- select active canonical recurrence slots instead of rebuilding from tick day
- scope intake suppression and dedup metadata to the occurrence local date
The 15-minute reminder tick computed windowDuration ONCE per schedule
as windowEnd - windowStart, then applied that SAME span to every
timeOfDay slot in the schedule. For a single-dose schedule that span
genuinely is the one slot's window, but for a multi-dose schedule
(e.g. windowStart=08:00/windowEnd=18:00 with timesOfDay=[08:00,18:00])
it silently gave the 08:00 slot a 600-minute grace before even
entering ORANGE phase — ten hours nobody configured — while an
identically-intended single-dose schedule with a narrow legacy span
(08:00-09:00) correctly escalated on schedule but then had only a
30-minute radius for a logged-but-late dose to suppress its reminder.
Same misapplied field, opposite-looking symptoms: one medication
silently never reminded, the other kept escalating despite being
logged as taken.
resolveSlotWindowDurationMinutes resolves each slot's duration
independently, checked in priority order: an explicit per-dose
doseWindows entry for that exact timeOfDay (the actual per-dose rule
set in the dose-window editor) > the schedule's reminderGraceMinutes
(documented for exactly this purpose but never actually read by the
reminder tick until now — the write path already reads it via
graceToleranceMs) > the same default an unconfigured "point" dose
gets everywhere else in the app, bounded by the gap to the nearest
sibling slot so two doses can never share a window. A single-dose
schedule with neither override keeps the exact legacy windowEnd -
windowStart behaviour, unchanged, for backward compatibility with
schedules that predate the per-dose doseWindows system.
The core property this restores: a dose's resolved window never
depends on how many sibling doses share its schedule. Two
identically-configured doses now resolve identically regardless of
whether one of them happens to have a second dose elsewhere in the
day.
Full suite (18k+ tests) passes with no regressions; 13 new tests
cover both real-world cases that surfaced this (a single 08:00-09:00
schedule and a twice-daily 08:00/18:00 one) plus the sibling-
independence property directly.
Thirty-three suites read a registrar as source text and matched
`boss.work` next to a queue constant. They now match `createAndWork`,
and the seven schedule tuples that grew a `cronIsTheRetry` third element
assert that element rather than accepting any arity — a guard that
accepts more than it did before is a guard that notices less.
Two negative assertions were tightened while they were open: the
"has no cron" checks on the arrival and workout-insight queues ended at
a literal `]`, so a cron added WITH send options would have slipped past.
The behavioural repairs carry the real change. Handlers that resolved to
undefined now resolve to their outcome, so the assertions name the counts
instead of asserting nothing. The reconcile tick's test said it swallows
a failure instead of throwing; it reports a failed outcome now, and the
test says that, with the comment pointing at the retryLimit that carries
the old anti-retry-loop concern.
All 104 bindings across the five registrars now go through createAndWork,
whose handler type is (jobs) => Promise<JobOutcome>. The forty-two inline
handlers return what they did. A handler that falls off the end no longer
compiles, and the healthlog/job-handler-outcome rule refuses a bare
boss.work( anywhere under src/lib/jobs except the one module that owns
the wrapper. The rule's header states its own limit: it catches the
omission, not a handler that claims ok:true after a swallow.
Retry policy, reviewed queue by queue because the rethrow changes what
runs, not only what is visible:
- Twenty-one cron passes carry cronIsTheRetry (retryLimit 0). They are
the retention DELETEs, the OAuth-state prunes, the hourly maintenance
sweeps and the nightly per-sample drain — every one of them a
statement that will fail identically a second later. pg-boss defaults
to two retries with no delay, so converting them without this would
have run the same doomed statement three times a night. The next tick
is the retry and it arrives with the whole gap as backoff.
- The policy rides on the schedule, not on createQueue: create_queue()
ends in ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING, so a queue-level default would be
inert on every already-running instance.
- Everything else keeps its retries deliberately. A TLS probe, an
off-host upload, a restore drill and a provider poll all fail
transiently, and the reminder ticks only fail at job level when the
pass itself could not run.
