Replace the internal "[unverified]" token the grounding guard left in a Coach
reply with the editorial elision mark […], and add a quiet muted caption
under the bubble explaining that some figures could not be checked against the
user's data. The mark holds the slot grammar-safely mid-sentence, before a
surviving unit, and inside a range; the notice carries the meaning. The withheld
count rides the existing provenance envelope (unverifiedFigures) through the
stream, persistence, and reload, and the fenced document-chat path carries a
minimal envelope so its notice survives too. New i18n key across all six locales.
Also fix an adjacent reload gap: provenanceFromJson restored only a subset of the
serialised envelope, so a persisted suggestion card, confirm action card, and the
tool trace were dropped on conversation reload despite the render layer expecting
them to survive. Restore them defensively alongside the new field.
Replace the untyped magnitude bag in the Coach numeric verifier with a typed
tokenizer and a normal-form reconciler, and narrow the outbound risk and dose
banks so correct figures and correct refusals stop being blocked while every
fabrication shape still blocks.
Grounding verifier (coach-prose-grounding.ts):
- Classify each prose number before grading — ISO/written dates, clock times,
bare years, ordinals, list markers, hyphenated time spans, ranges, percents,
thousands-separated integers, unit-suffixed measurements. Benign types are
never graded or stripped; ranges decompose into per-endpoint magnitudes.
- Grade against typed authoritative entries (value + kind + aggregation).
Sign-insensitive, canonical rounding, ratio to percent in percent space, and
minutes to hours widen the match only for an aggregate, kinded entry; kind
scoping stops a weight value grounding a blood-pressure claim.
- Thousands/decimal separators follow the reply language.
- Boundary-safe strip so a flagged token never clips a larger grounded number.
Outbound screen (outbound-screen.ts):
- Risk bank requires an asserted figure or a categorical engine result; a bare
engine or horizon mention (education/refusal) passes. Spelled-out percents
count as figures. No refusal-context exemption. EN + DE.
- Dose bank keeps a maintenance-continuation restatement, voided by any change
stem. Taper suffix fixed.
Route + fenced-chat thread the reply locale into the verifier.
Every ingest path in the product can now emit a typed, salience-classified
event into pg-boss, consumed by one worker that claims a durable per-day
reaction marker and fans out to the reaction surfaces.
The recency classifier runs at the seam, before anything is enqueued, so a
mass backfill — a multi-year Apple Health export, a provider re-sync, a
30-day catch-up — emits nothing at all. Non-salient writes are annotated and
dropped.
The worker makes no provider call by construction: it imports no provider
module, writes only markers, and enqueues nothing that is not budget-gated
downstream. Business refusals return a status rather than throwing, so a
refusal is never retried against a ceiling that will not move until the local
day rolls over.
Seams: sleep (one hook, inherited by all seven transports), workouts (the
batch route, the four provider syncs, the export importer), weight and blood
pressure (both measurement routes), labs (manual, OCR commit, document fact
commit).
The provider workout syncs could not previously tell a created row from an
updated one, so a re-sync of a recent session would have re-fired on every
poll; they now recover the distinction from the row the upsert already
returns.
Reaction lines are AES-256-GCM at rest, following the InsightNarrative
precedent, and the column is registered for key rotation. Markers are pruned
after 14 days by a daily maintenance job.
Every staged fact carried a sourceText the model echoed back, stored verbatim
as 'the exact verbatim span of the document the fact came from'. Nothing
checked that the span existed. A paraphrase, a normalised rendering, or an
outright invention was persisted and shown to the reviewer as a transcription
of their own clinical record — an anchor pointing at nothing, or at a span the
document never contained.
Treat the echo as a lookup key instead. anchorSourceText resolves it against
the extracted text (exact, then whitespace-collapsed and case-folded to absorb
OCR reflow) and stores the span the document actually carries, with its offset.
A quote that matches nothing is dropped and the fact is flagged unanchored;
vision mode has no extracted text at all, so its facts are unanchored by
construction. Rows written before this resolve to unanchored on read — their
quote is preserved but never presented as checked.
