Forty-two guard files carried their own comment stripper, block comments
first in one non-greedy pass, so a /* inside a line comment opened a
block that hid the code after it, and the stricter copies hid code
behind a /* inside a string, which every e2e route glob has. They all
read through the shared stripComments now, and it scans the way the
parser does: strings, template literals and regular expressions keep
every character, a comment inside a template expression goes, and line
numbers are kept. A parity test strips every source file both ways,
with the scanner and with the TypeScript parser, and fails on the first
that differs.
No guard reports anything new. Each one fails when the stripper returns
nothing; three of them passed on an empty file and assert that the code
they ban is read at all now.
api-handler.ts held two modules: the route wrapper and thirteen guards. The
guards now live in lib/auth/guards/, one module per family (the caller,
the acting-account carrier, the record modes, the cookie-only helpers, the
fresh-factor and recent-proof gates, the Bearer elevation, MFA management).
api-handler.ts keeps the wrapper and re-exports every guard, so it stays the
one public entry and no route changes its import.
The bodies move verbatim; only the version prefixes of moved comments are
dropped. The structural guards that read the auth layer now find the module
that declares a guard by name (helpers/auth-guards.ts) instead of a fixed
path, and a new guard holds the entry: nothing outside the folder but
api-handler.ts imports a guard module.
Every write has gone to insights_cached_text_encrypted since 0411, and
the boot-time free-text backfill sealed the rows written before it.
Migration 0430 drops insights_cached_text and the backfill index that
served it. A host that skipped the intervening releases loses only a
cache of model output; the next warm writes a fresh, sealed payload.
The cipher module now reads and writes the sealed column only, the
backfill job loses its insights step, and consent withdrawal, the wipe
plan, the backup plan and the session projection follow the schema.
Backups never carried the column, and restore ignores unknown account
settings; a round-trip test now proves an old backup naming the field
still restores cleanly. The access guard pins exact counts for where
the sealed name may appear. Fixtures, the demo seed and the demo
migration script seed the sealed column instead of plaintext.
The session lookup and the Bearer resolver loaded the whole users row on
every authenticated request, including the profile picture bytes, the
cached briefing text and every stored integration credential. Both now
select SESSION_USER_SELECT, a named allowlist of the small columns the
request path reads, and so does the owner load for a switched record.
The few routes that need a credential or a large column read it
themselves at the moment of use: the factor verifiers load the password
hash and TOTP secret, the profile response loads the insurance number,
and the snapshot read loads the cached briefing text. A structural guard
holds the lookups to the projection and keeps every Bytes and
secret-shaped column out of it.
Marc-André Bombeck