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fix(auth): link single sign-on to an existing account only after its own sign-in
The SSO callback bound a verified provider email to the local account with the same address on the spot. The local address is not verified: anyone could register with it, or type it into their profile, and the SSO user then landed in an account the other person still held the password to. The callback now links nothing. It records the link it would make in a sealed, ten-minute, HttpOnly cookie and sends the browser to the sign-in page, and the link is made only when that browser then signs in to that same account with its password (and second factor) or passkey. Under an SSO-only policy the password form opens for exactly that account. The native sign-in answers oidc_link_required; the link is confirmed once on the web. Moving an account to a new email address now also needs a fresh proof: a sign-in or second factor in the last five minutes, or the current password sent alongside the change. Without it the address is left as it was and reported in rejectedFields; the rest of the save still lands.
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@@ -282,3 +282,76 @@ async function readProof(
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const parsed = stepUpMintSchema.safeParse(body);
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return parsed.success ? parsed.data : "invalid";
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}
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export type SensitiveChangeProof = "ok" | "required" | "failed" | "rate_limited";
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/**
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* The proof in front of changing the account's email address.
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*
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* The address is what single sign-on matches an existing account by, so it is
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* part of how the account is reached and a stolen session must not rewrite it.
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* Accepted: on a cookie session, a sign-in or second factor inside the last
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* five minutes; on either transport, the current password alongside the
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* change. The password draws on the shared re-proof budget and a wrong one is
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* audited like every other refused proof.
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*/
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export async function authorizeSensitiveChange(args: {
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user: Pick<
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User,
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| "id"
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| "passwordHash"
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| "totpSecretEncrypted"
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| "totpLastStep"
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| "totpConfirmedAt"
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>;
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/** The session row id on a cookie request; null on a Bearer request. */
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cookieSessionId: string | null;
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currentPassword: string | null;
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ipAddress: string | null;
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stage: string;
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}): Promise<SensitiveChangeProof> {
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const { user, cookieSessionId, currentPassword, ipAddress, stage } = args;
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if (cookieSessionId) {
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const row = await prisma.session.findUnique({
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where: { id: cookieSessionId },
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select: { mfaVerifiedAt: true, createdAt: true },
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});
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const now = Date.now();
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const recent = (d: Date | null | undefined) =>
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d != null && now - d.getTime() <= RECENT_PROOF_MAX_AGE_MS;
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if (recent(row?.mfaVerifiedAt) || recent(row?.createdAt)) return "ok";
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}
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if (!currentPassword) return "required";
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const rl = await checkRateLimit(
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reproofBucket(user.id),
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REPROOF_LIMIT,
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REPROOF_WINDOW_MS,
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);
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if (!rl.allowed) {
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await auditLog("auth.reproof.rate_limited", {
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userId: user.id,
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ipAddress,
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details: { stage },
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});
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return "rate_limited";
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}
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const outcome = await verifyExistingFactorProof(user, {
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method: "password",
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password: currentPassword,
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});
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if (!outcome.ok) {
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await recordReproofFailure(
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user.id,
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ipAddress,
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stage,
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"password",
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outcome.reason,
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);
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return "failed";
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}
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return "ok";
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}
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