A medication added at 16:05 with doses at 09:00, 14:00 and 21:00 showed its
creation day wrongly in "Last 90 days". The 14:00 dose, recorded afterwards
on its own slot, read as an off-schedule take "due" at 21:00, and a 09:00
row with no time appeared as off-schedule too.
The history route minted slots only from the creation instant, so the 14:00
slot never existed for the dose to land on, while the write path, which
mints the whole day, had filed it there. The 09:00 row was the pending
placeholder the today projector mints for every slot of the day, which the
auto-miss pass stamped a day later; with no slot to bind to it surfaced as
an off-schedule row.
The ledger now mints slots over the requested window and takes the
creation instant as the floor of expected slots: a slot before it appears
only when a recorded dose claims it (a take by its window or its pin, or a
skip), and a pending or auto-missed placeholder on it is dropped. The first
archived schedule era also covers the stretch before the creation, so an
edited schedule behaves the same.
Every adherence surface tallies the same ledger with the same floor, so the
detail rates, the calendar and the ledger bar agree on that day. The doctor
report, the Coach and the adherence chips previously read the slots before
a medication existed as missed whenever their window started earlier; they
now read nothing there.
Refs #1028
Reading a stored document (suggest, summary, extract, index, chat,
reindex), scanning a lab report and turning medication text into a
schedule now answer under documentAi, labsOcr and medicationExtract. The
operator's master switch and the new reading-documents switch stop the
work and the egress; a module off for the record, a delegate inside
somebody else's record, and a missing receipt refuse with the capability
envelope. Existing no-provider codes keep their status.
The document pick and the labs pick re-check the capability for the
provider they picked, immediately before anything is sent, so a job
enqueued before a switch flipped finds no provider and falls back to the
provider-free text layer. Consent follows the document rule for all
three: any provider that leaves the machine needs an ai_extraction or
ai_full receipt, answered for the provider actually picked.
The fenced Coach chat and attachments answer under coach and documentAi.
Uploads are always stored and indexed; the background summary is only
enqueued while documentAi is open. The capability probes report the
capability beside the provider answer and keep a read offered when only
the receipt is missing. medications/extract keeps its 503 for no provider
and adds ai.provider.none, and its budget refusal gains the
coach.budget.exceeded code.
The dose-history response reported the slot window: `from` clamped
to the medication's creation, `to` the request's end. Recorded doses
are now read from the requested start and, for a dose recorded ahead
of its slot, up to that slot, so the response reported a narrower
window than the rows it carried.
`from` and `to` now report the window recorded doses were read over.
Both fields keep their shape; the OpenAPI descriptions say what they
mean.
Refs #1028
The Verlauf ledger dropped doses the full history showed. Three windows
ended too early or started too late:
- The server clamped the window floor to the medication's creation
instant and filtered recorded doses by the same floor, so a dose
logged for earlier the same day on a medication added afterwards
fell out of "Last 90 days". The creation floor now bounds minted
slots only; recorded doses use the requested window.
- A dose taken inside its window before the slot's own time is stored
on the slot anchor, which still lay past the window end. The read
horizon now reaches the latest recorded anchor within a day, without
minting later upcoming slots.
- The client pinned from/to at mount and reused them on every refetch,
so a dose added after the tab opened stayed hidden until a reload.
The window is now resolved when the request fires and only "from"
travels; the query key carries the window length instead of instants.
Refs #1028
The owner split left an operator-funded chain with no ceiling at all. Its arm
compared operator_tokens, and that counter returns to roughly zero on every
reconcile the user's own plan settled: on the 2026-09-11 evidence the shared
key answered 500 and codex served, so the counter never grew, every job
reservation was admitted forever, and a runaway client loop could write an
unbounded row. A pre-existing concurrency contract caught it from the other
side, two reservations that must not both pass one cap both passing.
reserveBudget now refuses when the owner's counter is over its cap OR the day's
mixed total is over the abuse ceiling, and a background surface gets its share
of that ceiling too, so background spend is bounded on the total and not only
under a counter the operator's key never fills. The surface is a required
argument, so the type checker enumerated every reservation site.
The hop guard learns the same lesson: an operator-funded fallback hop is now
rationed at the calling surface's ceiling rather than the full operator cap. A
job admitted under the job share could previously spend the whole 200 000 once
its chain fell back onto the shared key, which is the original defect reached
by the fallback path.
The job share applies only where the operator pays for the chain. Multiplying
whichever ceiling the chain resolved halved background generation for a
self-hoster on a local model, who costs the operator nothing.
Refusals now name the ceiling they hit and whose it was. A refusal used to emit
the day's mixed total and nothing else, which on an operator refusal is not the
counter that tripped.
The automatic generators — status and reference cards, the briefing, the
arrival reaction, the nudge, document summaries and the index backfill —
reserved against the same ceiling as the chat. On the operator's account
that meant 150-330 ledger rows a day, 172 metric generations before
06:42Z, and a ceiling already spent when he opened the chat.
Every background surface now reserves through
`resolveDailyCapFor("job", chain)`: half the cost owner's ceiling, all
job surfaces together. The interactive routes keep the whole ceiling, so
a day of background work can no longer take the user's own away.
