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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Marc-André Bombeck
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41c6eea2a1 |
fix(backup): stream every large section of an uploaded backup
The admin upload streamed only the measurements while it checked a file, so a document-heavy account copy was held whole in memory and an upload of a few hundred megabytes could take the process down. The sections a reader takes an element at a time are now named once (BACKUP_STREAMED_SECTIONS in streamed-backup.ts): measurements, intake events, mood entries, documents and ECG recordings. The upload reads its file through readStreamedBackup like the restore and the preview, and the restore drill and the restore script use the same key set. A behavioural test pushes a 271 MB document-heavy file through the real upload route and fails when the heap grows with the file. The stream guard now asserts that every reader goes through the shared reader or key set and that no file declares its own. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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849748c4cd |
fix(backup): bind new off-host objects to their key and account, and cap what an uploaded backup may inflate to
Off-host objects are now written as envelope version 4: the header names the off-host key by fingerprint, and the object's key in the bucket (<date>/user-<id>.json.enc) is authenticated as GCM associated data, so a copy moved to another account or another night no longer opens. Objects of versions 1 to 3 still read. BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_PREVIOUS_KEYS (comma-separated, on the compose whitelist and in the env manifest) keeps retired off-host keys readable, which is the rotation path the off-host key did not have. The admin backup upload counted the bytes that arrived and none after the gunzip, so a small gzip could expand without limit into the JSON scanner and take the app down. The inflated bytes are now held to 100 times the compressed bytes read (at least 256 MB, at most 4 GB) and a file past that is refused with 413 before anything is stored. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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237acc0002 |
fix(backup): export, upload and restore a large account as streams
An account of 1.25 million measurements could not export its data or be restored from any backup (#1031). Measured in a 1 GB container: - The full export and the passphrase export built the whole payload and its JSON string in memory; the app ran out of heap and restarted. - The weekly backup's JSON is 662 MB, longer than any string V8 can hold, so `unpackBackupBlob` threw on every read. Restore, download and the restore preview all answered "could not be decrypted". - Upload accepted 10 MB, a fraction of a large export. Every reader and writer of a backup file now streams it: - `scanBackupJson` reads a backup's bytes once, keeps every section but the named bulk arrays, and hands their elements out one at a time. `readStreamedBackup` uses it twice: a first pass that validates each measurement against the element schema and keeps the rest of the file, and a second pass that hands the measurements to the writer in batches. Stored copies and off-host objects are authenticated whole on their compressed ciphertext before any plaintext is read; only the decompression is streamed. - Restore writes the measurements with one `INSERT … FROM unnest` per batch. Prisma caches a query plan per `createMany` row count, and one 1 000-row plan kept about 145 MB alive, which alone put the restore past the heap limit. The transaction budget grows with the measurement count. The awards and ECG sections are handed the ids they reference that were written, not every written id. - The export routes write the file into the response as it is produced. The passphrase export spools its ciphertext to a temporary file because the HLX1 format puts the tag first; the format is unchanged, so existing archives open as before. - Upload accepts the raw body, JSON or gzip, up to the 512 MB request ceiling, checks it as it arrives and stores it in the same pass; the admin page compresses the file in the browser before sending it. Multipart stays for small files. - Download streams the stored JSON; the preview counts measurements from the stream. The monthly restore drill and `scripts/restore-backup.ts` read the off-host object the same way; the script can write `.json.gz`. On the seeded account in a 1 GB container: export 25 s at 389 MB peak, passphrase export 25 s, both uploads 19 s, restore of the weekly backup 94 s at 554 MB peak, and export, upload and restore round-trip to exactly the same rows. The encrypted-column guard now also recognises the raw SQL statement that writes `DataBackup.data`. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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0037cc1bcd |
Write restored PHI 0o600 and let TRUST_PROXY_HOPS reach the container
Two findings from the docs truth audit, both operator-facing. scripts/restore-backup.ts wrote the decrypted backup, which is health data in plaintext, with the process default file mode, leaving it world-readable on the operator's disk while it sat there. It is now written 0o600. TRUST_PROXY_HOPS is read from the environment to size the trusted X-Forwarded-For chain, but it was absent from the compose environment whitelist, so an operator value in .env never reached the container and was silently ignored. It now rides all four surfaces: the compose whitelist, both env examples, and the manifest that pnpm check-env reads. |
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Marc-André Bombeck
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085aa3f5c5 | fix: harden pnpm supply chain and runtime image (#572) | ||
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Marc-André BombeckandMarc-André Bombeck
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d7778c1085 |
feat(v1.4): multi-tenant prep — off-host backup, encryption-key versioning, worker/web split, native-Bearer UA gating (#135)
* feat(crypto): G2 — encryption-key versioning + rotation CLI
Adds backwards-compatible support for ENCRYPTION_KEYS (JSON map of
{ "id": "<key>" }) plus ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID. Ciphertext format is now
"<keyId>.<base64payload>"; legacy bare-base64 ciphertext still decrypts
under the synthetic "v1" id derived from the existing ENCRYPTION_KEY.
scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts re-encrypts every encrypted column on
User / WithingsConnection / AppSettings with the active key. Idempotent —
rows already on the active id are skipped.
Why: enables zero-downtime rotation when a key is suspected leaked,
without forcing every encrypted row through a single big-bang rewrite.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): G4 — native-Bearer UA gating + rotating refresh tokens
Web callers (UA contains 'Mozilla/') keep the legacy 90d Bearer when they
explicitly opt in via X-Client-Type: native. Native callers (HealthLog-iOS,
HealthLog-iPad, n8n, Health-Connect, unrecognised UAs) now receive a 24h
access token plus a 60d rotating refresh token in the login response.
New /api/auth/refresh endpoint atomically validates + rotates the refresh
token (one-time-use), revokes the previously paired access token, and
audit-logs every refresh + revoke. Reuse of an already-consumed refresh
token revokes the entire family for the user/device — defence against a
stolen refresh token.
Migration 0025_refresh_tokens adds the table; the only DDL is CREATE
TABLE so it is forward-compatible. Down migration documented at
docs/ops/migrations/0025-down.sql.
Why: the V3 audit (still-V2-A) flagged that 90d tokens are too long for
native callers when refresh-token rotation is now table-stakes for mobile
apps. Web flows are unchanged so existing browser sessions keep working.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(infra): G3 — web/worker container split via HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE
Adds a tiny startup gate (src/lib/process-type.ts) so the same Docker image
can run as web-only, worker-only, or 'all' (default — single-container,
backwards compatible). assertSubsystemEnabled() refuses to boot the
reminder worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web, preventing accidental
double-cron when an operator splits the deployment.
docker-compose.yml ships the optional app-worker service block commented
out so 'docker compose up' keeps working out of the box; uncommenting it
+ flipping app to HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web is the only change to scale
HTTP horizontally. Healthchecks are isolated per service so neither
startup deadlocks the other; both wait on db: service_healthy.
docs/self-hosting/scaling.md walks through when + how to split.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(jobs): G1 — daily off-host encrypted backup to S3-compatible storage
New pg-boss queue 'data-backup-offhost' runs at 02:30 Europe/Berlin, dumps
each user's measurements + medications + intake events + mood entries,
encrypts the JSON under a SEPARATE key (BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, isolated
from the application ENCRYPTION_KEY), and uploads to any S3-compatible
target via @aws-sdk/client-s3.
Wire format documented in docs/ops/backup-restore.md:
magic "HLBK" || version 0x01 || iv(12) || authTag(16) || ciphertext
The worker prunes objects older than BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS (default 30);
operators are encouraged to also configure a bucket-level lifecycle rule.
Admin endpoint POST /api/admin/backup/test issues a 1-byte PUT+GET
roundtrip and returns endpoint + bucket + per-call latency. Credentials
are never returned.
scripts/restore-backup.ts downloads + decrypts a single object so
operators can verify the chain end-to-end without standing up a separate
restore harness.
Why: GDPR Art. 32 + V3 audit "data durability" — without an off-host copy
the only line of defence against a Postgres volume loss is the in-DB
DataBackup model on the same host. Separate-key isolation means a leak of
the application encryption key does not also expose every user's archive.
Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(multi-tenant): address review findings — rotation coverage, hard decrypt errors, web/worker gates
Multi-agent review on PR #135 caught several CRITICAL + HIGH issues that
would have shipped silent data corruption or weakened the threat model:
Encryption + rotation
- scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts: stop selecting `bugReportTokenEncrypted`
(column doesn't exist in the schema; the script crashed on the AppSettings
step). Add the three encrypted columns it was missing —
NotificationChannel.config, PushSubscription.p256dh, PushSubscription.auth
— so rotating to a new key actually re-encrypts every encrypted row.
