diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 1ea5ffed1..399a2a5e6 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -2,6 +2,28 @@
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [1.29.5] — 2026-07-17
+
+### Security
+
+- **Hardened the same-origin redirect guard.** A crafted relative
+  post-login `next` path (e.g. `/..//evil.com`) passed the same-origin
+  check but left a protocol-relative pathname that could re-resolve to a
+  foreign origin when re-used in a redirect or client navigation. The
+  guard now re-verifies the reconstructed path resolves on-origin and
+  rejects it otherwise. Covers the OIDC callback and the password/passkey
+  login redirect.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **OIDC login redirects use the operator app URL, not the request URL.**
+  Behind a reverse proxy that does not forward the original host, the
+  login and callback routes built their browser redirects from the
+  address the app was reached at inside the container, sending users to
+  an unreachable internal URL after login. Every OIDC redirect is now
+  built from the operator-set `NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL`, matching the
+  convention the other integrations already use.
+
 ## [1.29.4] — 2026-07-17
 
 - **The workouts list shows the most recent first.** The list was ordered
diff --git a/docs/api/openapi.yaml b/docs/api/openapi.yaml
index db9fade75..183eb5ea8 100644
--- a/docs/api/openapi.yaml
+++ b/docs/api/openapi.yaml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 openapi: 3.1.0
 info:
   title: HealthLog API
-  version: 1.29.4
+  version: 1.29.5
   description: >-
     Self-hosted personal-health-tracking PWA — public API surface for the iOS native client and external ingest.
 
diff --git a/package.json b/package.json
index 068f91e17..371f4d0b9 100644
--- a/package.json
+++ b/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "healthlog",
-  "version": "1.29.4",
+  "version": "1.29.5",
   "description": "Self-hosted personal-health-tracking PWA with Withings integration, AI insights, and doctor-report PDF export.",
   "license": "PolyForm-Noncommercial-1.0.0",
   "homepage": "https://healthlog.dev",
diff --git a/public/sw.js b/public/sw.js
index bbd60981a..d91e5e259 100644
--- a/public/sw.js
+++ b/public/sw.js
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ try {
 // v1.4.38.4 → v1.4.42. Do not hand-edit; bump `package.json` and rebuild.
 const CACHE_VERSION =
   (typeof self !== "undefined" && self.__APP_VERSION__) ||
-  /* @sw-version-fallback */ "v1.29.4";
+  /* @sw-version-fallback */ "v1.29.5";
 const STATIC_CACHE = `healthlog-static-${CACHE_VERSION}`;
 const PAGE_CACHE = `healthlog-pages-${CACHE_VERSION}`;
 // v1.18.6 — read-only data cache for a curated allowlist of safe GET `/api/*`
diff --git a/src/lib/__tests__/url-safety.test.ts b/src/lib/__tests__/url-safety.test.ts
index d94474fe5..a97c04c03 100644
--- a/src/lib/__tests__/url-safety.test.ts
+++ b/src/lib/__tests__/url-safety.test.ts
@@ -31,6 +31,23 @@ describe("sanitizeSameOriginPath", () => {
     expect(sanitizeSameOriginPath("\\\\evil.com", BASE)).toBe("/");
   });
 
+  it("rejects a same-origin next whose pathname collapses to protocol-relative", () => {
+    // `/..//evil.com` resolves ON-origin here (the `..` collapses at root),
+    // but its pathname is `//evil.com`. Consumers re-resolve the returned
+    // value (`new URL(result, base)`, `router.push`), where `//evil.com`
+    // becomes protocol-relative and escapes to https://evil.com. The
+    // reconstructed-path re-check must reject these to "/".
+    expect(sanitizeSameOriginPath("/..//evil.com", BASE)).toBe("/");
+    expect(sanitizeSameOriginPath("/.//evil.com", BASE)).toBe("/");
+    expect(sanitizeSameOriginPath("/../..//evil.com", BASE)).toBe("/");
+  });
+
+  it("still allows a legitimate same-origin path with an inner double slash", () => {
+    // Only a LEADING `//` (protocol-relative) escapes on re-resolve; a double
+    // slash inside the path stays on-origin and must be preserved.
+    expect(sanitizeSameOriginPath("/reports/a//b", BASE)).toBe("/reports/a//b");
+  });
+
   it("preserves a same-origin path's search and hash", () => {
     expect(sanitizeSameOriginPath("/settings?tab=security#top", BASE)).toBe(
       "/settings?tab=security#top",
diff --git a/src/lib/url-safety.ts b/src/lib/url-safety.ts
index b8422e75d..3d0be7bbf 100644
--- a/src/lib/url-safety.ts
+++ b/src/lib/url-safety.ts
@@ -22,10 +22,19 @@ export function sanitizeSameOriginPath(
 ): string {
   if (!next) return "/";
   try {
-    const resolved = new URL(next, baseUrl);
     const base = new URL(baseUrl);
+    const resolved = new URL(next, baseUrl);
     if (resolved.origin !== base.origin) return "/";
-    return `${resolved.pathname}${resolved.search}${resolved.hash}`;
+    const result = `${resolved.pathname}${resolved.search}${resolved.hash}`;
+    // Consumers commonly RE-RESOLVE the returned value against the origin
+    // (`new URL(result, base)` in the OIDC callback redirect, `router.push()`
+    // on the login page). A same-origin `next` can still leave a pathname
+    // like `//evil.com` — e.g. `/..//evil.com` resolves on-origin here (the
+    // `..` collapses at root) yet its pathname is protocol-relative, so the
+    // re-resolve escapes to `https://evil.com`. Re-verify that the
+    // reconstructed path itself still resolves on-origin; reject otherwise.
+    if (new URL(result, base).origin !== base.origin) return "/";
+    return result;
   } catch {
     return "/";
   }