A READY row whose ciphertext will not open reports UNAVAILABLE, so the view
does not render a heading over nothing. Nothing asserted that, and removing the
degrade left the suite green.
Opening a document said "the summary is being prepared" and kept saying it.
The view had one fallback for a null summary column and used it for every
outcome: a document nobody ever enqueued, a missing vision provider, a spent
budget, a withdrawn consent, an unreadable file, a provider error, and a
summary the outbound screen withheld all rendered as work in progress.
The common case is not the screen. The background job is enqueued at exactly
one place — a fresh upload with the auto-read opt-in already on — and no
backfill reaches anything else. Every document uploaded before the toggle went
on has a null column no job will ever fill, and the view promised all of them a
summary that was never coming.
Record the outcome as `summary_state` (migration 0254, additive, defaults to
NONE which is truthful for every existing row) and branch on it. Only PENDING,
set when a job genuinely exists, may claim generation is running. NONE,
WITHHELD and UNAVAILABLE each say what happened and offer to generate one.
The withhold keeps its rule and loses its dead end. Blocked prose is still
never shown and never stored — only the fact of the refusal is kept, and it is
no longer terminal, so asking again re-runs the gauntlet. That was the original
intent; leaving the column null defeated it, because null read as "generating"
and the guard meant nothing would ever overwrite it.
The on-demand summary now persists what it produces. It is the only repair path
for the documents the job never ran for, and re-deriving the same paragraph on
every open costs a provider call for nothing. Generation is still only ever a
click — nothing runs because a view rendered. Transcription stays session-only.
Also drop the "read by AI" line from the detail footer.
The Coach SNAPSHOT was spliced into the prompt bare. Its JSON leaves are not
all server-computed: lab analyte, panel and unit names are transcribed by a
model out of an uploaded PDF and stored verbatim as the biomarker name, so a
hostile document chooses those strings. The about-me block has been fenced
since v1.16.1; extend the same pattern rather than adding per-field escapes.
- Move the fence markers and the wrapping primitive into a shared data-fence
module. Content is scrubbed against every known marker, not just its own
pair, so text in one block cannot forge another block's boundary.
- Fence the SNAPSHOT with an explicit data/instruction frame.
- Fence the OCR text handed to the document extractor; the previous
'OCR TEXT:' label was a label, not a boundary.
- Sanitise analyte, panel and unit at the labs source, which feeds both the
snapshot prompt and the labs_read tool result, and the medication label in
the adherence storyline.
- Capture a ---REMEMBER--- sentinel as proposed rather than active. It was
the only model-driven write with no confirm step, and the reminder recall
block fed it back into every later turn. Proposed reminders are already
excluded from that block and already carry a confirm control.
The coverage check hung off generateInsight, whose only caller runWithFallback
has no production caller left -- every live surface routes through
runRawCompletionWithFallback instead. The admin quality dashboard was reading a
metric nothing emitted. Widen the input to the structural shape both payloads
share and call it from the comprehensive post-parse step, so the annotation
reflects real generations.
Writing the locale tests found three gaps the English-only banks hid: Polish
verb suffixes fell outside the ASCII word class, a trailing word boundary after
an accented character never closed, and German subordinate clauses put the verb
last so the natural phrasing of a dose instruction never matched. The payload
collector also skipped legacy bare-string recommendations entirely.
The summary is model prose about the document and is contractually
descriptive-only, but it was returned to the browser verbatim with no guard.
Screen it against the insights contracts and let each caller apply its own
policy: the on-demand route replaces the text with a short honest statement
because a user is waiting on it, while the background job persists nothing --
its updateMany is guarded on a null summary, so a stored refusal would stamp
the document permanently with no path to regenerate.
Transcription stays unscreened by construction. It reproduces the user's own
document verbatim; a discharge letter that says to increase a dose is the
prescriber's instruction, and censoring it would delete the user's own record
from their own view. Locale is required on the summary input type and absent
from the transcription input so a caller cannot silently fall back to the
English banks.