Sixty-two handler functions across twenty-four modules now resolve to a
JobOutcome instead of undefined. The counts they already wrote to their
wide event ride out in `did`, so a run that deleted nothing and a run
that could not run are no longer the same shape.
Three rules decided each conversion:
- a catch that swallowed becomes jobFailed, keeping its warning line;
- a catch that already rethrew keeps its throw, because the throw
already fails the job and rewrapping it buries the stack;
- a fan-out pass is judged on the pass. One account's revoked grant
belongs on that account's integration ledger, not in a queue-wide
failure that retries the whole cohort, so per-leg failures ride out
as a users_failed count — visible for the first time.
The retention cleanups are the behaviour change worth naming: every one
of them used to warn and return, so a purge that had not run for weeks
looked like a purge with nothing to do. They fail now. Their registrar
sets retryLimit accordingly in the commit that converts the bindings.
JobFailure carries the thrown error's stack; without it every one of the
101 queues would report the same runJob frame.
Six provider syncs returned a bare count, which narrowed their failures away:
a Nightscout window in which every SGV row was refused by a constraint
returned the same 0 as a quiet night, and an Oura or Polar run whose
collections all failed returned 0 too. The routes then answered 200 with a
count and the settings card drew a green tick over it.
Every sync now reports what it imported AND whether any part of it did not
land, and the route resolves the outcome server-side so the web card and the
native client cannot disagree. Google Health keeps its 502 for a run that
failed and wrote nothing, but a run that failed after writing some resources
is now a partial rather than a discarded result. The labs OCR commit carries
the same resolved outcome.
A pg-boss handler signalled success by falling off the end of a function.
Every binding in this tree resolved to undefined and nothing read the
value, so a handler that caught an error, logged a warning and returned
was indistinguishable from one that finished its work: pg-boss marked
both completed and the failed-job readers saw nothing.
JobOutcome makes the completion a value the handler has to construct.
runJob turns ok:false into a reported, rethrown failure so the queue's
retry policy applies. createAndWork is the one binding path; its handler
type is (jobs) => Promise<JobOutcome>, so a handler that returns nothing
no longer compiles.
The type cannot make a handler honest — jobDone() after a swallow still
compiles. It converts omission into commission, which is the smaller and
far more reviewable class.
The per-phase "already sent today" guard read the Telegram message
ledger, and that table is written only when a Telegram send succeeds. A
user on email, APNs or ntfy never had a row, so the 15-minute tick
re-derived the same overdue slot and sent it again on every pass — around
fifty mails for a single missed dose.
Anchor the guard in `push_attempts` instead, the ledger the daily
briefing and the illness escalation already use. Two properties are
deliberate: the anchor is stamped for every dispatched slot regardless of
what any channel returned, because keying it on a delivered push would
re-open the flood the moment a channel starts failing; and it is stamped
before the dispatch, so a crash costs one phase's notice rather than a
repeat every quarter hour.
The key carries the schedule id and the slot's real HH:mm alongside the
phase and the local date. Both are load-bearing: two legacy
single-window schedules on one medication share the empty first-class
time-of-day, so a coarser key would collapse the evening dose into the
morning one. The tests assert the other direction too — the next phase
still escalates, and the next local day starts clean.
The Telegram ledger keeps its message-tracking duties; it is no longer
the dedup key. Anchor rows carry a sentinel channel and stay out of the
operator's notification health and diagnostic reads, which count
deliveries, not decisions.
`medication.clientManaged` and `measurementReminder.clientManaged` mean
the iOS client schedules the reminder locally, so the server should not
push it. That is what the OpenAPI description, the settings copy and the
iOS contract all say. What the crons did was skip the dispatch entirely,
so a user who flipped the switch also lost Telegram, ntfy, webhook,
email and Web Push — channels they may well read on a desktop while the
phone holding the local schedule sits in a drawer.
Move the gate into the dispatcher's channel loop, where it applies to
APNs and nothing else. The skip is not counted as an attempt, so
`dispatched` keeps meaning "something reached the user", and it stays
countable: the same wide-event keys the crons emitted are emitted here,
plus a `skipped` row in the push-attempt ledger.