`coach_usage` counted one number per (user, day). A turn served by the
user's own ChatGPT plan after the operator's shared key answered 500 was
therefore charged to the operator-cost cap, and the operator's chat was
locked out every morning by background work he pays for himself.
The ledger gains `operator_tokens`: the share of `total_tokens` served by
an operator-funded provider. `reserveBudget` books a reservation to the
owner of the chain's primary and `reconcileSpend` settles it against the
provider that actually served, both inside the same statements as the
total so concurrent requests can never see one counter without the other.
Every call site names its cost owner and its serving hop; the argument is
required, so a new surface cannot inherit the old blind accounting.
The eleven single-record writes answered their shared 429 with prose and
nothing else, while the envelope's own description tells a client to
branch on `meta.errorCode`. On `POST /api/medications/[id]/intake` and
`POST /api/cycle/day-logs` a second, narrower bucket can answer 429 as
well, so the presence of the rate-limit headers was the only thing
telling the two refusals apart.
All eleven now carry `record_write.rate_limited`, the catalogue lists
it, the published 429 names it, and the contract test fails if a site
stops emitting it or the sentence stops publishing it.
The same description now states what a client could not predict from
"300 requests per 60 seconds": refused requests count too, because the
check runs before the body is read.
The batch endpoints have been capped at 60 calls a minute since they
were written. The per-record siblings a naive or older client loops
over — the measurement create, the mood entry, both medication-intake
writes, a lab result, a custom-metric entry, a cycle day-log, a
vaccination, an allergy, a biomarker and an encounter — had no ceiling
at all. That is backwards from the risk: the batch endpoint is the one
a well-behaved client uses, and the unlimited path is the one a broken
loop finds.
All eleven share one generous per-account bucket, `record-write`, at
300 requests a minute. Five writes a second sustained for a full minute
is beyond any hand-driven session and any sync burst, and every one of
these routes is already wrapped in `withIdempotency`, so an honest
retry storm is deduplicated before it is counted — the bucket exists to
cut off the pathological loop, not to shape traffic. It keys on the
ACTING account, the precedent the delegable medication routes set, so a
delegate burns their own allowance rather than locking the record's
owner out of their own log.
The eleven operations publish the bucket name and the cap instead of
the generic refusal, on the shared 429 that already declares
`Retry-After` and the rate-limit triple. A test pulls the key and the
window out of the query the limiter runs and holds the published
sentence to them, so the paragraph cannot drift away from the bucket it
describes.
Two more creates the client replays out of its offline outbox ran the
handler again on the replay. A titration step carries no natural key at
all, so a lost success response left the medication with two dose
changes on the same day and the runway estimate reading off the wrong
one. A custom cycle symptom is unique on its label, so the replay did
not duplicate — it answered the 409 that uniqueness raises, reporting a
conflict the client cannot act on for a row it has no record of
creating.
Both wrap in `withIdempotency`, the composition their siblings already
ship, and both operations publish the header and the in-flight 409 so a
client generated against the contract can tell a retry is safe.
The integration file that drives the medication creates twice against
real Postgres gains the titration case: one dose-change row after the
replay, and a replayed 201 carrying `X-Idempotent-Replay: true`.
`POST /api/mcp/tokens` is deliberately not on this list. Its response
carries a freshly minted `hlk_` credential, and the wrapper refuses to
persist a secret-shaped body — publishing the header there would
promise a replay the mechanism will never perform.
The comment on the measurements list justified the tiebreaker with an Apple
Health import stamping long runs with one instant, and said the unique index
forbids two live measurements of the same type at that instant. The index is
`(userId, type, measuredAt, source, sleepStage)`, so the named example is the
one case it does block — while ties survive across `type` (the `stats:` daily
rollups), across `source` (two writers landing together) and across
`sleepStage`. Same conclusion, honest premise.
The per-day drill-down on the same route still sorted on `measuredAt` alone.
It slices in memory rather than with `skip`, so nothing drifts between pages,
but two identical requests were free to render a tied block in different
orders, and a list that reshuffles on refresh reads as data changing.
Three of the tiebreakered routes had nothing pinning the order: custom-metric
entries, the per-medication intake history (both sort arms, so the NULLS LAST
pin cannot be lost to the tiebreaker) and the mental-health assessment
history. Each now asserts the `orderBy` the way the illness day-log test does.
The two compliance engines disagreed about a deliberate skip. The dose-history
ledger (`tallyComplianceFromLedger`, behind the medication card, the dose
history, the doctor report and the Health Score pillar) has excluded a skipped
dose from the denominator since v1.15.9 — a skip is a pause, not a miss. The
schedule-anchored engine behind the dashboard tile and the adherence storyline
built its denominator from the raw expected-slot count with no skip term, so it
counted the same slot as expected-and-missed. A twice-daily day with one dose
taken and one skipped read 100 % on the card and 50 % on the tile.