The outbound safety screen ran on the Coach only. A dose-change imperative or
a fabricated clinical risk score written onto a per-metric, biomarker or
derived-score status card persisted as that day's cached assessment, while the
identical sentence in the Coach was caught and replaced -- the only transform
between provider and persistence was whitespace normalisation.
Move the pattern banks into a shared screen that takes the reader's locale.
The old signature took no locale, so the dose-refusal and risk-score contracts
had no enforcement for fr/es/it/pl even though the ground rules ship in all six
contract files. Banks now cover all six locales and each screen runs the
reader's bank plus English, since a provider often answers in English
regardless of the language directive.
Status cards withhold on a trip: serve the deterministic stub and persist no
model text. Nobody waits on a background-generated card, and persisting a
refusal would pin it to the card for the day.
When the auto-AI-read opt-in is on, a freshly uploaded document is summarised
once in the background and the encrypted summary is stored and shown on the
document detail view.
- A background step runs after upload alongside the existing content-index and
thumbnail steps. It generates a short (3-4 sentence) plain-language summary
only when the user's documentsAutoAiRead opt-in is on (that flag is also the
standing AI-egress consent), skips a document that already has one, and
no-ops when no vision provider is configured. It reuses the same provider
resolution, egress-consent re-assertion, and AI-budget reserve/reconcile
helpers as the on-demand route; a provider error refunds the reservation and
never fails the upload.
- The summary is stored encrypted (summaryEncrypted Bytes) with a
summaryGeneratedAt timestamp on inbound_documents, registered for key
rotation, and returned decrypted in the document detail response.
- The on-demand transient summary route is unchanged.
Gated by the same consent, budget, and module checks.
Two directions, folding the vault and labs pipelines into one linking path
without weakening either manual flow.
Vault document → lab values (auto-stage). After the per-document auto-index
job transcribes a stored document, a lab-looking document is run through the
same inbound extraction the manual "Extract" button uses, but the facts land
PENDING for the existing human review — nothing is committed. Gated on both
the documents and labs modules plus the auto-AI-read consent gate the
auto-index external path already uses; a text-structuring pass over the
transcription the index just produced, so no second vision call is spent. The
staging is a guarded STORED→EXTRACTED transition, and a keyword heuristic (or
an explicit LAB_RESULT kind) keeps an arbitrary photo from burning a call.
Everyone without the opt-in keeps the manual extract button.
Lab scan → vault. A lab report scanned in the labs area is now also filed
into the Documents vault (kind LAB_RESULT) through the existing upload —
encrypted at rest, EXIF-stripped, thumbnailed, sha256-deduped — and the
committed labs are cross-linked back to it with the same APPROVED-observation
provenance the manual vault → labs path produces. Text-mode scans keep the
image on-device and file nothing. Idempotent: a re-commit inserts no rows and
links nothing new, and the vault dedupe means no duplicate document.
Owner-scoped and module-gated on both sides; the cross-link is best-effort so
it never fails the authoritative write.
Replace the scalar document_id discriminator on a coach conversation with a
CoachConversationDocument join table and a sticky documentScoped flag, so a
conversation can be grounded on several stored documents at once while the
prompt-injection fence stays intact across the data-model change.
The fence is re-established at both enforcement points, fail-closed:
- Client: resolveCoachSendTarget routes any turn on a fenced conversation (or a
fresh chat with staged attachments) to the new /api/insights/chat/fenced
endpoint; the fenced body is strict and never carries scope, guided-question,
or prefill hints.
- Server: the tool route fetches with documentScoped:false AND 404s when the
fetched row still carries an attachment (flag/join drift), emitting a
fence_drift audit alarm. Document text now enters an LLM prompt in exactly one
code path — the fenced pipeline — with no tools and no health snapshot; a
module-graph test pins that the tool loop is unreachable from it.
The fenced turn fences each document separately with a server-built, scrubbed
header line (title and filename are untrusted text), runs a per-document egress
consent check on the single picked provider, and grounds numerically over the
live attachment union only. Attachments are capped at five documents and 192 KB
of combined text with honest truncation.
