fix(auth): end connected assistants, tokens and share links on sign-out everywhere

"Sign out everywhere" ended web sessions and device logins but left every
credential that works without signing in: a connected AI assistant kept its
OAuth connection and minted the next access token from it, a connector or
ingest token kept working, and a clinician share link kept opening the
record. A password change revoked the tokens but not the assistant's
connection or the share links. Anything a stolen session had minted
outlived the remedy.

- Sign out everywhere now ends every other sign-in, every AI-assistant
  connection, every programmatic token except the caller's own, and every
  clinician share link. Share links are revoked by default; the web offers
  a checkbox to keep them (keepShareLinks=1), and a client that sends
  nothing, such as the shipped app, gets the safe default.
- A password change and an admin password reset also end AI-assistant
  connections, share links and step-up elevations.
- Turning on the first second factor (TOTP or a security key) ends every
  other sign-in, as a password change does. Adding a further factor does
  not.

destroyOtherSessions takes an explicit reach ("sign-ins" or "everything")
so each caller says how far it goes.
This commit is contained in:
Marc-André Bombeck committed 2026-09-26 20:06:36 +02:00
1 parent 0fc83cb0a1
commit 92c5b0a60d
23 files changed
+658 -66

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@@ -76,10 +76,14 @@ describe("POST /api/auth/me/mfa/disable", () => {
it("revokes other sessions + trusted devices (via destroyOtherSessions), keeping the current one", async () => {
const res = await POST(req());
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(destroyOtherSessions).toHaveBeenCalledWith("u1", {
kind: "session",
sessionId: "sess-current",
});
expect(destroyOtherSessions).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
"u1",
{
kind: "session",
sessionId: "sess-current",
},
{ reach: "sign-ins" },
);
});
it("spares the CALLER's own device login on the Bearer path", async () => {
@@ -99,10 +103,14 @@ describe("POST /api/auth/me/mfa/disable", () => {
const res = await POST(req());
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(destroyOtherSessions).toHaveBeenCalledWith("u1", {
kind: "accessToken",
accessTokenHash: "hash-of-caller-access-token",
});
expect(destroyOtherSessions).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
"u1",
{
kind: "accessToken",
accessTokenHash: "hash-of-caller-access-token",
},
{ reach: "sign-ins" },
);
});
it("spends the elevation before tearing the factor down", async () => {
+1
View File
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ export const POST = apiHandler(async (req: Request) => {
auth.transport === "cookie"
? { kind: "session", sessionId: auth.session.id }
: { kind: "accessToken", accessTokenHash: auth.accessTokenHash },
{ reach: "sign-ins" },
);
await auditLog("auth.mfa.disabled", {
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ import {
import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit";
import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
import { destroyOtherSessions } from "@/lib/auth/session";
import { decrypt } from "@/lib/crypto";
import { checkRateLimit, rateLimitHeaders } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
import { verifyTotp } from "@/lib/auth/mfa/totp";
@@ -110,6 +111,12 @@ export const POST = apiHandler(async (req: Request) => {
}
const recoveryCodes = generateRecoveryCodes();
// A confirmed TOTP secret was refused above, so the only second factor the
// account can already hold is a security key.
const hadSecondFactor =
(await prisma.webauthnMfaCredential.count({
where: { userId: user.id },
})) > 0;
// The code verified and the activation is next — spend the elevation here so
// a wrong code above costs the caller nothing.
@@ -141,6 +148,19 @@ export const POST = apiHandler(async (req: Request) => {
// admin-enforced forced-enrollment redirect must clear immediately.
await setMfaEnrollCookie(false);
// Turning on the first second factor ends every other sign-in, as a password
// change does: a session opened before the factor existed, perhaps by
// whoever made the owner turn it on, must not keep going without it.
if (!hadSecondFactor) {
await destroyOtherSessions(
user.id,
auth.transport === "cookie"
? { kind: "session", sessionId: auth.session.id }
: { kind: "accessToken", accessTokenHash: auth.accessTokenHash },
{ reach: "sign-ins" },
);
}
await auditLog("auth.mfa.enabled", {
userId: user.id,
ipAddress: getClientIp(req),
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import {
import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit";
import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
import { destroyOtherSessions } from "@/lib/auth/session";
import { verifyMfaRegistration } from "@/lib/auth/mfa/webauthn";
import { mfaWebauthnRegisterVerifySchema } from "@/lib/validations/mfa";
import { setMfaEnrollCookie } from "@/lib/auth/mfa-enrollment";