The skip term now lands in the engine, not at the call sites: the day's
expected count drops the doses the user skipped, capped at the minted slots,
and a day whose every expected dose was skipped falls out of the buckets the
same way it falls out of the ledger denominator. The schedule anchoring, the
per-day buckets and the duplicate-log cap are untouched — only the skip
treatment moved. `skipped` outranks `autoMissed`, mirroring
`reconstructDoseHistory`, so a dose the auto-miss cron marked forgotten still
counts against the rate.
A new parity test feeds one fixture (twice daily, one taken, one skipped, one
missed) to both engines and pins them to the same figure, so the class cannot
come back through either side; both new cases were confirmed to fail against
the previous behaviour. The tile-engine suite gains the corrected figure.
`/api/measurements` and `/api/labs` sort on one non-unique column and
page with `skip`/`take`. When the sort key ties, Postgres does not
promise the same order for the query that fetches page N and the one
that fetches page N+1, so a client paging its own history can receive a
row twice and never receive another — silently, on both sides.
Ties are not hypothetical here. The partial unique index forbids two
live measurements of the same type at one instant, but the tie that
occurs in production is the cross-type one: a daily `stats:` rollup
posts steps, distance, flights and active energy at the identical
timestamp, and an unfiltered history list pages straight through the
block. A lab panel drawn in one sitting shares `takenAt` across every
analyte in it.
Appending `{ id: <same direction> }` to the `orderBy` makes the order
total. Same fix on the five siblings that page the same way — medication
intake history, illness day-logs, custom-metric entries, reminder
history, mental-health assessments — because the defect is the shape,
not the two routes it was found on. No wire change; `/api/sync/changes`
already ordered this way.
The fixtures seed ids in an order unrelated to insertion order, so the
assertion on order inside the tied block can only hold if the secondary
key is doing the work: with the tiebreaker removed the new file fails on
all three cases.
A refused client had nothing to back off against. `rateLimitHeaders()`
emitted `X-RateLimit-Remaining` and an ISO `X-RateLimit-Reset`, no
`Retry-After` and no cap, and only about 70 of the 199 route files that
consult a limiter attached even those two. The rest answered with a bare
prose envelope, including every endpoint an offline replay queue hits:
the four batch ingests, `/api/sync/changes` and `/api/auth/refresh`. A
first-run Apple Health import trips the 60-per-minute batch ceiling
reliably, and the only strategy left to the client was a blind backoff.
Threading headers through 129 handlers is 129 edits the next new route
forgets, so the verdict is carried instead: `checkRateLimit` records it
in a request-scoped cell and `apiHandler` dresses any 429 that leaves
without headers. A route that already built its own is left alone —
`Retry-After` is the presence test, and it comes from the same builder.
`Retry-After` is whole seconds rounding UP (RFC 9110 §10.2.3), floored
at zero. `X-RateLimit-Limit` is new and needs the cap, so the limiter
result carries it. `X-RateLimit-Reset` keeps its ISO form: it is the
wrong convention for the name, but it is on the wire today and changing
it is a decision of its own.
The cell lives in its own leaf module because 177 test files replace
`@/lib/rate-limit` wholesale with a mock factory, and `apiHandler` must
not depend on anything those factories stand in for.
The native client replays its offline outbox with the same
Idempotency-Key on every attempt, and `POST /api/medications`, the
side-effect log and the inventory register ran the handler again on the
replay: after a lost success response the account was left with a
duplicate medication, a duplicate symptom entry or a second pen in the
supply count. The dedupe on `(externalSource, externalId)` only ever
covered a MIRRORED create; a manually entered medication carries
neither field and had nothing to collapse a retry onto.
All three wrap in `withIdempotency`, the composition the batch ingest
already ships, and the three operations publish the header so a client
generated against the contract can tell that a retry is safe. Zod
parsing and `requireRecordAuth` are untouched.
An integration test drives each route twice against real Postgres and
asserts what a status check cannot: one row in the table, and a replayed
201 carrying `X-Idempotent-Replay: true`.
A `z.object()` without `.strict()` strips an unknown key and parses
clean, so a caller that misspells a field name gets a 200 and loses the
value with nothing to tell it. The worst of them was the Coach
question-dismiss endpoint, where an omitted `question` means "dismiss
all": a typo in that key wiped every pending question and answered as
though one had been dismissed.
Twenty-four inline schemas across twenty-two endpoints are strict now —
the settings toggles, the restore and bulk-delete endpoints, message
feedback, the admin user update, the onboarding acknowledgements, the
provider chain, the chart overlay preferences, the medication extractor
and the two client-side reporters.
The strip stays where it carries weight. Sync ingest, device
registration and the layout PUTs are built out of fields that shipped as
additive and optional, on the promise that a server which does not know
one ignores it; an app running ahead of the install it talks to is
routine here rather than exceptional, and refusing would turn a dropped
field into a refused batch — a year of history lost to one row, a
dashboard that will not save, a phone that quietly stops registering for
push. A read filter discards nothing when a stray query parameter rides
along, the OAuth endpoints are required by RFC 6749 and RFC 7591 to
ignore parameters they do not recognise, and an import file comes from
another version or another tool by definition. Each is registered with
its reason in a new inventory test, so a schema cannot join them without
someone making the call. That test parses the tree rather than grepping
it: fourteen of these schemas are written `z\n .object({…})` and a
`z.object(` sweep never saw them.