Attach and detach ride dedicated endpoints: attaching validates the document is
owned, live, indexed, and within cap, then flips the conversation fenced (the
one legal, privilege-reducing transition, audit-logged); detaching removes the
document but never clears the flag. The document-sheet chat keeps its public
wire contract and shares the same fenced pipeline over the join.
Migration 0245 adds the join table and the flag, backfills every legacy
single-document chat into a one-attachment fenced conversation, and drops the
scalar column in the same transaction — no dual-truth window.
The bundled Skia x64 build (document thumbnails, scanned-PDF rasterization)
uses AVX2 instructions; on an x86-64 host without them — Celeron/Atom-class
NAS CPUs, pre-2013 Xeons, VMs masking CPU flags — the first canvas call is an
uncatchable SIGILL that kills the process and crash-loops the container (live
incident: a Synology DS1520+, exit 132 ~18 s after every boot, reported with
kernel traps and the correct root cause in hand).
The renderer is now gated on a one-time CPU-feature check before the module
ever loads: linux/x64 requires the avx2 cpuinfo flag; arm64 and non-Linux are
unaffected; unreadable cpuinfo fails open. Behind a closed gate, thumbnail
generation and PDF rasterization take their existing fail-soft paths (vault
shows type icons; PDFs read as text) and the boot-time thumbnail backfill
skips enqueueing. NATIVE_CANVAS=off|on overrides detection, documented in the
env example and whitelisted in compose.
Dashboard layout changes take effect immediately: the save now evicts the
locale-keyed home-screen snapshot it previously missed, so a re-ordered or
toggled tile set no longer reverts to the prior selection for the SWR window.
A share link built with a narrowed report-section selection now serves exactly
that selection. The stored selection is the grouped export shape; the shared
view read it through the flat parser, which dropped every grouped toggle and
fell back to the full defaults — an over-share against the owner's choice. The
view now folds the grouped shape down faithfully. Documents-only shares were
never affected.
Hardening: the shared-document download path now sanitises the filename
identically to the owner download path, and thumbnail generation re-checks the
pixel ceiling after decode so a malformed image that slips past the header
sniff still cannot exhaust the worker.
Document vault shows a per-file thumbnail: a server-rendered preview,
downscaled and re-encoded so location and camera metadata are dropped,
served only to the file's owner over an authenticated request. Files that
cannot be previewed keep their type icon. Generation is bounded — a header
sniff refuses an over-large source before decode, so a crafted image cannot
exhaust the preview worker.
Also folds in admin-managed central AI access — an administrator connects
one access on the server and each user opts in or keeps their own provider,
off until an admin turns it on — and trims the redundant documents-search
caption and per-file searchable/read badges.
Render a small JPEG preview for each stored document and show it at the
card's leading edge, falling back to the kind icon when none exists.
- Generate previews in the background on upload (new document-thumbnail
pg-boss queue) plus a boot-time corpus backfill for existing documents;
upload never blocks on or fails because of it. Images are downscaled via
@napi-rs/canvas, a PDF's first page is rasterised then downscaled, every
other type is skipped. Generation never throws.
- Store the preview encrypted at rest in a 1:1 DocumentThumbnail side table
(migration 0236) so the list/detail queries that omit the original blob
never drag the preview either. Same AES-256-GCM string codec + fail-closed
decrypt as the content index; wired into the key-rotation walk.
- Serve it through an owner-scoped GET /api/documents/inbound/[id]/thumbnail
(auth + module gate + userId-scoped query + fail-closed decrypt), always
image/jpeg + nosniff + private, no-store; 404 on miss. The card renders an
authed lazy <img>, onError falls back to the icon.
- Add hasThumbnail to the document DTO so the card only fetches a preview
that exists.
Also drop the "search looks inside your documents" caption from the overview
(the index-all prompt stays) and the per-card searchable marker; both were
noise. Remove the now-unused i18n keys across all six locales.
Introduce an operator-level ChatGPT-subscription (Codex) credential that the
operator connects once and shares server-wide, plus a per-user switch to route
AI egress through it.
