Answer the native client's open server asks

- Publish timezone, glucoseUnit and a features block on the account
  payload; glucoseUnit reads as the closed pair the contract names, and
  features.trackIntake tells a separately released client that
  medications take the record-only switch.
- Refuse a new dose for a record-only medication with
  medication.intake.notTracked on every dose-writing route; the bulk
  route reports it per entry as intake_not_tracked, and correcting an
  already resolved event stays open.
- Answer passkey sign-in failures by name instead of a 500:
  passkey.challenge.expired, passkey.unknown, passkey.response.invalid
  and passkey.verification.failed, each with an audit row.
- Carry one account-wide adherence figure in meta.aggregate on the
  batched compliance read, weighted by expected doses, and accept
  ?days=30|60|90|180|365 for a report window.
- Accept ?days=30|90|180|365 on the mood insights read so stability
  covers the period shown, and name the window it covers.
- Keep only the reminder that announces a dose off APNs when the phone
  owns medication reminders; follow-ups for a dose still open are
  pushed again, marked by a followUp flag the reminder cron sets.
- Document which batch validation issues belong to an entry and pin it
  with a test that splits and resends a batch; publish rejectedFields
  items as ValidationIssue.
This commit is contained in:
Marc-André Bombeck committed 2026-10-08 10:32:11 +02:00
1 parent 7bcb6f71d9
commit bb563b6506
50 files changed
+1789 -142

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@@ -304,6 +304,33 @@ export async function createAuthenticationOptions(userId?: string) {
return { options, challengeId: challenge.id };
}
/**
* Why a passkey assertion could not be checked at all — as opposed to an
* assertion that was checked and did not verify. Each kind is a case a
* client can name to the person (the passkey was removed here, the sign-in
* took too long), so the sign-in route answers it with its own status and
* `meta.errorCode` instead of letting it surface as a server fault.
*
* - `challenge_expired`: the challenge is gone (expired, already used, never
* issued) or was begun for a different account.
* - `unknown_passkey`: no passkey with this credential id is registered here.
* - `malformed`: the assertion body is not an authentication response.
* - `verification_failed`: the WebAuthn library refused the assertion
* (origin, RP id, challenge or signature mismatch).
*/
export type PasskeyAuthErrorKind =
"challenge_expired" | "unknown_passkey" | "malformed" | "verification_failed";
export class PasskeyAuthError extends Error {
constructor(
readonly kind: PasskeyAuthErrorKind,
message: string,
) {
super(message);
this.name = "PasskeyAuthError";
}
}
export async function verifyAuthentication(
challengeId: string,
response: unknown,
@@ -318,7 +345,10 @@ export async function verifyAuthentication(
type: "authentication",
});
if (!challenge) {
throw new Error("Challenge expired or not found");
throw new PasskeyAuthError(
"challenge_expired",
"Challenge expired or not found",
);
}
// v1.4.43 W13 L-3 — explicit Zod narrowing instead of the previous
@@ -329,7 +359,10 @@ export async function verifyAuthentication(
// type-narrowing gap a future refactor could trip on.
const parsed = authenticationResponseSchema.safeParse(response);
if (!parsed.success) {
throw new Error("Malformed passkey authentication response");
throw new PasskeyAuthError(
"malformed",
"Malformed passkey authentication response",
);
}
const typedResponse = parsed.data as unknown as AuthenticationResponseJSON;
@@ -340,27 +373,41 @@ export async function verifyAuthentication(
});
if (!passkey) {
throw new Error("Passkey not found");
throw new PasskeyAuthError("unknown_passkey", "Passkey not found");
}
// A challenge begun for one account (the re-proof arm names the account)
// is answered only by that account's passkey.
if (challenge.userId !== null && challenge.userId !== passkey.userId) {
throw new Error("Challenge expired or not found");
throw new PasskeyAuthError(
"challenge_expired",
"Challenge expired or not found",
);
}
const verification = await verifyAuthenticationResponse({
response: typedResponse,
expectedChallenge: challenge.challenge,
expectedOrigin: getExpectedOrigin(),
expectedRPID: getRpId(),
credential: {
id: passkey.credentialId,
publicKey: passkey.credentialPublicKey,
counter: Number(passkey.counter),
transports: passkey.transports as Transport[],
},
});
let verification: VerifiedAuthenticationResponse;
try {
verification = await verifyAuthenticationResponse({
response: typedResponse,
expectedChallenge: challenge.challenge,
expectedOrigin: getExpectedOrigin(),
expectedRPID: getRpId(),
credential: {
id: passkey.credentialId,
publicKey: passkey.credentialPublicKey,
counter: Number(passkey.counter),
transports: passkey.transports as Transport[],
},
});
} catch (err) {
// The library throws, rather than answering `verified: false`, for an
// origin, RP id or challenge mismatch and for a bad signature. Those are
// a refused assertion, not a server fault.
throw new PasskeyAuthError(
"verification_failed",
err instanceof Error ? err.message : "Passkey verification failed",
);
}
if (verification.verified) {
// Update counter + stamp last-used so the management UI can surface