`sanitiseZodIssues` renders `unrecognized_keys` instead of passing it
through. Zod leaves `path` empty and puts the names in `issue.keys`, so
the sanitised issue named nothing at all and the caller was told only
that its body had failed. The names now ride a bounded `keys` field and
the message is rebuilt from them, capped at ten keys of 64 characters
and restricted to identifier characters, so a caller-supplied key cannot
echo back verbatim through the error path or into the audit ledger. The
names survive `stripValuesFromMessage` because a field name is
structure, not user-typed content.
Register `ko` in the locale list, language names, and labels, and ship
messages/ko.json so the whole UI — dashboard, settings, share views,
clinician PDF, notifications, and AI prompts — renders in Korean.
Extend the locale-parity, English-leak, plural-completeness, and copy
guard tests to cover the new locale, and update README/CONTRIBUTING to
list Korean among the supported languages.
`GET /api/medications/{id}/glp1` resolved the caller as themselves while
the POST beside it has resolved the record since v1.37.0. A manager
inside a shared record could therefore add a titration step to a
medication whose history the same path refused them: may write, may not
read. No reading of the sharing model produces that shape, and the
sibling reads on the same medication — `/inventory`, `/side-effects`,
`/cadence` — have all resolved the record at READ level for releases.
The read joins them at that level rather than at the POST's MANAGE,
because it is strictly narrower than the write already admitted. The
module was already on both reviewed allowlists, so nothing is newly
delegable; its reason line said the module was reached through the
MANAGE arm alone, which is no longer true and now says so.
The gap survived this long because a route that refuses every switched
caller is indistinguishable from a route nobody classified. Three legs
close that: a delegate scoped to medications reads the owner's titration
history and still cannot reach their own medication, a delegate scoped
elsewhere is refused, and a caller who never switched is unchanged. Both
delegate legs assert the refusal CODE rather than the status, because the
pre-fix answer was also a 403 — verified by reverting the handler, at
which point the first leg reads 403 for 200 and the second reads
`sharing.not_permitted` for `sharing.access.denied`.
Eleven routes the native client calls have never been in the registry, so
`docs/api/openapi.yaml` does not describe them. Nothing caught it:
`openapi:check` compares the registry against the YAML and never compares
the route tree against the registry, so a route registered nowhere drifts
with every gate green.
GET /api/analytics
GET,POST /api/cycle/symptoms/custom
GET /api/dashboard/summary
GET /api/environment
GET /api/export
GET,PUT /api/insights/settings
GET /api/insights/targets
GET,POST /api/medications/intake
GET,POST /api/medications/{id}/glp1
GET /api/mood/insights
GET /api/personal-records
Each contract is derived from the handler rather than from its comments:
the methods it exports, the parameters it reads with their real defaults
and bounds, the statuses it can actually produce, whether it resolves the
record fence, and which module gate it sits behind. Where the answer is
awkward it is written down rather than smoothed over — `/api/export`
answers a bare `data` key and not the standard envelope; `/api/analytics`
serves two unrelated shapes behind one query parameter and records the
health score it computes; `GET /api/medications/intake?scope=today`
projects rows before it reads them; the GLP-1 GET is not delegable while
the POST on the same path is; and `highlightInsight` on the dashboard
summary is pinned null by the handler and has never carried anything.
The intake aggregator's query and body schemas move from inside the
handler to `@/lib/validations/medication`, so the contract generates from
the same object the route parses with instead of a second copy of it. The
environmental overview gets its own route module because nothing owns that
surface. `docs/api/openapi.yaml` is regenerated separately.
The two halves of a resolved dose were split across routes: the single
intake route reset the medication's snooze but never closed the pending
dose-due Web Push reminder, while the bulk route closed the reminder but
left the snooze standing. Each path was missing exactly what the other
had. A dose drained from a device's offline queue lands on these routes,
so a synced take could keep ringing as snoozed or leave a stale web
badge behind.
The bulk route now nulls snoozedUntil once per affected medication when
a non-skipped entry actually lands, and the by-id route dispatches the
same fire-and-forget web clear the other intake paths have carried since
v1.18.4.
A medication whose slots carry different doses (a whole tablet in the
morning, a half at noon — #219) was consumed correctly but reported
wrongly: the wire shipped only the raw nullable per-slot column (clients
had to derive the inheritance), stockDosesRemaining divided by the
medication-level units alone, and no runway figure existed outside the
low-stock push.
- Every schedule now carries resolvedUnitsPerDose, resolved server-side
exactly like the intake consumption resolver.
- stockDosesRemaining divides the units pool by the schedule-weighted
average units per dose.
- runwayDays (whole days of supply under the slot-aware burn rate) rides
the list AND detail payloads; the detail GET also gains the stock
aggregates the list already had.
- The low-stock engine runs the same slot-aware math, so the push and
the wire cannot disagree; the web cards, table, and detail Übersicht
prefer the server figure over their client estimate.
- OpenAPI regenerated with the new fields.
