fix(http): trust X-Real-IP only behind a declared proxy

The client-IP resolver read X-Real-IP on every path: with
TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0, which means no proxy in front and no forwarding header
to believe, and on the path where the X-Forwarded-For chain was shorter
than the declared hops, which means the proxies were bypassed. A caller
sending a new X-Real-IP with each request got a new per-IP rate-limit
bucket each time.

X-Real-IP now gets the trust X-Forwarded-For gets: it is read only when at
least one proxy hop is declared and the request carries no X-Forwarded-For.
A short chain resolves to no address. The reverse-proxy guide no longer
suggests TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0 for a proxy that sets X-Real-IP; such a proxy
takes 1.
This commit is contained in:
Marc-André Bombeck committed 2026-09-26 20:10:12 +02:00
1 parent 92c5b0a60d
commit bc69dec8e6
4 files changed
+50 -26

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@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ describe("getClientIp trusted-proxy semantics (V3 audit)", () => {
},
);
it("with TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0 ignores XFF entirely", () => {
it("with TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0 trusts no forwarding header, x-real-ip included", () => {
process.env.TRUST_PROXY_HOPS = "0";
const ip = getClientIp(
makeRequest({
@@ -80,7 +80,17 @@ describe("getClientIp trusted-proxy semantics (V3 audit)", () => {
"x-real-ip": "8.8.8.8",
}),
);
expect(ip).toBe("8.8.8.8");
expect(ip).toBeNull();
});
it("x-real-ip rotation — with no declared proxy a caller cannot mint a fresh bucket per request", () => {
process.env.TRUST_PROXY_HOPS = "0";
const seen = new Set(
["1.1.1.1", "2.2.2.2", "3.3.3.3"].map((ip) =>
getClientIp(makeRequest({ "x-real-ip": ip })),
),
);
expect(seen).toEqual(new Set([null]));
});
it("with TRUST_PROXY_HOPS=0 and no x-real-ip returns null", () => {
@@ -277,7 +287,8 @@ describe("getClientIpOrTrustWarning shape (F-6, 2026-05-16)", () => {
expect(result.ip).toBeNull();
});
it("returns trustViolation=true and x-real-ip when chain is short but x-real-ip is set", () => {
it("returns trustViolation=true and ignores x-real-ip when the chain is short", () => {
// The declared proxies were bypassed, so x-real-ip came from the caller.
process.env.TRUST_PROXY_HOPS = "2";
const result = getClientIpOrTrustWarning(
makeRequest({
@@ -285,7 +296,7 @@ describe("getClientIpOrTrustWarning shape (F-6, 2026-05-16)", () => {
"x-real-ip": "9.9.9.9",
}),
);
expect(result).toEqual({ ip: "9.9.9.9", trustViolation: true });
expect(result).toEqual({ ip: null, trustViolation: true });
});
it("returns trustViolation=false when XFF is absent (no chain to validate)", () => {
@@ -176,8 +176,9 @@ describe("checkAuthSurfaceRateLimit — trust-violation tightening", () => {
5,
15 * 60 * 1000,
);
// Falls through to x-real-ip when the chain is too short.
expect(result.ip).toBe("9.9.9.9");
// A short chain means the declared proxies were bypassed, so the
// caller-set x-real-ip is not believed either.
expect(result.ip).toBeNull();
expect(lastKey()).toBe("auth:anon:trust-violation");
} finally {
warn.mockRestore();