mirror of
https://github.com/MBombeck/HealthLog.git
synced 2026-11-17 23:52:24 +00:00
Add invite universal-link landing for app deep-link
Encode the admin invite QR as a clean /invite/<hlv_token> universal-link that the iOS app intercepts via the AASA wildcard matcher. Add the matching web route as a thin, shape-validated redirect onto the existing register flow, and open the path on the public allowlist so an unauthenticated scanner reaches it. A malformed token segment is indistinguishable from no invite — no database hit, no enumeration oracle. The token is never logged.
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
e561f8d893
commit
c1eb618dcc
8 files changed
+235
-5
No files matched your search
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
|
||||
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* v1.17.0 — invite universal-link landing (iOS #16).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* `/invite/<hlv_token>` is a thin, server-side redirect: it validates the
|
||||
* `hlv_` shape, then bounces a browser onto the existing
|
||||
* `/auth/register?invite=<token>` flow. These tests pin the security
|
||||
* contract — the token shape gate, the carry-through to register, and the
|
||||
* non-oracle behaviour where a malformed segment is indistinguishable
|
||||
* from "no invite". The route never touches the database.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const redirectMock = vi.fn((href: string) => {
|
||||
// next/navigation `redirect()` throws a sentinel inside the
|
||||
// server-component renderer to short-circuit rendering. Mimic it by
|
||||
// throwing an error tagged with the href so each test can assert the
|
||||
// exact redirect target.
|
||||
const err = new Error(`__redirect__:${href}`);
|
||||
(err as Error & { __redirect__: string }).__redirect__ = href;
|
||||
throw err;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock("next/navigation", () => ({
|
||||
redirect: (href: string) => redirectMock(href),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
import InviteLandingPage from "../page";
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
redirectMock.mockClear();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const VALID_TOKEN = `hlv_${"a".repeat(64)}`;
|
||||
|
||||
async function runRedirect(token: string): Promise<string> {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await InviteLandingPage({ params: Promise.resolve({ token }) });
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
const tagged = e as Error & { __redirect__?: string };
|
||||
if (tagged.__redirect__) return tagged.__redirect__;
|
||||
throw e;
|
||||
}
|
||||
throw new Error("expected redirect, none thrown");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe("<InviteLandingPage> universal-link landing", () => {
|
||||
it("carries a well-formed token through to the register flow", async () => {
|
||||
const href = await runRedirect(VALID_TOKEN);
|
||||
expect(href).toBe(`/auth/register?invite=${VALID_TOKEN}`);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("encodes the token segment into the register query string", async () => {
|
||||
const href = await runRedirect(VALID_TOKEN);
|
||||
const url = new URL(href, "https://h.example.com");
|
||||
expect(url.pathname).toBe("/auth/register");
|
||||
expect(url.searchParams.get("invite")).toBe(VALID_TOKEN);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it("drops a malformed token to plain register (no enumeration oracle)", async () => {
|
||||
// Wrong prefix, wrong length, and outright garbage all land on the
|
||||
// identical target — the page never reveals whether a token exists.
|
||||
for (const bad of [
|
||||
"not-a-token",
|
||||
`hlk_${"a".repeat(64)}`,
|
||||
`hlv_${"a".repeat(63)}`,
|
||||
`hlv_${"G".repeat(64)}`,
|
||||
]) {
|
||||
redirectMock.mockClear();
|
||||
const href = await runRedirect(bad);
|
||||
expect(href).toBe("/auth/register");
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
||||
import { redirect } from "next/navigation";
|
||||
|
||||
import { looksLikeInviteToken } from "@/lib/auth/invite-token";
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* v1.17.0 — invite universal-link landing (iOS #16).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* `https://<host>/invite/<hlv_token>` is the URL encoded in the admin
|
||||
* invite QR and the path the AASA `["*"]` matcher hands to the iOS app:
|
||||
* - On an installed iOS app the scene delegate intercepts the
|
||||
* Universal Link before this page ever renders and starts onboarding
|
||||
* registration with the token prefilled. This server component is the
|
||||
* BROWSER fallback only.
|
||||
* - In a browser, the page is a thin, safe redirect onto the existing
|
||||
* `/auth/register?invite=<token>` flow, where the invite banner shows
|
||||
* and the token rides the signup POST exactly as before.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Security:
|
||||
* - The `hlv_` shape is validated before the token is ever reflected
|
||||
* into the redirect target — a malformed segment lands on plain
|
||||
* `/auth/register` with no `?invite`, so the page can never echo
|
||||
* attacker-controlled text into the URL.
|
||||
* - The route does NOT touch the database and is NOT an enumeration
|
||||
* oracle: a well-formed-but-unknown token and a well-formed-and-valid
|
||||
* token redirect to the identical target. Whether a token is real is
|
||||
* only ever decided at `POST /api/auth/register`, which keeps its
|
||||
* existing uniform error semantics and rate limit.
|
||||
* - The token is never logged here; the redirect is the only effect.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The route is listed in `PUBLIC_PATHS` (`/invite/`) so an unauthenticated
|
||||
* visitor reaches it without the auth-gate bounce to `/auth/login`.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export default async function InviteLandingPage({
|
||||
params,
|
||||
}: {
|
||||
params: Promise<{ token: string }>;
|
||||
}) {
|
||||
const { token } = await params;
|
||||
|
||||
if (looksLikeInviteToken(token)) {
|
||||
redirect(`/auth/register?invite=${encodeURIComponent(token)}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Malformed token: behave exactly like a visitor with no invite. No DB
|
||||
// hit, no leak of whether any token exists.
|
||||
redirect("/auth/register");
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user