The bearer MINT matcher demanded a literal apiToken.create( in the very
file that documents how a whitespace-wrapped call walked past its T1
sibling; it is whitespace-tolerant now, asserts a non-zero match count,
and the always-true filter beside it is gone. The T1 resolver matcher no
longer demands tokenHash first in the where object. The English-leak
guard pins a non-zero key floor per bundle so a broken walker cannot
pass as no-leaks-found. The two audit-row integration suites poll for
the fire-and-forget rows instead of sleeping a fixed span, with one
deliberately widened grace kept for the absence assertion. And the
fixture fuses with 2027 horizons (suggested-actions next-due, the
printed-expiry trio) are now-anchored so they can never age into
inverted assertions.
Add schedules[].unitsPerDose to the create/update contract with the
same whole-number-or-curated-fraction validation as the medication
level, built into the Prisma data field-by-field on both the create
and the schedule-replace path. Unwrap the nullable Decimal to a JSON
number at every medication read/write response through one shared
serializer so the wire shape cannot drift, keeping NULL as NULL to
mean inherit-the-medication-level.
Marking a missed dose taken from the Verlauf ledger showed the row flip to
taken and then fall straight back to missed, with the entry nowhere on the day
it was made for.
The ledger posts the displayed slot's own anchor as `scheduledFor` and means
"record THIS dose". The route resolved the slot by window band from `takenAt`
instead, which answers a different question: which slot the recording moment
falls into. Backfilling an older slot matches no band, so the write fell
through to the standalone insert and landed as an ad-hoc row anchored at the
recording moment. The named slot stayed unserved, the optimistic row was
overwritten by the authoritative refetch, and the dose sat under today with no
sign of where the user had put it.
A named instant that is a real slot of this medication now decides the binding,
validated against the same band anchors the "diesem Slot zuordnen" pin uses, so
an arbitrary client instant still records ad-hoc. A slot that lies ahead of the
take is still refused by the existing forward guard, so a late-morning dose
cannot consume the evening slot. When the naming and the clock disagree the
binding rests on the user's choice, so the row stores it as such and the read
ledger anchors it there rather than dropping back to ad-hoc; an ordinary
on-time take resolves to the same anchor either way and is untouched.
The tests drive the shipped POST and the shipped dose-history GET, and assert
the persisted row and the ledger read back from it.
A grant has meant one thing since it shipped: the whole record, to read or to
add to. This lays the words for the two shapes the rest of the sharing work
needs — part of a record, and management of one — while changing what no
existing grant does.
`ShareDomain` is a closed set of eight sections in `src/lib/sharing/scope.ts`,
clustered from the delegable read surfaces rather than invented, plus the
distinguished `record` for the routes that read across them. It never converts
to a `ModuleKey` and never imports one: two masks, two questions, no shared
spelling, because the day they share a name is the day somebody makes one
imply the other, and a module the owner enabled is not a section the owner
shared.
`account_grants.scope_json` is NULL on every row that exists, and NULL is the
entire record — the answer those rows were consented as, so no backfill and no
re-consent. A non-NULL value is read through one fail-closed normaliser: a
blob it cannot parse opens nothing, including a section the blob happened to
name. That is the deliberate inverse of the module preference normaliser,
which fails open on purpose; both do the safe thing with a value nobody can
read, and the safe thing differs because one answers an authorization question
and the other a presentation question.
`MANAGE` joins the level enum, ordered above WRITE so a write grant can never
satisfy it, and carries no scope at all: management of part of a record
promises a boundary that cannot survive an edit, so the invite path refuses to
write one.
`requireRecordAuth` takes the section as a second required argument. The
requirement is the lever — a delegable route without a classification does not
typecheck, so the set of classified routes cannot fall behind the set of
delegable ones. All fifty-seven modules carry theirs. The structural guard
freezes each against the production vocabulary, fails when a module's own arms
disagree, and pins a non-zero count of resolved sections so a matcher that
stopped reading the argument fails instead of agreeing with everything.
`requireGuardianAuth` is exported and reaches nothing yet. It gates on the
managed-profile marker rather than on the grant, so an adult who granted
management of their own record cannot arrive at that record's settings by any
argument about what MANAGE means: widening MANAGE would widen the record
resolver and would not touch this one. Its frozen list lands empty, with the
declaration site as the positive control that keeps "nothing reaches it" a
measurement rather than a renamed symbol.
`users.managed_profile_at` says since when a record is one somebody else runs.
A timestamp and not a boolean, for a reason the schema has to keep possible:
clearing it is the handover, and the grants and the activity trail span it
untouched.
v1.36.1 stopped a delegate changing a dose the owner had already recorded, and
it stopped them on one route. The sibling `POST /api/medications/[id]/intake`
reaches the same rows through the shared slot upsert, where the only existing
protection is against a pending sync echo washing out a recorded dose. An
explicit skip is not an echo: it fell through, flipped the outcome, and the
inventory the take had consumed was refunded on the way. So the refusal I added
was a door with the next one left open.
The rule compares OUTCOMES rather than refusing every write onto an actioned
slot, and the reason is the third case in the new contract. A double tap, an
offline replay and a retry after a partial batch all re-post the same decision,
and a caregiver hits all three; refusing those would make the feature
unreliable exactly when somebody is standing in a kitchen with a pill box. Same
decision applies, a different one is refused.