The Vorsorge path is the sharper half. It suppressed every channel and
then advanced `nextDueAt`, which dropped the reminder out of the
preventive-care card and out of the daily digest: a reminder that never
reached anyone was recorded as handled. The advance now happens only
where it always belonged, after a dispatch that a channel actually
delivered. When nothing delivers, the reminder stays overdue and visible.
A sync failure the classifier bucketed as `transient` had no exit. The park
test read `kind === "persistent"` and the persistent streak anchor was only
ever stamped by a persistent failure, so a streak could run for a thousand
attempts with the persistent counter at zero, the state frozen at
`error_transient`, and no ladder it could climb. `transient` is a hypothesis
about retryability, and the classifier defaults every timeout, 429, 5xx and
unrecognised response to it precisely because the wire cannot tell a reboot
from a permanent break. That default is right for one attempt and wrong for a
thousand: an unbroken streak retried hourly for a full day has refuted it by
experiment. Record it as `persistent` from there, which feeds the park ladder
that already exists — 48 h of unbroken failure end to end before an
integration stops attempting.
The counters could not accumulate anyway. `IntegrationStatus` is keyed
(user, integration) while Withings runs four legs on four crons and WHOOP four
resources on four more, and a success cleared the error, every bucket, the
streak anchor and the state whatever leg had recorded them. The ECG tick at
:41 wiped what the sleep tick recorded at :15 — including a reauth park — so
the strike ladder was reset several times an hour and the card painted a green
"connected · 12 minutes ago" over a data class that had stopped arriving. A
success now clears only what it is entitled to clear.
Two columns carry it: `failing_since_at` dates the streak, `failing_leg` names
its owner. The migration backfills the anchor for rows already in an error
state so a connection broken for weeks escalates on its next attempt rather
than restarting its clock.
The nightly tombstone purge asked for `deleted_at IS NOT NULL AND deleted_at
< cutoff` and the audit-log purge asked for `created_at < cutoff`. Neither
predicate had an index behind it: every deleted_at index in the schema is
partial on IS NULL, the live-rows predicate, and every audit_logs index leads
with user_id or action. Both purges planned a sequential scan and then paid
index maintenance per removed row, in one unbounded statement, on a
connection carrying statement_timeout=60000. Past a certain backlog the
statement aborts, the transaction rolls back, nothing is purged, and the next
night runs the identical statement against the same rows. The mechanism that
gives deletion a horizon could not close on the instances that needed it.
Migration 0277 adds the indexes the predicates ask for; the three tombstone
ones are partial on IS NOT NULL, so on a healthy instance they cover only the
tombstones and shrink as the purge drains. The purges now walk the backlog in
batches of 5 000 by primary key, capped at 200 000 rows a run.
Both handlers used to swallow every error into a wide-event warning and
return, so pg-boss recorded a successful job either way: a purge failing
every night looked exactly like a purge with nothing to do. They now rethrow,
and a run that stops at the cap records that a backlog remains.
Mood has been a first-class module here for a long time, with entries,
structured tags, rated factors and notes. The bridge to the external moodLog
service had nothing left to add, and its Settings card was withdrawn in
a56e6fe61 on the promise of a dedicated removal. This delivers it.
Removed: the hourly `moodlog-sync` queue, cron and handler binding; the
inbound webhook and its shared-secret handling; the reverse push and its four
call sites; the pull-sync module; the per-user credential routes and the
instance-wide toggle; the entry on the `/api/integrations/status` envelope,
the `IntegrationKey` union, the cadence map and the display-name table; the
boot-time secret rotation pass; 22 message keys per locale.
Migration 0271 drops the five `users` credential columns and
`app_settings.mood_log_global`, clears the ledger row for the provider, and
deletes the retired pg-boss schedule so no cron keeps enqueuing work no
handler drains.
