fix(http): read forwarding headers only from a connection a proxy could make

The client-IP resolver trusted one forwarding hop by default and read the
rightmost X-Forwarded-For entry. Next fills that header with the socket's
address only when the request carries none, so a caller reaching the
published port directly could send its own and choose a fresh address per
request: every per-IP limit (sign-in, second factor, passkey, share unlock,
webhooks) became per-request, and sessions, the audit log and sign-in
notices recorded the chosen address.

The server now writes each connection's own peer address into an internal
header from Node's http.server.request.start diagnostics channel, installed
at boot and overwriting anything a caller sent under that name. The resolver
reads forwarding headers only when that peer is loopback, private,
unique-local or CGNAT, where a reverse proxy sits; a public peer is its own
client address, and a log line says once that its forwarding headers were
ignored. With TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0 the peer is used instead of no address, so
a directly exposed host no longer shares one bucket across all anonymous
callers. Proxies on the same host, Docker network or tailnet need no change.
This commit is contained in:
Marc-André Bombeck committed 2026-10-25 13:52:04 +01:00
1 parent ba22932101
commit d6d0f7e73f
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@@ -525,8 +525,10 @@ API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY="<openssl rand -hex 32>"
# it unset, or an attacker could forge the header. Off by default.
# Number of trusted reverse-proxy hops in front of the app; the client IP is
# read that many entries from the right of the X-Forwarded-For chain. 0 for a
# directly-exposed host, 1 (the default when unset) behind a single reverse
# proxy; X-Real-IP is read only at 1. A wrong value makes the app refuse the
# directly-exposed host (the connection's own address is used), 1 (the
# default when unset) behind a single reverse proxy; X-Real-IP is read only
# at 1. Forwarding headers are never read from a connection that comes from a
# public address: only a proxy on loopback or a private network is believed. A wrong value makes the app refuse the
# headers, log one warning, and collapse anonymous callers into one
# rate-limit bucket.
# TRUST_PROXY_HOPS="1"