The check rides into `applyCanonicalSlotWrite` rather than sitting at the call
site, because that is where the existing row is already loaded: no extra query,
and nothing between the read and the update for a concurrent write to slip
through. A refused attempt files under the owner with the same action name the
sibling route uses, so it reaches the activity panel the same way.
Three integration cases, and each asserts the row rather than the status alone
— a 403 that had already written the flip would read as protection while being
the opposite. Watched fail: with the delegate flag forced off, the flip returns
201 while the replay and the owner's own correction stay green.
Found by an adversarial pass over the release candidate before it was tagged,
and it is the reason the tag waited.
`POST /api/medications/intake` is admitted for delegates because a caregiver
standing next to the patient has to be able to say the tablet went down. It is
an update, though, and the same body can carry two other things. Snoozing
writes `snoozedUntil` on the OWNER's medication row, and the reminder cron
skips that medication for as long as the stamp is in the future. The field
takes any future instant. So somebody with write access could stop another
person's medication reminders for years, and three things made it quiet: the
owner is deliberately not notified of a delegated snooze, the activity feed
renders the whole family as "marked a dose", and the only accurate trace was a
line in the admin audit log.
The second was flipping a dose the owner had already recorded — taken to
skipped and back, which rewrites their compliance history and refunds
inventory. The consent screen promises that changing what is already there
stays with the owner.
Both refuse for a delegate now and stay open to the owner, who is the only
person either was ever for. A refused attempt is filed under the owner and gets
its own sentence in the activity panel rather than borrowing the one for
marking a dose, because folding them together is what made the gap dangerous.
Two more from the same pass:
The consent notice named allergies among the things a delegate may add. That
left the admitted set before this release shipped, and it said so in six
languages on the one screen where somebody decides who may write into their
health record. It also omitted half of what IS admitted. The copy now matches
the frozen list, and the test asserts the withdrawal rather than only the
presence of the rest.
The banner told a WRITE delegate nothing at all — the mode line rendered only
in the read case, guarded by a comment stating that write grants did not exist
yet. This is the release that made them exist. It matters that the banner say
it, because the rule that a refused control is absent rather than disabled
rests on the banner naming the mode globally.
And a third instance of the substitution this release already fixed twice: the
BMI chart divided the owner's weights by the height of whoever was looking.
Inside a shared record it draws nothing now rather than a number belonging to
two different people.
Ten routes on `/` refused with `undeclared_mode`, which made the first page
of account sharing the only page in it that does not work. Each one now
declares a mode, per route rather than as a class.
Eight are record reads: the dashboard snapshot, the Today digest, the badge
grid, the Coach nudge signal and reminder ledger, the medication low-stock
thresholds, and the two presentation blobs. The old objection to admitting an
aggregate — a summary can carry a finding from a module the grant does not
cover — does not hold while a grant is whole-record and all-or-nothing. Every
admission site names that, so the day per-module scope lands the aggregates
are findable.
The layout routes split their verbs. Reading the owner's arrangement is right
and, for the dashboard, forced: the snapshot already carries the layout and
the client seeds the same cache cell from it, so an actor answer would put two
people's layouts in one key. Writing it is not a caregiver's job, so the PUT
and DELETE stay bare and refuse. Same on the medication list, where the stored
order names the owner's medication ids and means nothing anywhere else.
Two are actor surfaces: the UI language belongs to the person reading the
screen and must not be transplanted onto the record, and the feature-flag
matrix reads the settings singleton and no user row at all.
Also fixes a second instance of the delegate-data-under-owner-banner defect,
on the same page: the dashboard's client-side band fallback derived blood-
pressure targets and the weight range from `/api/auth/me`, which answers about
the caller, and painted them over the record's charts. Under a switch it now
derives nothing and waits for the snapshot's own bands.
The integration suite drives every admitted route with both accounts seeded,
proves the two answers differ, and then demands the owner's back.
The dose-history purge was the one destructive verb in the intake family
that removed rows outright. Both siblings, the single-event DELETE and the
bulk delete, stamp `deletedAt` and bump `syncVersion`; the purge called
`deleteMany`, so a mis-tap was final and a client offline at purge time kept
every row forever, because a row that no longer exists produces no tombstone
for the sync feed to carry. It tombstones now, scoped to live rows so a
second purge counts zero. No inventory refund: a purge wipes a history as
bookkeeping, and refunding every dose ever taken would inflate the current
container count instead.
The manual water quick-add and the lab-result un-delete both wrote health
data and reached only the wide event, which expires. Months later nothing
could answer who put a day's total there or who brought a reading back, and
with a second person able to act on a shared record that question has a
second possible answer. Both write a durable row now, named after the
neighbours they sit beside.
The refused-delegation audit comment claimed the row was written for the
owner's benefit. It is not: it is filed under the caller, it is only written
for a header refusal, and a header names an account the caller merely
asserts. Filing under that claim would let anyone write rows into any
account's activity feed by naming it. The comment says what the row is now,
and points at `recordDelegatedAccess`, which is the half the owner does see.