Mood data is untouched. `mood_entries` is not named anywhere in the migration
and cannot be reached from it: the dropped columns carry no index, constraint
or foreign key, and `mood_entries.user_id` references `users(id)`, not any of
them. Rows the bridge imported keep `source = 'MOODLOG'`, and every read path
- list filter, source badge, exports, backups - still resolves that value.
`src/lib/validations/moodlog.ts` held the native mood-entry schemas alongside
the bridge's own; it is now `validations/mood.ts` and carries only the former.
Fitbit re-scores a night after the fact, and the per-segment externalId carried
a positional index plus the stage label. Both moved on a re-score: renumbered
segments minted fresh keys, the previous scoring's rows stayed live because
nothing swept them, and the night total counted both copies from then on.
Key the segment on the stable session anchor plus its own start instant
(`<logId>:sleep:<segment-start>`), and add the replace-by-window sweep every
other segment-writing provider already has. The two ship together with the
natural-key rescue that has been sitting in the Fitbit upsert unused: the sweep
tombstones the old-keyed rows first, so the rescue re-keys those very rows in
place instead of inserting a parallel copy or losing the insert to
`skipDuplicates` against the natural unique index.
A one-shot repair queue re-reads the bounded sleep history once per connection
so no user has to do anything; it stamps `sleepRepairedAt` (migration 0270) only
on a clean run, never touches the sync watermark, and reports the rows it
removed. Nights older than the 365-day backfill horizon keep their old keys and
whatever duplicates they already hold — they can no longer gain new ones.
Alongside: `fitbitGet` now honours a `Retry-After` inside a 120 s cap by waiting
once and retrying once, and fails fast above it so a long hold cannot starve the
rest of the poll cohort or outlive a job's expiration. The measurement upsert
skips a write whose payload is unchanged, which takes the hourly overlap off the
delta feed for every Fitbit resource.
These four were the only connected providers with no way to ask for a
sync; they ran on their scheduled pass and nothing else. Each gets a POST
sync route on the hardened Fitbit and Google Health template: session auth,
a 5-per-minute per-user bucket, and a fixed 502 on failure. No body and no
full-sync flag, because none of the four entry points has a full-history
arm to call. Polar goes through the shared legs entry point so both legs
run with the attribution rules built for them.
The Nightscout error arm is the one that matters: a base URL carries the
API token as a query parameter, so the caught message can hold the user's
secret and never reaches the response body. The classified failure is
already on the ledger, recorded with the provider's own redaction.
Connecting also starts the first sync now. The poll handler has accepted a
single-user payload since it was written and never had a producer, so a
fresh connection sat empty for up to an hour waiting for the schedule. The
Oura and Polar callbacks and the Nightscout connect route enqueue one
targeted job each, best effort, with the hourly tick still the safety net.
Strava needs none: its callback already enqueues the history backfill,
which covers the recent window.
The four poll-queue names move into their own module so a request-path
caller can name a queue without dragging the whole worker handler graph
into the request bundle, following the backfill-queue precedent. Creation,
scheduling and handler binding stay in the registrar, and the dead-queue
guard follows the declarations.
Restructure the Polar vitals sync from a single Promise.all over the five
collections into a Promise.allSettled over a per-collection spec, each closure
fetching and mapping so a throwing mapper is contained exactly like a failing
fetch. The healthy collections import; a failing one is recorded once as a
partial failure that names it, without stamping success and without rethrowing,
so a single unavailable data type — SpO2 on a watch without the sensor, a
higher-tier cardio-load read an account lacks — stops blanking recharge, sleep,
and activity on every tick.
A 401 is now a per-collection failure classified reauth_required, not a
whole-leg throw; the write-path escape still surfaces unmarked for the poll
boundary to record once. Mirrors the shipped Oura isolation, minus the
token-refresh leg Polar has no path for.
Add an hourly ECG catch-net cron so a watch-only account with no scale pulls its
recordings without a webhook: the queue was registered and bound but never
scheduled, and the handler now grows a cohort arm that walks every connection on
a payload-less tick, mirroring the activity and sleep handlers.
