diff --git a/prisma/migrations/0260_step_up_elevation/migration.sql b/prisma/migrations/0267_step_up_elevation/migration.sql
similarity index 100%
rename from prisma/migrations/0260_step_up_elevation/migration.sql
rename to prisma/migrations/0267_step_up_elevation/migration.sql
diff --git a/prisma/schema.prisma b/prisma/schema.prisma
index bcec3d1b9..61e8fff79 100644
--- a/prisma/schema.prisma
+++ b/prisma/schema.prisma
@@ -3257,8 +3257,11 @@ model StepUpElevation {
   // HMAC-SHA256 (`hashToken`) of the raw `hle_<64 hex>` secret. Unique so a
   // redemption is a single indexed lookup and a collision cannot alias two rows.
   tokenHash  String    @unique @map("token_hash")
-  // Which factor was re-proved: "password" or "passkey". Audit/telemetry only —
-  // never an authorisation input.
+  // Which factor was re-proved: "password", "totp", "webauthn", or "passkey".
+  // This IS an authorisation input, not telemetry — see `FRESH_FACTOR_METHODS`
+  // in `@/lib/auth/step-up`. Only totp / webauthn / passkey satisfy a
+  // fresh-factor gate; password reaches what a plain cookie session reaches
+  // and stops there.
   method     String
   expiresAt  DateTime  @map("expires_at")
   consumedAt DateTime? @map("consumed_at")
@@ -3270,7 +3273,7 @@ model StepUpElevation {
   @@index([userId])
   @@index([apiTokenId])
   @@index([expiresAt])
-  // NOTE: migration 0260 additionally creates a PARTIAL unique index —
+  // NOTE: migration 0267 additionally creates a PARTIAL unique index —
   // `(api_token_id) WHERE consumed_at IS NULL` — so at most one elevation per
   // token is ever redeemable. Prisma cannot express a partial index, and a
   // plain `@@unique([apiTokenId])` would be wrong: it would also forbid minting
diff --git a/src/lib/auth/step-up.ts b/src/lib/auth/step-up.ts
index d3aa78834..b718e54c2 100644
--- a/src/lib/auth/step-up.ts
+++ b/src/lib/auth/step-up.ts
@@ -328,18 +328,8 @@ export async function revokeStepUpElevations(userId: string): Promise<void> {
   await prisma.stepUpElevation.deleteMany({ where: { userId } });
 }
 
-/**
- * Delete every elevation whose window has closed.
- *
- * Runs on the queue, not on a request. The earlier fire-and-forget sweep on the
- * mint path was a cross-tenant unbounded DELETE competing with the request for a
- * pool connection, and recurring work belongs on pg-boss. An expired row is
- * already unredeemable — the predicate in `claimStepUpElevation` refuses it — so
- * this is hygiene, not enforcement, and a missed run breaks nothing.
- */
-export async function pruneExpiredStepUpElevations(): Promise<number> {
-  const { count } = await prisma.stepUpElevation.deleteMany({
-    where: { expiresAt: { lt: new Date() } },
-  });
-  return count;
-}
+// The expired-elevation sweep runs on the pg-boss queue against the WORKER
+// Prisma client, not this module's request-scoped one — see
+// `handleStepUpElevationCleanup` in `@/lib/jobs/reminder/cleanup-handlers`.
+// A copy of the predicate here would be unreachable and only invite drift
+// between the two, so it does not exist.