- Schema (migration 0235): three encrypted columns on AppSettings for the
operator's central Codex access/refresh tokens and the ChatGPT-Account-ID
claim, plus expiry/connected-at/status; a per-user useCentralCodex flag
(default false). Register the new encrypted columns in the rotation registry
and script.
- Resolution: add the admin-codex chain type; append it to a user's resolved
chain only when they opted in AND the operator connected it. Tokens refresh
server-side against the singleton row (CAS-style), same primitives as the
per-user Codex path.
- Budget: bill an admin-codex primary against the operator cost cap, not the
user plan — it drains the operator's account.
- Consent: admin-codex is server-managed external egress, gated by the existing
consent machinery (self-snapshot and document surfaces alike). No existing
consent path is weakened.
- Document order: rank admin-codex with the subscription tier (last), so the
document class stays local-first.
- UI: admin device-code connect/disconnect card (cookie-only admin routes) with
honest copy on account pooling, shared rate limits, and training-by-default;
a per-user opt-in switch shown only once the operator has connected it, off by
default, behind a one-time honesty confirm.
- i18n across all six locales; unit tests for the chain type, budget cap,
consent gate, vision capability, and document order; a mocked e2e for both
the admin connect surface and the per-user switch.
The central credential's tokens are encrypted at rest and never returned to a
non-admin API; the opt-in only takes effect once the operator has connected the
shared account.
The bundled (Turbopack) copy of pdfjs-dist failed its render path in the
standalone image with a bare Error, so a scanned PDF on a non-Anthropic
provider fell back to 'PDF scanning needs a Claude vision provider' — while the
identical un-bundled module rasterizes the same document fine (verified in the
container end to end on the real document). Externalize pdfjs-dist and
@napi-rs/canvas so the server loads the real modules, and hoist pdfjs-dist to
the top level in the image so the runtime import resolves. Also log the render
error message (not just its name) and drop the redundant 'not saved' note from
the document summary panel.
Only Anthropic accepts a native PDF block; codex and other image-only-wire
providers dropped it. Add a bounded, best-effort server-side rasterizer that
renders a PDF's pages to JPEG images those providers read as ordinary image
input, so a scanned/image-only PDF is legible on the auto-read path.
- @napi-rs/canvas promoted to a direct dependency; its musl prebuilts + the
pdfjs loader pinned into the standalone trace (next.config.ts)
- rasterize-pdf.ts: lazy pdfjs import (keeps DOMMatrix out of the eager chunk),
first 10 pages, 1600px long edge, JPEG q80, never throws
- prepareVisionInput rasterizes a PDF for a non-Anthropic vision provider and
keeps the native PDF block for Anthropic; the document capability reports
PDFs readable via raster so the UI offers the read
The auto-index-on-upload job resolved over the cost-first app-wide chain
(codex priority 1) and gated with the chain-based consent check, so a
pure-codex chain could silently egress a freshly uploaded document to the
subscription backend on upload. Reconcile it onto resolveDocumentVisionProvider
(local-first, codex last) and govern external egress with the
documentsAutoAiRead opt-in: a local pick always runs (no egress); an external
pick runs only when the toggle is ON, otherwise the job stays strictly local.
This tightens the default and makes the opt-in path deliberate.
Add the documentsAutoAiRead per-user Boolean (migration 0231, default
false) that authorises ambient AI reading of uploaded vault documents.
OFF by default keeps the vault local-first for every self-hoster.
- schema column + migration 0231_documents_auto_ai_read
- documentAutoReadEnabled(userId) read helper
- GET/PATCH /api/auth/me/documents-auto-ai-read toggle route; the ON
write mints an ai_full consent receipt for the audit trail
- the document consent gate short-circuits an external pick when the
toggle is ON; a local pick stays ungated and OFF still requires a
receipt for any external egress
The local content-extraction reader imported pdf-parse at module top level.
pdf-parse pulls in pdfjs, whose module evaluation references the browser-only
DOMMatrix global; on the server that reference throws during chunk
instantiation and takes down every route sharing the chunk — the document
list, upload, and search among them, so old and new documents alike fail to
load. Move the parser to a lazy import() inside the extraction function
(surface type kept as a type-only import). Verified under plain Node that the
lazy path still extracts a real PDF text layer, so local indexing is
unaffected.