Make the activity and sleep write paths honest. A swallowed activity batch-write
fell through to the success stamp — a green pill over lost data, green forever on
a persistent write bug; it now records a transient failure and refuses the
stamp. A reconcile throw out of either sleep transaction propagated past the
stamp and was swallowed by both callers, leaving neither success nor failure
recorded; the source now records a transient failure and rethrows so the cron
and webhook paths stay honest without changing their warn-and-continue
behaviour.
Port the hard-fail ledger the Fitbit transport already carries. A revoked WHOOP
grant makes every resource short-circuit and return zero rows without throwing,
so the cycle read as clean: it stamped success, un-parked the reconnect state,
reset the failure streak, and the hourly cohort hammered the dead refresh token
on every tick. Record the three dead-token null-return paths on the ledger and
fold that verdict into both drivers — the full orchestrator and the per-resource
cron path that runs most often — so a dead-token cycle refuses the success
stamp and the park holds.
Return an imported-plus-failed verdict from the orchestrator and gate the
history backfill on it: an interrupted full-history walk now throws for a
pg-boss retry instead of being stamped complete, and a connection parked at
reauth returns without burning the retry budget. Thread the same verdict into
the one-shot sleep-timeline backfill.
Also catch a write-path throw on both drivers so a persistent measurement-write
failure surfaces on the status ledger instead of leaving a stale-green pill, and
widen the cycle overlap to the seven-day re-score window the other collections
use so a late-revised day's strain and energy are re-fetched rather than
stepped past.
Introduce a recorded-marker primitive on the integration ledger so a provider
that records-then-rethrows a sync failure is not recorded a second time at the
poll-cohort boundary, while an unrecorded escape (an Oura or Polar write-path
throw, or any future path) lands on the ledger exactly once, correctly
classified and redacted by the source that owns it. Without the marker a
boundary-blind recorder would double-count the failure streak and could persist
a Nightscout token-bearing URL into the stored error.
Give the poll-cohort factory a required per-provider failure recorder and wire
one for Oura, Polar, Nightscout, and Strava.
Nightscout now counts only freshly inserted readings instead of insert plus
re-confirm (the inflated count fired the reminder trigger every tick), records a
transient failure and skips the success stamp when some rows fail to write, and
emits the measurement-arrival spine for its inserts. Correct the docstring that
promised a far-history backfill that does not exist: the hourly window imports
about 48 hours and nothing deeper.
Strava now enqueues its history backfill at connect time, mirroring the WHOOP
and Fitbit callbacks, so deep history imports within the hour instead of waiting
for the next worker restart.
Parity suite proves a Polar exercise and an equivalent Strava activity map to a
downstream-indistinguishable Workout row (sport bucket, start instant, duration,
distance, calories, HR, null-vs-zero). Regression guard asserts the exercises
request hits GET /v3/exercises with no userId path segment. Dedup ladder tests
mirror the Strava suite (overwrite-in-place, Apple+Polar twin collapses, Polar
above Strava). Composite test proves a failure in one Polar leg leaves the
other leg's result intact on the shared ledger. Defensive-shape tests cover the
four flagged assumptions: numeric-vs-string id, UTC-offset composition (positive
and negative), bare-array-vs-paged body, and a 403 scope error as a soft error.
Refs #568
Pull the athlete's exercises from the stateless GET /v3/exercises list (last
30 days of uploads, no transaction, no userId in the path) and upsert each into
the Workout table as source POLAR, keyed on (userId, source, externalId) so a
re-fetch or Polar-side re-analysis overwrites in place. A new table-driven
sport map normalises the raw Polar sport labels into the canonical
WorkoutSportType bucket at ingest, mirroring the Strava/WHOOP mappers; the raw
labels and training load ride metadata for provenance.
The exercise leg rides the existing hourly polar-sync cohort tick alongside the
vitals leg, with independent attribution on the shared polar ledger: each leg
is attempted and records its own failure, and neither can mask the other's
result. Polar takes its place in the workout source ladder between Withings and
Strava. No migration and no OpenAPI change: MeasurementSource.POLAR and the
full workouts source enum already exist.