Two comments in the biomarker surfaces still claimed the `SetNull` foreign
key left the readings behind when a marker is deleted. That stopped being
true when delete became a "drop this and its history" action and the
confirmation copy was rewritten in six locales to say so.
The purge route gains a call-shape assertion rather than a count assertion,
because a count comes back identical from a `deleteMany`. The lab restore
route had no test at all and now has one.
The activity feed maps an audit action to a sentence. The web client posts to
/api/medications/[id]/intake, which has audited as `medication.intake` since
v1.0.0, but the map only knew `medications.intake.update` — so a delegate
recording a dose showed up in the owner's feed with no verb at all. Both
spellings are recognised now, plus `measurement.create.batch`.
A new test reads the audit actions straight out of every route that calls
requireRecordAuth("write") and fails when one has no case in the map, so the
next route to be opened for delegates cannot land a silent gap.
The delegate notification is fire and forget now, like every neighbouring
side effect. The dispatcher awaits each channel in the cascade, so one
unreachable channel added its whole timeout to the request of the person
standing next to the patient waiting for a dose to register. The integration
test polls the ledger rather than relying on the await, so nothing about the
proof weakens.
Four medication verbs resolve the record: adding a medication with its
nested schedule, recording a side effect, and both forms of marking a dose.
Editing and deleting a medication stay refused under a switch, which is the
sharpest asymmetry in the feature — a delegate can create a medication and
can never correct the typo in its dose afterwards.
The side-effect rate bucket keys on the acting account rather than the
record. That was the condition on which the verb was admitted: on the
record key a delegate could exhaust the owner's allowance and lock them out
of their own log, and could collect a fresh one by switching to another
record. Everyone who has not switched lands in the bucket they always did.
Both intake routes tell the owner who marked their dose. Everything else
downstream stays addressed to the owner and is correct there: the
cross-device sync wakes their devices, the web-push clear closes their
pending reminder and recounts their badge, the compliance rollup recomputes
their day.
Two validation breadcrumbs move to auditLog(), the only writer that stamps
the acting account.
Ten routes: the cabinet list, the medication detail, its cadence, schedule
revisions, side effects, inventory, phase config and intake history, plus the
account-wide intake list and the batched compliance read.
`GET /api/medications/compliance` is the one delegable read that spends a
quota, and its rate-limit bucket now keys on the ACTOR while everything below
it scopes to the record. Both halves matter: a delegate hammering the route
must burn their own allowance rather than lock the owner out of their own
cabinet, and switching records must not hand the same caller a fresh one. The
test reads the `rate_limits` row rather than inferring it from a 429, because
a bucket keyed on the wrong person still answers 200.
`GET /api/medications/[id]/api-endpoint` stays refused. It returns two scalar
fields and no secret, and it tells a delegate whether the owner holds a live
ingest credential and for which medication — in the same file as the PUT that
mints one that would survive revocation.
The two intake validation breadcrumbs move onto `auditLog()` for the actor
stamp. The POST arm's breadcrumb stays as it is: that arm cannot be reached
under a switch.
One resolver, both transports, on every request. The cookie path reads
the carrier off the session row it has already loaded; the Bearer path
reads the `X-HealthLog-Account` selector header, because stamping switch
state onto a long-lived token would make the credential itself ambient
authority. Two carriers converge on one function for the same reason
`resolveBearerToken` lives in one file for two wires.
Three declared modes. `requireRecordAuth("read" | "write")` honours a
valid switch and substitutes the owner as the data scope while keeping
the delegate as the actor. `requireActorAuth()` always serves the
caller's own rows and keeps working under a switch, which is what the
switcher and the banner need.
Bare `requireAuth()` refuses to run under a switch at all, with a stable
`sharing.not_permitted` code. It does not fall back to the caller's own
account, and that arm is the point of the whole design: a delegate who
believes they are reading the owner's record and is handed their own is
the same data mixing pointed the other way. A route nobody has reviewed
is inaccessible while switched, never wrongly accessible.
The grant is loaded from Postgres on the request that uses it. Nothing
memoises the verdict, so a revocation lands on the delegate's next
request rather than their next login.
Refusals do not enumerate. The denial takes no constructor arguments and
carries a fixed message, and neither branch looks the named account up:
an account that does not exist and one that granted nothing produce the
same empty row from the same query, so the two answers are identical in
bytes and in timing rather than by careful wording. The reason reaches
the audit row and the wide event and nothing else.
`getSession()` still answers who is calling. That is what leaves
`requireAdmin`, `requireCookieAuth` and `requireFreshMfa` structurally
out of a switch's reach; the row's carrier rides out beside the session
id as a value to be checked, never as a decision already made.
The selector header is a Bearer carrier only. Sent over the cookie
transport, or to an actor surface, it is refused rather than ignored. A
client that names an account on a route which never reads one has a bug,
and a correct response to a wrong expectation hides that bug until it
arrives as a support case about data that looks wrong.
Five test files gain the session shape their fixtures always claimed to
have; they were building an auth context without one.