@@ -57,6 +58,12 @@ export const POST = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
// failed ceremony above must not have cost the caller their elevation.
await auth.commitElevation();
const hadSecondFactor =
user.totpConfirmedAt !== null ||
(await prisma.webauthnMfaCredential.count({
where: { userId: user.id },
})) > 0;
const { registrationInfo } = verification;
const created = await prisma.webauthnMfaCredential.create({
data: {
@@ -76,6 +83,19 @@ export const POST = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
// so clear any forced-enrollment redirect immediately.
await setMfaEnrollCookie(false);
// Turning on the first second factor ends every other sign-in, as a password
// change does: a session opened before the factor existed, perhaps by
// whoever made the owner turn it on, must not keep going without it.
if (!hadSecondFactor) {
await destroyOtherSessions(
user.id,
auth.transport === "cookie"
? { kind: "session", sessionId: auth.session.id }
: { kind: "accessToken", accessTokenHash: auth.accessTokenHash },
{ reach: "sign-ins" },
);
}
await auditLog("auth.mfa.webauthn.register", {
userId: user.id,
ipAddress: getClientIp(request),
@@ -163,16 +163,21 @@ describe("DELETE /api/auth/me/sessions (sign out everywhere)", () => {
vi.mocked(destroyOtherSessions).mockResolvedValue({
sessionsRevoked: 3,
accessTokensRevoked: 0,
connectorsRevoked: 0,
shareLinksRevoked: 0,
});
const res = await DELETE(del());
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const body = await res.json();
expect(body.data.sessionsRevoked).toBe(3);
expect(destroyOtherSessions).toHaveBeenCalledWith("user-1", {
kind: "session",
sessionId: "sess-current",
});
expect(destroyOtherSessions).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
"user-1",
{ kind: "session", sessionId: "sess-current" },
// Everything, share links included, when the client says nothing: the
// shipped app sends no parameter and gets the safe default.
{ reach: "everything", keepShareLinks: false },
);
});
it("names a Bearer caller by its access token so its own device login is spared", async () => {
@@ -198,15 +203,18 @@ describe("DELETE /api/auth/me/sessions (sign out everywhere)", () => {
vi.mocked(destroyOtherSessions).mockResolvedValue({
sessionsRevoked: 1,
accessTokensRevoked: 1,
connectorsRevoked: 0,
shareLinksRevoked: 0,
});
const res = await DELETE(del());
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(destroyOtherSessions).toHaveBeenCalledWith("user-1", {
kind: "accessToken",
accessTokenHash: hashToken(raw),
});
expect(destroyOtherSessions).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
"user-1",
{ kind: "accessToken", accessTokenHash: hashToken(raw) },
{ reach: "everything", keepShareLinks: false },
);
vi.mocked(headers).mockResolvedValue({ get: () => null } as never);
});
});
+38 -8
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
/**
* GET /api/auth/me/sessions — list the user's active web sessions.
* DELETE /api/auth/me/sessions — "sign out everywhere": revoke every OTHER
* session (and native refresh tokens), keeping
* the caller's current session. Closes #64.
* session, device login, AI-assistant
* connection and token, and (unless
* `?keepShareLinks=1`) every clinician share
* link, keeping the caller's current
* credential. Closes #64.
*
* v1.23 — the user-facing session/device-management surface. Distinct from
* `/api/auth/me/devices`, which lists APNs / Web-Push notification devices;
@@ -114,15 +117,35 @@ export const DELETE = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
}
: { kind: "session", sessionId: auth.session.id };
const { sessionsRevoked, accessTokensRevoked } = await destroyOtherSessions(
user.id,
current,
);
// "Everywhere" reaches every credential that works without signing in: AI
// assistant connections, programmatic tokens and, unless the caller asks to
// keep them, clinician share links. The default is to revoke, because the
// person pressing this is often doing it after losing a device or a session,
// and a share link made by whoever held it would otherwise keep working. A
// client that sends nothing (the shipped app) gets the safe default.
const keepShareLinks =
new URL(request.url).searchParams.get("keepShareLinks") === "1";
const {
sessionsRevoked,
accessTokensRevoked,
connectorsRevoked,
shareLinksRevoked,
} = await destroyOtherSessions(user.id, current, {
reach: "everything",
keepShareLinks,
});
await auditLog("auth.session.revoke_others", {
userId: user.id,
ipAddress: getClientIp(request),
details: { sessionsRevoked, accessTokensRevoked },
details: {
sessionsRevoked,
accessTokensRevoked,
connectorsRevoked,
shareLinksRevoked,
keepShareLinks,
},
});
annotate({
@@ -130,10 +153,17 @@ export const DELETE = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
meta: {
sessions_revoked: sessionsRevoked,
access_tokens_revoked: accessTokensRevoked,
connectors_revoked: connectorsRevoked,
share_links_revoked: shareLinksRevoked,
},
});
return apiSuccess({ sessionsRevoked });
return apiSuccess({
sessionsRevoked,
accessTokensRevoked,
connectorsRevoked,
shareLinksRevoked,
});
});
/**