Refs #568
The persistent mood-rollup writer bucketed on the UTC truncation of
`mood_logged_at` and ignored the canonical per-row `MoodEntry.date`
label. Every coverage-miss fallback keys on `entry.date`, so the rollup
tier disagreed with the fallback and with the day the user logged the
mood: a late-evening or after-midnight local mood landed on the wrong
calendar day, and the label shifted the moment the boot backfill flipped
a user from the live fallback onto the rollup tier.
Key every bucket off the stored `date` label instead — DAY, WEEK, MONTH
and YEAR — with `bucket_start` set to that label's UTC-midnight instant.
The rollup is now byte-identical to the live `entry.date` fallback and
timezone-independent by construction: DST correctness stays where it
already lives, in `moodDateKey` at write time. No consumer changes, no
schema change; every rollup reader already formats `bucket_start` as a
UTC day label.
Migration 0269 empties `mood_entry_rollups` so the boot-time
full-backfill worker re-mints every user's buckets under the corrected
keying; the worker now deletes-then-refolds so it is self-cleaning
against any row left by an older instance. While the table is empty,
reads fall back to the live `date`-keyed walk, which was already
correct, so there is no window where a wrong day is shown.
Closes#588. The ZIP extractor decompressed export.xml synchronously
into one in-memory buffer, then wrote it with a blocking writeFileSync
— on the same event loop the web server runs in the default
single-container deployment. A real multi-year export could pin the
Node main thread for minutes, freezing every other request, while
briefly holding roughly 2x the decompressed size in heap. A process
that died mid-extraction never reached the failure path, so the
ImportJob row stayed stuck in "unpacking" with "0 rows imported"
forever and no error ever surfaced.
Extraction now streams through zlib's async inflate into a file write
stream, moving the decompression work off the event loop and bounding
memory to the chunk size. The zip-bomb ceiling moves from
inflateRawSync's maxOutputLength to an equivalent byte-counting
transform on the streamed output.
Orphan-ImportJob reconciliation used to run once, at worker boot.
docker-compose's restart:unless-stopped does bring a crashed worker
back, but a fast restart can land before the stuck row's heartbeat
goes stale or pg-boss stops reporting the job as live — and because
the boot-time pass never re-runs on a healthy worker, that row was
never revisited again. A 15-minute cron now re-runs the same reconcile
so a genuinely abandoned import converges to a visible failure instead
of staying silently stuck.
The disable-route suite only ever supplied a cookie-shaped context, which is why
the token-id-as-session-id defect was invisible to it. It now covers both arms
and asserts the credential shape handed to the session revoker, plus that the
elevation is spent before the teardown and not spent when the factor code is
wrong.
The spine dispatches a generator-free enqueue; the worker resolves the
provider. Five gates stand in front of it in ascending cost order — both
modules on, ten-minute duration floor, a hard count of four a day in the
user's own timezone, an input hash over the deterministic evidence, and the
token ledger inside the shared status chokepoint. Each refusal returns a
status rather than throwing, because retrying against a ceiling that does not
move until midnight is an unbounded loop.
The detail route only reads: a workout with no row serves null and renders no
card, which is every workout that predates this and every re-synced one. An
undecryptable paragraph degrades to no card rather than failing the page.
Today gains two additive-nullable digest fields. `justIn` names the day's
newest arrival while it is still news — under three hours old, after which the
record is simply current rather than new. `reactionLine` carries a single
generated sentence about that arrival and replaces the hero's standing lead for
the rest of the local day, never appending a second paragraph, so the hero stays
one lead line tall and nothing below it shifts.
Nothing here polls. The open dashboard picks the change up on the cadence it
already runs — a state change, not a notification.
The generated sentence is bounded before it is written: the arrival spine's
unique row per kind per local day IS the throttle, the worker re-checks the
same claim before spending, and the reservation is reconciled on every exit
including each failure path. Without a provider, without consent, or against an
exhausted budget the row stays line-less and the surface falls back to the
deterministic lead — the chip and the provisional-to-final flip are unaffected.
The chip's time string is formatted client-side after mount; `justIn.at`
crosses the wire as an ISO instant so the server never renders a local
wall-clock time the browser would disagree with.