Add GET /api/documents/inbound/capability (document provider order + vendor-blind
egress class), repoint the vault capability hook to it, and show a per-egress
notice in the detail sheet before a document read leaves the machine. Cover the
document provider order, the egress consent gate, and the notice with tests.
i18n x6 + OpenAPI regenerated.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck
Add a document-class provider resolution that demotes external/train-by-default
providers below local (local -> BYOK no-train API -> operator key -> codex last)
and a pick-based document-egress consent gate that requires an active receipt
for any external provider. Coach/insights keep the app-wide cost-first order.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck
Surface the content-search index's source (vision vs local extraction) on
the list + detail DTO so the vault UI can tell an AI-read document from a
locally-indexed one. Threads the source through both read paths and the
serialisers, regenerates the OpenAPI contract, and adds a narrowing helper
for the free-String column.
Index a document for content search automatically the moment it is stored,
instead of requiring a manual index action. A fire-and-forget per-document
job runs an AI-first decision tree: when a vision-capable provider is
configured and consented, transcribe the stored original (rich, handles
scanned PDFs and images), budget-reserved exactly like the interactive index
route; otherwise fall back to server-side text-layer extraction via pdf-parse
(no provider, no egress, milliseconds) so content search works at a baseline
even with no AI. Budget exhaustion, a provider that cannot read the file
(a text-layer PDF on a non-Anthropic account), and provider errors all fall
through to the free local path rather than leave a document unsearchable.
Both paths write the same blind, encrypted content index (AES-256-GCM text +
opaque HMAC token tags) — nothing readable at rest. The local path adds the
'local-pdf' / 'local-ocr' source values (free String column, no migration).
Server-side OCR for scanned images and scanned PDFs is left as a documented
seam. Pin pdf-parse + pdfjs-dist into the standalone trace so the wasm text
extractor ships in the runtime image.
P2-1. The list GET now issues a documentContentIndex lookup and unions a
content-token OR branch when a search term is present, so the existing route
test gains the mock + the third OR branch in its where assertion. Fix the
backfill test's findFirst mock signature under strict tsc.
P2-1. Unit tests for the token scheme (whole-word match, stopword drop,
de-accent, no plaintext at rest, subkey follows the active key), HKDF subkey
derivation, the suggest route (drafts only, writes nothing, provider-gated),
the summary route (session-only, budget+audit only), the index route (vision
transcribe→upsert, text posts OCR text, provider/local-OCR gated), and the
backfill (no-provider/no-consent no-op, indexes, budget-reached resume).
P2-1-T2/T3/T4/T5/T6.
- assist.ts + [id]/suggest: one provider call proposes a { title, kind,
documentDate } filing draft over the stored original or browser-OCR text.
Runs the full extract gauntlet (module → provider → consent → rate-limit →
budget) but writes nothing — never touches the fact rail or status.
- describe.ts + [id]/summary?mode=summary|text: session-only summary or raw
transcribed text. Descriptive only, no diagnosis; persists only the budget
ledger + audit.
- content-index.ts + [id]/index: normalise → tokenise (de-accent, stopword
drop, whole-word) → HMAC-SHA256 under an HKDF-derived subkey → store the
token array plus AES-256-GCM ciphertext of the text. Vision path transcribes
via the provider (consent + budget); text path indexes posted local-OCR text
(no egress). Gated on the existing AI consent — no new per-user toggle.
- crypto.deriveSubkey: HKDF-SHA256 purpose-bound subkey off the active key.
- list search now unions title/filename ILIKE with a GIN-accelerated
whole-word content-token match; DTO gains hasContentIndex.
- usage gains assistAvailable + contentIndex { enabled, indexedCount,
totalCount }; detail gains hasContentIndex.
