98.11%
- src/app/api/integrations/moodlog/webhook/route.ts 95.23%
- src/app/api/telegram/webhook/route.ts 95.12%
Test count: +61 (494 -> 555).
Three small follow-ups to the v1.3.3 audit:
- src/lib/auth/__tests__/hmac.test.ts now stubs API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY via
vi.stubEnv per test instead of mutating process.env in beforeAll, so the
variable is restored cleanly after every case (and worker leaks under
--no-isolate are gone).
- The two native-token issuance tests (password login + passkey login) now
mock hashToken as (raw) => "hashed:" + raw and assert the persisted
tokenHash equals hashToken(plaintext) instead of accepting any string.
Catches a regression where the route would hash the wrong value.
- vitest.config.mts adopts coverage.include for the full src/ tree (the
vitest 4 replacement for coverage.all=true) so untouched files surface
with 0% rather than being silently omitted, and excludes the future
tests/integration/** suite so unit-test runs stay fast.
No production code touched; suite stays at 454 green.
HealthLog — personal health-tracking PWA with weight, blood pressure,
pulse, mood tracking, medication compliance, Withings integration,
doctor report PDF export, and Dracula-themed UI.
Marc-André Bombeck