A step-up elevation minted from the account password satisfied the fresh-factor
routes. That is a second-factor bypass: a stolen token plus a known password
could rotate the recovery codes — which take no factor in the body — and then
spend one of them to disable the second factor outright. The web has never
allowed that chain, because a password login does not stamp mfaVerifiedAt.
The method is now an authorisation input. Only totp, webauthn, and passkey
satisfy a fresh-factor gate, which is exactly the set of ceremonies the web
stamps a session for; password reaches what a plain cookie session reaches and
stops. The mint gains TOTP and security-key arms so a TOTP-only account can
still manage its factor natively, and the response says which reach it bought.
The gate also returns a discriminated context. session.id meant a session row on
one arm and a token row on the other, and the disable route passed the token id
to a session-scoped query — excluding nothing, so it deleted every browser
session and revoked the caller's own device login. The transport is now in the
type and the compiler refuses the confusion.
Redemption splits into validate-then-commit so a 429, a 422, or a wrong code no
longer burns a proof against a five-per-fifteen-minute mint ceiling. The claim
is UPDATE ... RETURNING, so the statement that decides is the one that reports.
The mint is transactional behind a partial unique index. Sign-out-everywhere and
both password-reset paths clear elevations. The status read drops to plain
requireAuth — it carries no credential material — and every mutation stays gated.
Every ingest path in the product can now emit a typed, salience-classified
event into pg-boss, consumed by one worker that claims a durable per-day
reaction marker and fans out to the reaction surfaces.
The recency classifier runs at the seam, before anything is enqueued, so a
mass backfill — a multi-year Apple Health export, a provider re-sync, a
30-day catch-up — emits nothing at all. Non-salient writes are annotated and
dropped.
The worker makes no provider call by construction: it imports no provider
module, writes only markers, and enqueues nothing that is not budget-gated
downstream. Business refusals return a status rather than throwing, so a
refusal is never retried against a ceiling that will not move until the local
day rolls over.
Seams: sleep (one hook, inherited by all seven transports), workouts (the
batch route, the four provider syncs, the export importer), weight and blood
pressure (both measurement routes), labs (manual, OCR commit, document fact
commit).
The provider workout syncs could not previously tell a created row from an
updated one, so a re-sync of a recent session would have re-fired on every
poll; they now recover the distinction from the row the upsert already
returns.
Reaction lines are AES-256-GCM at rest, following the InsightNarrative
precedent, and the column is registered for key rotation. Markers are pruned
after 14 days by a daily maintenance job.
The per-document summary job is enqueued at upload time and no-ops while the
documentsAutoAiRead opt-in is OFF. Nothing ever re-enqueued it, so the switch
only applied to documents uploaded AFTER the flip — a user who filled the vault
first and opted in later had documents that would never be read, and the
setting looked inert.
A genuine OFF->ON transition now schedules one bounded catch-up pass over the
user's un-summarised documents. It grants nothing of its own: it only enqueues
the ordinary summary job, which still re-reads the opt-in, re-asserts the
per-document egress consent and reserves the daily token budget. The pass
itself re-reads the opt-in first, so a toggle flipped back OFF before it runs
egresses nothing.
Bounded by an id-cursor walk capped at 200 documents per pass (a summary is a
provider call, unlike the local-compute thumbnail backfill). Idempotent at four
levels: the trigger fires only on a real transition, the per-user singleton
collapses a double toggle, the candidate set excludes summarised documents, and
the summary job skips one that already has a summary.
The reconcile is the only thing that carries a policy onto a queue that
already exists, so whether it ran is the difference between the previous
release working and doing nothing on an upgraded instance. It reported
that through workerLog at info level, which is deliberately silent - so
the intended deploy signal could never appear, and the change was not
verifiable in production.
Emit a boot wide event instead, on every boot including the no-op one:
a reconciled count of zero on a later boot confirms an earlier boot
already migrated everything, whereas silence is indistinguishable from
the reconcile never running.