POST /api/documents/inbound now runs the policy layer end to end: bounded
read aborts at the admin-set cap (413 + meta.reason=fileTooLarge with the
limit), magic-byte classification (415 + unsupportedType), per-user quota
checked inside the insert transaction over every non-purged row —
tombstones keep counting, so deleted bytes are never invisible weight
(413 + quotaExceeded with the figures), sha256 dedupe (a same-bytes
re-upload answers 200 + meta.duplicate with the existing live row; the
partial unique index closes the race), an honoured Idempotency-Key, the
binary2 codec on write, and optional episodeIds[] pre-linking narrowed to
the caller's live episodes.
GET stops fetching the encrypted blob per row (omit: contentEncrypted —
a 50-row page dragged up to 50 × cap ciphertext before), learns kind[] /
episodeId / year facets on top of q/from/to, and returns conditionLinks +
servingClass on every DTO via one grouped link query (no N+1). PATCH gains
replace-set episodeIds with the same 404-shaped refusal for a foreign
episode. The extract path decrypts through the codec dispatcher.
The document-kind labels gain REFERRAL in all six locales.
Tasks: W1-T5, W1-T6, W1-T7.
The policy module (src/lib/documents/upload-policy.ts) is the one source of
truth for what the vault accepts and how it serves: Class A (PDF/JPEG/PNG/
WebP/GIF) renders inline; Class B (Office OOXML+CFB, text/CSV/Markdown/RTF,
TIFF, HEIC/HEIF, XML/JSON) is stored verbatim and leaves the origin only as
an opaque attachment download; executables, HTML/XHTML/SVG, and generic
archives are denied. Detection is magic-bytes first — the wire Content-Type
is never trusted; containers (ZIP → OOXML, CFB → legacy Office) and
extension-only text formats gate on the filename plus a no-NUL heuristic.
resolveDocumentLimits() reads the admin-tunable per-file cap (clamped to
the hard 100 MiB ceiling — single-shot GCM and bounded in-memory reads are
load-bearing past that) and the quota (user override ?? instance default).
crypto.ts gains the binary2 codec: encryptBytes/decryptBytes do AES-256-GCM
over raw bytes with a versioned key-id header, skipping the base64 detour
(−33 % at rest, one fewer copy). Same fail-closed discipline as the string
codec. The store dispatches per row on the explicit contentCodec column:
new uploads write binary2, pre-existing base64v1 rows keep decoding
byte-identically, and an unknown codec throws instead of guessing.
Exhaustive unit coverage: every accept class from real magic-byte fixtures,
every deny case (incl. the PDF-with-HTML-head, SVG-as-image, and
ZIP-renamed-docx polyglots), header-matrix source of truth, limit clamping,
codec round-trips both ways, crossed-codec and unknown-codec fail-closed.
Tasks: W1-T3, W1-T4.
The insights alert cards computed medication compliance with the naive
`schedules.length × days` denominator, so a fully-adherent weekly
injectable read ~14% and fired a false low-compliance alert (and a paused
medication mis-fired the same way). Route the alert path through the
canonical `calculateCompliance` engine like every other compliance
surface — pause eras, schedule revisions and dose windows honoured.
Document confirm: committing a numeric observation against an existing
biomarker silently replaced the stated unit with the catalog's, with no
conversion — a stated "6.1 mmol/L" against a mg/dL marker committed
"6.1 mg/dL". Reject on a unit mismatch (fail closed) so the user
reconciles on the review screen, the same posture as the unit-required
guard.
Wire grip strength, waist (with waist-to-height) and pain into the
briefing feature set and the grounding allow-set so the clinical-depth
signals reach the daily narrative; the mental-health screeners stay
excluded by construction.
Biomarker detail: fall back to a generic description for catalog-less
markers, and keep the heading + description with a retry on the error
state. Collapse the medication External-API and Lifecycle groups by
default. Re-enable the insights scroll-to-top regression and assert the
shipped main-content reset.
Align the EN haemoglobin/haematocrit display names to British spelling.