A GET must not have side effects — api-handler.ts says so next to
READ_HTTP_METHODS, where an MCP-audience token is admitted on the safe
methods precisely because they are assumed to write nothing. Three routes
broke that: the sync handshake bumped User.lastSyncedAt, the achievements
read inserted unlock rows, and the cycle calendar fired a discarded promise
at the forecast cache so a failed write left no trace anywhere.
Each write moves to the place that causes it.
The sync checkpoint is now stamped by the batch ingest endpoints for
measurements, mood and intakes. The handshake reports it. That also fixes
the watermark: the checkpoint used to advance past a window the client had
not drained, and a client trusting it would skip that window. It can only
trail a real sync now.
The unlock rows move to a nightly achievement-unlock-sweep. The badge grid
never needed them — unlocked comes from the live metrics and the completion
date is derived — so the payload is unchanged; the rows pin that date and
carry it into the backup, and the sweep reaches accounts that never open
the page.
The cycle forecast moves to a nightly cycle-prediction-refresh. The
CyclePrediction row is not a cache of a read: it is the index the reminder
cron scans, so which reminders an account received depended on whether
somebody had opened the calendar. persistPredictionCache no longer
swallows its errors either — the job reports them.
The per-medication import and the account-wide dose-history import queued
their work through ninety near-identical lines each: row lock, stale-job
sweep, active-job refusal, job row, pg-boss send, and the fallback that fails
the row when the queue is not there. Five steps written twice drift, and the
drift shows up as an import that hangs on one surface and not the other. The
status projection moved out of these routes for the same reason; this is the
write half.
Scope is the only real difference, and it is one argument. What the two
surfaces legitimately say differently — the 409 wording, the envelope, the
kickoff audit line — stays at the call site.
The replay key had the same shape of problem in smaller form: the export
reader owned a function for it and the hand-listed body inlined the same
template. Both now call one function, with a test that pins them equal for
the same medication and instant.
A supply container went EXPIRED 30 days after its first use no matter what
kind of container it was. That window exists because puncturing an injection
pen exposes its contents and the product information caps how long the rest
stays usable; a blister of tablets has no such limit, every tablet sits in
its own sealed cavity, and pressing the first one out says nothing about the
rest. The state machine never read `containerType`, so a tablet pack opened
five weeks ago had its remaining stock written off.
The clock now keys off the container kind. PEN and AMPOULE carry it: both are
a single sealed reservoir that the first dose breaches. BLISTER, INHALER,
BOTTLE and OTHER do not: their units stay individually sealed, or the
arrangement is simply unknown, and a fixed 30 days would be a number nobody
entered. The printed expiry still applies to every kind, so an unknown
container is not an unbounded one.
`computeExpiresAt` takes the kind too, so a clock-less container with no
printed date now persists no `expiresAt` at all and the daily expire scan
never sees it.
The per-item PATCH gains a way back out: `markAsFirstUseAt` accepts null and
clears the opening date, which is the correction a container needs after the
intake hook auto-opened it from a back-dated dose.
Also drops `daysRemainingInUse`. It had no caller anywhere in the tree and
its docblock described a chip that does not exist.
The seven documented statuses are four kinds of thing, so they get four
rulings instead of one.
Taken and Skipped state a decision about a dose and each maps onto something
already recorded here — a row with a take time, and a row marked skipped. That
second mapping was checked rather than assumed: skipped is documented as a
deliberate skip and held apart from autoMissed, which is the marker for a dose
nobody ever acted on, and the compliance re-fold counts a skipped slot in its
own column and never as taken. So a deliberate skip arrives as one.
Not Interacted, Not Logged and Unspecified are absences rather than
statements. Written as taken they would invent a dose; written as skipped they
would invent a decision, because not answering a notification is not choosing
not to take something; written as pending they would put outstanding doses
from years ago in front of someone today. Snoozed describes what happened to a
reminder. Notification Not Sent is about the software. None of the five
becomes a row.
All five are refused, but each under its own name, because "the file says
nothing about this dose" and "this row is about a reminder" are different
things and a person acts on them differently. Three reasons where there was
one, each with its own sentence in six locales.
An inactive medication's history imports and the medication stays inactive.
Preserving what happened and putting a medication back on the active list are
two acts, and only the first belongs to an import.
Three things the tests said were covered and were not.
A column flipped from honoured to ignored moved both sides of its own
assertion, because the check read the verdict off the table it was checking.
The verdicts are now written out as literals, so changing one is a decision
somebody states twice.
The preview block was unreachable from an SSR-only test, so nothing would
have noticed it rendering through the outcome view — which would classify
what a preview *would* write as a success and put a tick on a run that never
ran. It moves into its own component that takes the verdict as a prop, the way
the CSV result view already does, and the preview and the archived-row report
are asserted directly.
The account-wide import narrows its in-progress check to account-wide jobs, so
an import running on one medication's page does not refuse it. Nothing pinned
that; now something does.
Also correct two comments about the earlier replay-key fault. The repeated
value in the reported file was not a dose quantity — it was copied from the
example this dialog itself displays. The field never carried identity, and the
submission was never at fault.
Marc-André Bombeck