Root-cause the intake source attribution and give the HealthKit batch a
diagnostic sync-trigger, one attribution surface for both.
AuthContext now carries a read-only authMethod ("cookie" | "bearer"),
derived from the same branch that sets the wide event's auth_method. The
medication-intake route maps it to the stored IntakeSource: a Bearer
(native) call records API, a cookie (browser) call records WEB. The other
producer values are untouched — a converge onto a pending reminder row
updates through applyCanonicalSlotWrite, which never rewrites source, so
REMINDER / IMPORT / APPLE_HEALTH provenance is preserved. The value is
never client-asserted, the same posture as userId being narrowed from auth.
The dose-history ledger now selects and returns source per intake row so a
client can label how each dose was recorded. The endpoint gains its first
OpenAPI entry (path plus response schema) so the field lands in the
iOS-consumed contract.
The measurements batch accepts an optional per-request syncTrigger
(foreground | background | push). It is diagnostic-only: recorded on the
measurement.batch.ingest wide event and nothing else — never persisted,
never part of the dedup key, never an input to attribution or how a sample
is stored. Sending it or omitting it produces byte-identical row outcomes.
Regenerated docs/api/openapi.yaml.
The two vault knobs become editable where operators already work: the
app-settings card gains the per-file upload cap (MB, 1-100, mirrors the
hard server ceiling) and the default per-account storage quota (GB,
commit-on-blur with clamped conversion to bytes); the user edit form
gains the per-user quota override (GB, empty = instance default). The
admin users list now carries the override so the form can show it.
Refs: document-vault plan W3-T7
Wire the previously-unused mfaEnforced flag into a real policy. An admin can
require a second factor instance-wide (an AppSettings toggle in the General
section) or per user (a toggle in user management); the effective requirement is
the OR of the two. When required and the account has no active factor — no
confirmed TOTP, no registered security key, and no primary passkey — the user is
walled behind a forced-enrollment interstitial after sign-in, with only the
security settings and sign-out reachable until a factor is enrolled.
The gate is surfaced like the onboarding gate: a hint cookie the proxy reads
without a DB round-trip, recomputed from the database on every sign-in and on
/api/auth/me so a tampered cookie self-corrects. Nobody is locked out — the
enrollment surface stays reachable, and toggling the policy off (or the
disable-mfa CLI) is the operator's recovery path.
Adds vitest unit tests for five previously zero-coverage routes:
- /api/admin/users (GET) — admin gate, safe select shape regression, no
password-hash leak.
- /api/admin/users/[id] (PUT) — Zod validation, 404 for unknown id,
last-admin demotion guard, audit-log call shape.
- /api/admin/settings (GET / PUT) — singleton row regression, encrypted
blob never reaches the client, AES encrypt() called for VAPID +
GitHub-issue tokens, clear flags wipe encrypted columns, every
schema-allowed field round-trips through upsert.
- /api/admin/status (GET) — integration health summary aggregates umami
/ glitchtip / web-push / bug-report flags, only non-revoked tokens
count as active, encrypted blobs never appear in the envelope.
- /api/monitoring/glitchtip (POST) — IP rate-limit gate, short-circuit
when DSN is null, message/stack size caps (2000 / 20 000 chars),
upstream 5xx mapped to 502, environment fallback to "production".
All five files now land at >=80% line coverage:
- admin/users/route.ts: 100%
- admin/users/[id]/route.ts: 100%
- admin/settings/route.ts: 100%
- admin/status/route.ts: 84.21%
- monitoring/glitchtip/route.ts: 100%
Test count: 469 -> 523 (+54; my files contribute 46, the other 8 were
unblocked by re-running prisma generate in the worktree).
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Marc-André Bombeck