feat(admin): replace the key backup step with a recovery kit

The step confirmed one key, the active application key. A restore needs
more: off-host copies are sealed under BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY, a copy
written before a rotation needs the retired application key it was
written under, and every session, token and share link hangs off
API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY. An operator could do everything the step asked and
still be unable to read a single backup.

The recovery kit lists every key a restore of this server needs, by id
and fingerprint, never key material:

- each id in ENCRYPTION_KEYS, plus any retired id a stored copy
  (innerKeyIds) or an off-host object inside the bucket's retention
  (OffhostBackupKeyUse) still lists, also once the server dropped it;
- BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_KEY and each BACKUP_ENCRYPTION_PREVIOUS_KEYS entry,
  named by the id their objects record;
- API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY.

Confirming records the set the admin was shown and refuses a stale one
with 409 recovery.kit.stale. The kit is due again as soon as a key it
lists is not in that set (a rotation, a new backup key, a re-keyed
install); a key that merely drops out does not make it due. "Check my
copy" now checks any key in the kit.

Migration 0487 carries a confirmation given under the old step forward
as a kit holding that key, so that part stays confirmed, and drops the
four app_settings columns. It also creates the two tables the readiness
evaluation uses (restore_drill_outcomes, recovery_readiness_notices).

The routes move to /api/admin/recovery-kit; the reader of the keys the
backups still need moves out of the encryption status route into
src/lib/recovery/backup-key-needs.ts so the kit and the status view
share one definition.
This commit is contained in:
Marc-André Bombeck committed 2026-10-25 13:32:29 +01:00
1 parent 953c64f7a4
commit d3c672cc3f
56 files changed
+3042 -1611

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@@ -96,11 +96,13 @@ export const SENSITIVE_KEY_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[] = [
// `client_secret` are already covered by `/token/i` + `/secret/i`; the
// verifier is the one secret-shaped key those patterns miss.
/verifier/i,
// v1.40.0 — the encryption key an admin pastes into "Check my copy"
// (`POST /api/admin/encryption/key-backup/verify`). The route never logs its
// body; this keeps it out of any excerpt a future change might take.
// Anchored so `encryptionKeyId` and friends stay readable.
// v1.40.0 — the encryption key an admin pastes into "Check my copy", and the
// copy of any recovery kit key, sent as `keyCopy`
// (`POST /api/admin/recovery-kit/verify`). The route never logs its body;
// this keeps it out of any excerpt a future change might take. Anchored so
// `encryptionKeyId` and friends stay readable.
/^encryption[_-]?key$/i,
/^key[_-]?copy$/i,
];
/**