3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Marc-André Bombeck 67909f2d9d fix(db): derive the app role's password with scrypt
The key it comes from is one the operator chose, and a fast hash over a
weak one would be cheap to walk back from a leaked verifier.
2026-11-04 01:46:59 +01:00
Marc-André Bombeck a10bebdc43 fix(db): give each database its own app role and keep the queue schema the owner's
Roles are cluster-wide. Two HealthLog databases on one server shared
healthlog_app: each start set its own password, locking the other
instance out, and the role held grants on both databases. The role is
now healthlog_app_<database>_<hash>, marked with a comment naming its
database, its password is derived per database, and a role holding an
explicit CONNECT on another database is not used.

The role owned the pgboss schema, so it could plant a trigger, a rule or
a function body that a later owner session (a rollback, DB_APP_ROLE=off,
a fallback start) would run with the owner's rights. pg-boss changes its
schema only on install, on migration and for partitioned queues, which
the app does not use. The start now installs and migrates the schema as
the owner with pg-boss's own plans, and the worker runs pg-boss with
migrate: false when it does not own the schema. The role gets rows only,
read-only on pgboss.bam (SQL the migration runner executes) and on the
version column. Every start, on every path, takes back what a
HealthLog role owns there, drops triggers and rules, and after a
take-back restores the queue functions to pg-boss's own definitions and
retires the legacy role. Bloated queue indexes, which pg-boss only
reports when it does not own them, are rebuilt at start.
2026-11-03 23:31:37 +01:00
Marc-André Bombeck 485161a657 feat(db): run the app as a role that cannot change the schema
After the migrations the entrypoint ensures healthlog_app, a login role
with row access to the app's schema, MAINTAIN on measurements and
ownership of the pgboss schema, and starts the app with a DATABASE_URL
for it in place of the owner's. The role cannot alter or drop tables,
create roles, schemas or functions in the app's schema, read server
files or run programs, or write the migration history.

The password is an HMAC of a fixed label under API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY, so a
separate worker container derives the same one, and it is sent as a
SCRAM verifier. Every boot re-applies the grants in one transaction
under an advisory lock, and drops as the owner the indexes the
maintenance job may no longer drop. When the owner cannot create roles,
the server is older than Postgres 17, or the role cannot log in, the
boot says why and the app stays on the owner as before. DB_APP_ROLE=off
skips it.
2026-11-03 20:36:37 +01:00