merge: bring the MCP server onto the v1.23 base

Combine the remote MCP server (stdio + remote /mcp + OAuth 2.1 + read
tools + deep-value reads + a confirmed, audience-bound write surface)
with the v1.23 account-security line (MFA, known/trusted devices,
free-text note encryption).

- schema: keep every v1.23 User relation (MFA, known/trusted devices)
  alongside the McpOAuthConnection relation; the MeasurementSource enum
  carries the MCP value.
- api-handler: the MCP audience guard (a token scoped to
  health:read/health:write is bound to /mcp and refused a REST write)
  and the step-up MFA helpers coexist.
- maintenance queues: register the MCP token-cleanup sweep next to the
  note-encryption backfill and key-rotation queues; shift it to 04:00
  so the two daily discovery ticks do not collide.
- migrations: renumber the MCP migrations to 0206/0207 so they follow
  the v1.23 chain (0199-0205).
- MCP mood writes route the note through the v1.23 at-rest cipher.
This commit is contained in:
Marc-André Bombeck committed 2026-06-28 00:52:04 +02:00
commit fb986bc09d
89 files changed
+10276 -109

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@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
-- MCP Phase 3 security fix (H2) — revocable, theft-detectable refresh chains.
--
-- The remote MCP OAuth bridge minted stateless `hlrt_` refresh tokens that
-- referenced no server row: they could not be revoked (the settings "revoke"
-- only killed the 60-minute access token) and a replayed, already-rotated
-- refresh token was not treated as theft. This migration adds the persistent
-- anchor the refresh artifact lacked.
--
-- `mcp_oauth_connections` is the revocable unit: one row per connector
-- connection that requested `offline_access`. `current_jti` is the only refresh
-- `jti` valid at any moment — every rotation advances it, so a presented `jti`
-- that is not `current_jti` is a replay (theft signal) that revokes the row.
-- `revoked_at` is the kill switch the settings card flips; revoking the row
-- stops every future refresh.
CREATE TABLE "mcp_oauth_connections" (
"id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"user_id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"client_id" TEXT NOT NULL,
"client_name" TEXT NOT NULL,
"scope" TEXT NOT NULL,
"resource" TEXT NOT NULL,
"current_jti" TEXT NOT NULL,
"created_at" TIMESTAMP(3) NOT NULL DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
"last_used_at" TIMESTAMP(3),
"revoked_at" TIMESTAMP(3),
CONSTRAINT "mcp_oauth_connections_pkey" PRIMARY KEY ("id")
);
CREATE INDEX "mcp_oauth_connections_user_id_idx" ON "mcp_oauth_connections"("user_id");
ALTER TABLE "mcp_oauth_connections" ADD CONSTRAINT "mcp_oauth_connections_user_id_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("user_id") REFERENCES "users"("id") ON DELETE CASCADE ON UPDATE CASCADE;
-- Link each OAuth-minted access token back to its connection so a connection
-- revoke kills every access row it issued, and so the connector token list can
-- exclude the transient access rows (they would otherwise flood it — M2).
ALTER TABLE "api_tokens" ADD COLUMN "mcp_connection_id" TEXT;
CREATE INDEX "api_tokens_mcp_connection_id_idx" ON "api_tokens"("mcp_connection_id");
ALTER TABLE "api_tokens" ADD CONSTRAINT "api_tokens_mcp_connection_id_fkey" FOREIGN KEY ("mcp_connection_id") REFERENCES "mcp_oauth_connections"("id") ON DELETE SET NULL ON UPDATE CASCADE;
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
-- MCP write provenance.
--
-- The remote MCP endpoint gains a confirmed write surface (logging a
-- measurement / mood). Rows it writes carry their own `MeasurementSource`
-- value so they are distinguishable from MANUAL / TELEGRAM provenance and
-- get an isolated idempotency namespace `(userId, type, MCP, externalId)`.
--
-- Purely-additive enum extension; no row touched. `ADD VALUE IF NOT EXISTS`
-- makes a rerun safe. The new value is NOT used elsewhere in this migration,
