The reproductive-health page promised that deleting all data or the
account erases at once. Both wait for the grace window now, the nightly
dumps keep a record until they age out, and the old pgdata volume is a
full copy until it is removed; the page says so and how to make deletion
final. The README, the getting-started note on majors, the move guide and
the Unraid and Portainer templates catch up with Postgres 18, the backups
volume and the recovery kit. The demo seed's spread bound leaves room for
the seed's own one-in-150 spread.
The image creates DB_BACKUP_DIR owned by the app user, so an install that
runs it without the backups volume could write there, and every nightly and
pre-migration dump landed in the container's own layer. The next update
threw them away while the admin page, the boot line and the readiness card
called them kept on this server.
A dump directory now counts as kept only when it survives the container:
inside a container (Docker, Podman, Kubernetes, a container cgroup or an
overlay root) the directory must sit on a mount of its own that is not a
tmpfs, read from /proc/self/mountinfo with a device-number fallback;
outside one, a writable directory is a disk. Otherwise no dump is written
there: the nightly run uploads off-host only and records not_persistent,
the pre-migration dump is skipped with a warning, the boot line says the
directory is inside the container, the backups page stops promising local
dumps and ignores local-only ledger rows, and readiness fails with no
bucket and notes the bucket-only setup otherwise.
The Unraid template gains a path for the dumps, the Unraid and TrueNAS
pages say why it is needed, and the restore drill first runs the stack
without the volume and checks that nothing is kept or claimed.
At a first start there is no recorded key yet, so an operator facing a
refusal they are certain is false has no row to delete. With
ENCRYPTION_KEY_CHECK=warn (default enforce) the check still runs and logs
its full outcome, /api/health names a mismatch as a warning field without
failing, requests are served, and no key is recorded unless every key id
passes.
The variable is on the compose whitelist, in both example files, the env
manifest, the Unraid and Portainer templates and the published-env guard.
The log block, the mismatch page and the self-hosting pages offer it as the
last resort after the three real fixes, and say that it disables a safety
check.
Every configured key id now has a canary in encryption_key_canaries,
checked at boot. A key that cannot open its canary, or existing data
written before the canary existed, puts the process in a refusal state:
every API route answers 503 encryption.key_mismatch, /api/health reports
reason encryption_key_mismatch, the pages render one explanation, and
neither the queue producer nor the worker starts. The process stays up
so the reason is visible instead of hiding in a crash loop.
The admin Encryption page gains a "Back up your encryption key" step:
key id and fingerprint (never the key), where the key lives per
platform, a check of a pasted copy that is compared and discarded, and
a confirmation bound to the active key id and fingerprint. The overview
gets a tile and admins get a dashboard banner while it is due.
HEALTHLOG_PLATFORM picks the platform the step opens on. Adds the
TrueNAS self-hosting page and key backup sections in the docs.
Surface the load-bearing first-run vars in docker-compose.yml and the README
quick-start: secret generation, the SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=false LAN note, the
single persistent volume, and a /api/version verify step. Add an Unraid
Community Applications template plus a NAS walkthrough covering the external
Postgres setup, and a Portainer app template referencing the compose stack.
Marc-André Bombeck