The per-connection backfills and per-user one-shots take 'exclusive': a
worker restarting during a heavy account's multi-hour pass used to append
another identical full-history job per restart, because the discovery
predicate only stops offering a job once it has completed.
The morning-digest refresh takes 'exclusive' so its user+localDate key
becomes a real at-most-once-per-morning contract; a wall-clock
singletonSeconds window cannot express a local date.
The per-document queues take 'short' -- they have no discovery pass to
re-converge, so only queued duplicates may be collapsed or a re-process
after a content change would be lost.
Leave the environment-fetch queue on 'standard' and say why: its
explicit-range backfill deliberately sends without a key, so any policy
would silently merge two different requested ranges into one.
Every queue was created under pg-boss's default 'standard' policy, under
which no partial unique index constrains singleton_key. The singletonKey
each enqueue site passed was therefore inert and de-duplicated nothing.
Add a per-registrar policy table that records the decision and the reason
per queue. The recompute queues take 'short' (collapse only while queued,
because the handler re-reads the bucket at run time); the per-user
backfills take 'exclusive' (queued or active, because a second concurrent
run is pure duplicated work and discovery re-enqueues while work remains).
createQueue only applies a policy on first provision, so also reconcile
the stored policy for queues that already exist -- without that the tables
would be correct on a fresh database and inert on every running instance.
The per-metric assessment pipeline typed every locale as `de | en` and
narrowed on the way in, so a French, Spanish, Italian or Polish account
never reached a prompt with its own locale — the output-language directive
could not fire and the reader got English, or German where the binary
defaulted that way.
Widen `SupportedLocale` to the six locales the UI ships and replace the
narrowing binaries with one validating `normalizeLocale` that passes a
recognised locale through unchanged and defaults an unknown value to
English. The status-generate payload, status batch, status cache,
comprehensive generation, the pre-generate warm passes and the forced-warm
handlers all carry the full locale now.
Fix the collapse sites that discarded it: the warm enqueue on the
comprehensive route and the pregenerate route, the nightly batch cron, and
the forced-warm job handler — the last two defaulted to German outright.
The deterministic derived-score templates and the previous-context block
ship de/en bodies only, so they route through `instructionLocale` (German
for German readers, English otherwise) while the prompt names the reader's
own language.
The web OIDC flow ends in a session cookie the Bearer-transport native
client cannot consume, so on an OIDC_ONLY instance the iOS app had no
sign-in. Add a native leg: the app opens the login URL with
client=native and its own PKCE S256 challenge inside an in-app browser;
the callback resolves identity exactly as before, then mints a one-time
handoff code and 302s to the fixed compiled-in scheme
healthlog://oidc-callback (or hands back the existing MFA ticket when
the account has a second factor). The app exchanges the code plus its
PKCE verifier at POST /api/auth/oidc/native/token for the standard
native token bundle.
The return address is a compile-time constant — no redirect_uri
parameter and no env allowlist, so the open-redirect / scheme-hijack
class is removed by construction. The native flag and app challenge
travel only inside the AES-256-GCM state blob, so a network attacker or
the IdP cannot flip a web login into a native one. The handoff code is
256-bit CSPRNG, HMAC-hashed at rest, 90-second TTL, single-use via a
guarded consume; a failed PKCE check burns it. A replay of a consumed
code revokes exactly the pair the first exchange issued. The token pair
never rides a URL; only the opaque code or the MFA ticket do. The SSO
login can never satisfy requireFreshMfa step-up — the transport is
Bearer and step-up is cookie-only.
Adds the OidcNativeHandoff model (migration 0252), the token-exchange
route, a daily cleanup sweep, and the OpenAPI entry.
The webhook-driven per-resource sync advanced the resource cursor but never
touched IntegrationStatus, so lastSuccessAt stayed frozen at the last full
poll — the Settings 'last synced' pill and the integration-status read
reported stale for up to an hour after a webhook had already landed last
night's data. Stamp recordSyncSuccess per resource, reusing the full sync's
exact success guard (a genuine import clears the error state; a 403 soft-skip
leaves the looks-healthy window closed).