Drop the redundant `(userId, deletedAt)` index on inbound documents — a
strict prefix of the new three-column index. Trim the dead
MedicalDisclaimer variants to the one live `dataPosture`. Move the
crisis-resources card off the retired amber tint to a calm
destructive-subtle border. Add a registry invariant asserting every
biomarker signal key resolves to a real catalog slug.
Default documentDate at store time. A store-only upload no longer lands
with a NULL filing date: when the client omits one, default it to the
upload day so the column is always set on a stored row. The library list
sorts, groups, and range-filters on the same effective date the UI shows,
so undated uploads no longer mis-sort under nulls-last, break date-group
headers, or fall through the range filter. The date stays user-editable
and may be cleared back to NULL via PATCH.
Block re-extraction once any fact is APPROVED. A partially-confirmed
document stays EXTRACTED, which the CONFIRMED guard does not catch;
re-extracting would delete the approved facts (severing the committed
record's provenance) and re-stage them as PENDING, letting a second
approval duplicate the committed lab / condition / medication. The
extract route now refuses with 409 (documents.inbound.alreadyPartlyConfirmed)
when approved facts exist; the user must finish reviewing or discard first.
RFC 5987-encode the original-download filename. The Content-Disposition
now carries both an ASCII filename= fallback and a filename*=UTF-8'' value
so a non-ASCII name survives intact; the stored set is inline-safe by
construction, so the dead attachment branch is removed.
Add a light per-user rate-limit backstop to the original-read, PATCH, and
DELETE routes (generous; self-DoS only — the routes are owner-scoped).
Lean the list counts: tally facts for the whole page in one grouped count
instead of materialising fact-id rows, and exclude REJECTED facts from
factCount. Extend the documentDate index with deleted_at to cover the
list scan. Document the deliberate plaintext-title PHI tradeoff at the
column and the store site.
Invert the inbound-documents surface from an OCR inbox into a document
library: a file can be stored without any AI provider, and extraction
becomes an opt-in action on top.
- Migration 0222: add `title` + `document_date` columns, a
`(user_id, document_date)` index, the richer kind taxonomy
(lab/imaging/prescription/insurance/vaccination), and a STORED status
made the column default. The status enum is recreated so the new value
can be set as the default within the migration transaction; kind values
use ADD VALUE. Nullable columns, no backfill.
- POST /api/documents/inbound is now store-only: bounded multipart read,
magic-byte MIME sniff, AES-256-GCM at rest, persisted as STORED with no
provider/consent/budget call and no egress.
- POST /api/documents/inbound/[id]/extract carries the relocated
extraction gauntlet (resolve provider, consent, rate-limit, budget, run,
reconcile, stage facts) against an already-stored row; absent a provider
it 422s the enhancement only and leaves the stored document intact.
- PATCH /api/documents/inbound/[id] edits title/kind/documentDate
field-by-field, owner-scoped by session userId.
- GET /api/documents/inbound gains search, kind filter, documentDate
range, sort, and keyset pagination via the parameter-bound query builder.
- Extend the validation schemas + DTO, regenerate the OpenAPI contract,
and add route tests for the store/extract/edit/list paths.
The inbound-document store keeps the uploaded doctor letter encrypted at
rest (InboundDocument.contentEncrypted, AES-256-GCM), but there was no way
to read the original back — the decrypt helper had been dropped as unused.
- Restore decryptDocumentFromBytes in the document store, fail-closed on a
bad / missing key id.
- Add GET /api/documents/inbound/[id]/original: owner-scoped (userId-narrowed
query), module-gated, returns the decrypted bytes with the stored MIME
type. A PDF / image is served inline so the browser can render it; other
types download as an attachment. The filename is sanitised before it
reaches the Content-Disposition header. The bytes are PHI — never logged,
never served cross-user, and a decrypt error fails closed (500) rather than
returning ciphertext. Cache-Control is private, no-store.
- Surface a 'View original' action in the document review screen.
- Document the route in the OpenAPI registry and regenerate the spec.
- Cover the route with a test: owner-scoped success, attachment fallback,
404 for another user's document, and fail-closed on decrypt error.
i18n: viewOriginal across all six locales.
Marc-André Bombeck