Without this, dropping the old key id from ENCRYPTION_KEYS would leave
notification channels and web-push subscriptions permanently
undecryptable.
- src/lib/crypto.ts: refuse to silently fall back to the active key when a
legacy bare-base64 row is decrypted but no v1 entry is configured. Throws
a clear "Restore ENCRYPTION_KEY (or add a v1 entry to ENCRYPTION_KEYS)
and run scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts before removing it" so an
operator who pulled the v1 too early notices immediately instead of
hitting opaque GCM tag errors.
- docs/ops/encryption-key-rotation.md: full step-by-step + rollback note +
troubleshooting section. Spells out that rotation is a forward-only
operation and what to do if the rollback path is needed.
Web / worker split (G3)
- src/proxy.ts: refuse HTTP traffic with a 503 +
X-HealthLog-Process-Type: worker header when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=worker.
The worker container (which still runs `node server.js` for now) no
longer accepts requests, so a misrouted client gets a clear hint instead
of a partially-served response.
- src/instrumentation.ts: short-circuit before importing the reminder
worker when HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE=web — avoids the noisy
"[instrumentation] CRITICAL" stderr line we emitted on every web boot.
- /api/version added to PUBLIC_PATHS so the compose healthcheck doesn't
silently 302-redirect through the auth gate (the prior wget treated the
login page as a 200 success and would never notice an unhealthy backend).
Refresh-token rotation (G4)
- src/lib/auth/refresh-token.ts: reuse-detection now revokes ALL active
refresh tokens for the user, not only those scoped to the same deviceId.
An attacker who rotated without an X-Device-Id header would otherwise
keep their family alive on the no-device branch. Defence-in-depth.
- revokeRefreshToken() also revokes the paired access token so a leaked
access token cannot outlive the refresh-token sibling that the caller
just killed (logout-on-device).
Off-host backup (G1)
- src/lib/jobs/offhost-backup.ts: drop the worker-side DeleteObject path.
Retention is the bucket's lifecycle-policy job; the worker keeps a
PutObject + GetObject grant only. A compromised worker can no longer
wipe the backup history. Per-user errors are now surfaced as Wide
Event warnings + a structured failures[] array on the report so an
operator can tell which user failed and why.
- scripts/restore-backup.ts: schema-validate the decrypted payload before
writing to disk, plus an optional --user-id=<id> flag that refuses to
proceed unless the dump's userId matches. Prevents silent
cross-tenant restores when an operator points the script at the wrong
S3 key.
Idempotency
- src/lib/idempotency.ts: the leak-guard already blocked `hlk_`
(access-token prefix); also block `hlr_` so a future caller wrapping
the new /api/auth/refresh endpoint with withIdempotency() can't
accidentally cache a freshly-issued refresh token.
Migration / schema
- prisma/migrations/0025_refresh_tokens/migration.sql: wrap in a single
transaction; switch to CREATE { TABLE | INDEX } IF NOT EXISTS so a
partial-deploy retry is a no-op instead of "relation already exists";
guard the FK ADD with information_schema lookup for the same reason.
- Schema replaces the single-column `@@index([deviceId])` with a
composite `@@index([userId, deviceId])` (every lookup also filters on
userId; the old index would never have been used). Comment on
accessTokenHash corrected to HMAC-SHA-256.
Container / ops
- Dockerfile: install tzdata + ENV TZ=Europe/Berlin so the daily
pg-boss schedule (`30 2 * * *` Europe/Berlin) actually fires at 02:30
Berlin instead of silently falling back to UTC on the alpine base.
- docker-compose.yml: tighten the healthcheck to `wget --spider` (matches
the Dockerfile HEALTHCHECK style, doesn't pipe the body), pass through
BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS so a custom retention env reaches the container.
- .env.example: document every new env var added in this PR
(HEALTHLOG_PROCESS_TYPE, ENCRYPTION_KEYS, ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID,
BACKUP_S3_*, BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, BACKUP_RETENTION_DAYS) with
comments and the all-or-none semantics for the backup block.
491 tests still green, typecheck clean.
* chore: retrigger CI
---------
Co-authored-by: Marc-André Bombeck <noreply@anthropic.com>
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