-- so it is safe to extend the enum in the same step (Postgres only forbids
-- USING a freshly-added value in the same transaction). Mirrors the 0189
-- source-extension that added TELEGRAM. The enum is `@@map`-ed to the
-- snake_case type name `measurement_source`.
ALTER TYPE "measurement_source" ADD VALUE IF NOT EXISTS 'MCP';
+52 -1
View File
@@ -584,6 +584,9 @@ model User {
medications Medication[]
intakeEvents MedicationIntakeEvent[]
apiTokens ApiToken[]
// v1.24 — MCP remote OAuth 2.1 connections (1:N). Each row is a granted
// authorization for an MCP client, audience-bound to health:read/health:write.
mcpOAuthConnections McpOAuthConnection[]
refreshTokens RefreshToken[]
auditLogs AuditLog[]
withingsConnection WithingsConnection?
@@ -1209,6 +1212,15 @@ enum MeasurementSource {
// (server-resolved only); iOS DTO mirrors this spelling so the
// /api/sync/changes delta feed decodes the rows.
TELEGRAM
// v1.22.0 — measurements logged through the remote MCP write surface. A
// distinct provenance from MANUAL/TELEGRAM: the row was confirmed and
// written by an external assistant over the `/mcp` wire under a
// `health:write`-scoped token, never the cookie/Bearer client write path.
// Its own value gives the MCP writes an isolated idempotency namespace
// `(userId, type, MCP, externalId)`. The client batch + single-POST
// surfaces still reject it (server-resolved only); iOS DTO mirrors this
// spelling so the /api/sync/changes delta feed decodes the rows.
MCP
@@map("measurement_source")
}
@@ -2550,13 +2562,52 @@ model ApiToken {
expiresAt DateTime? @map("expires_at")
createdAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("created_at")
revoked Boolean @default(false)
// The MCP OAuth connection this access token belongs to, when it was minted
// through the `/api/mcp/oauth` bridge. Null for manually-minted tokens and
// native-client tokens. Lets a connection revoke kill every access row it
// ever issued (H2), and lets the connector token list exclude the transient
// 60-minute access rows so it does not flood (M2).
mcpConnectionId String? @map("mcp_connection_id")
user User @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
user User @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
mcpConnection McpOAuthConnection? @relation(fields: [mcpConnectionId], references: [id], onDelete: SetNull)
@@index([userId])
@@index([mcpConnectionId])
@@map("api_tokens")
}
// MCP OAuth connection — the revocable, theft-detectable anchor for a remote
// connector's refresh-token chain (Phase 3 security fix, H2).
//
// The stateless `hlrt_` refresh artifact carries this row's `id` (`cid`) plus
// the rotation `jti`; the row is the persistent server state the artifact alone
// lacks. `currentJti` is the only refresh `jti` valid for the connection at any
// moment — every rotation advances it. A presented refresh whose `jti` is not
// `currentJti` is a replay of an already-rotated token (theft signal) and
// revokes the connection (reuse-detection family revocation, mirroring
// `refresh-token.ts`). `revokedAt` is the kill switch the settings card flips,
// so revoking a connection stops every future refresh and (via the
// `ApiToken.mcpConnectionId` back-link) kills its outstanding access tokens.
model McpOAuthConnection {
id String @id @default(cuid())
userId String @map("user_id")
clientId String @map("client_id")
clientName String @map("client_name")
scope String
resource String
currentJti String @map("current_jti")
createdAt DateTime @default(now()) @map("created_at")
lastUsedAt DateTime? @map("last_used_at")
revokedAt DateTime? @map("revoked_at")
user User @relation(fields: [userId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
accessTokens ApiToken[]
@@index([userId])
@@map("mcp_oauth_connections")
}
// v1.15.20 — registration invite tokens. When the operator has disabled
// open registration (`AppSettings.registrationEnabled = false`), a valid,
// unexpired invite token still admits a signup. The raw `hlv_<hex>` token