fix(security): close moodLog SSRF + central error redaction; fix citation drift (#148)

The v1.4.1 audit pass turned up one CRITICAL, two HIGH, and four
medical-citation drift findings. This commit addresses everything
that's safe to land in a hardening release; deeper architectural
fixes (idempotency-race transactional rewrite, encryption-key
fallback gate, refresh-token reuse-detection serialisation, moodLog
secret HMAC lookup column) are tracked for v1.4.2 in
docs/ops/v141-followup-issues.md.

Security
--------

CRITICAL — moodLog SSRF
  src/lib/validations/moodlog.ts now refines the credentials URL
  with isPublicUrl() so an authenticated user cannot store
  http://169.254.169.254/ (cloud metadata) or RFC1918 hosts.
  src/lib/moodlog/sync.ts re-checks isPublicUrl(baseUrl) at the
  fetch site (so legacy rows stored before the credential guard are
  also refused) and switches to redirect: "manual" + 3xx → fail so a
  public host cannot 302 the request to an internal target with the
  user's apiKey on the redirect hop. New unit test
  src/lib/validations/__tests__/moodlog.test.ts asserts the guard
  rejects 169.254.x.x, 10.x, 172.16.x.x, 192.168.x.x, 127.0.0.1, and
  localhost.

HIGH — error-message secret leakage
  New src/lib/logging/redact.ts redacts Bearer tokens (incl. our
  hlk_/hlr_), Telegram bot URLs (bot<digits>:<token>), and
  query-string secrets (?secret=, ?code=, ?token=, ?api_key=). The
  redactor is called from WideEventBuilder.setError() — every error
  reaching Loki is scrubbed once, centrally — and from the
  reportToGlitchtip() call in api-handler.ts so the Glitchtip
  incident UI is also protected. New unit suite covers the four
  patterns plus over-redaction (Bearer's \\S+ greedily consumes
  anything up to the next whitespace, which is the safer side of
  the trade-off).

Truthfulness — citation drift fixes (audit found 0 hallucinations,
4 drift items)
  - messages/{en,de}.json bpClassificationTitle and avg30dEsc:
    "ESC/ESH 2018" → "ESH 2023". User-visible on the dashboard and
    doctor-report PDF. The numeric thresholds are unchanged from
    2018; the 2023 update is ESH-only since ESC withdrew from
    joint authoring.
  - src/lib/analytics/classifications.ts: section header,
    getBpTargetsByAge() docblock, and inline comment updated to
    cite ESH 2023 with the same "numerically unchanged" caveat.
  - src/app/api/insights/targets/route.ts:375: source label "WHO"
    → "Saint-Maurice JAMA 2020". The AI-prompt anti-pattern guard
    explicitly forbids citing WHO for a step number; this surface
    was the last "WHO" mislabel in the codebase.
  - Saint-Maurice "mortality plateau 8000-12000" attribution
    softened to "continued dose-response benefit through ~12,000
    steps/day, not a plateau" in src/lib/medical-citations.ts,
    src/lib/analytics/effective-range.ts,
    src/lib/analytics/classifications.ts, and both AI prompts. The
    original JAMA 2020 paper shows continuing benefit (HR 0.49 at
    8k vs 4k, HR 0.35 at 12k); the plateau-shaped finding belongs
    to Paluch 2022 Lancet PH (PMID 35247352), not Saint-Maurice.

Quality gates
  pnpm typecheck         clean
  pnpm test              669 / 669 (was 658; +11 from new suites)
  pnpm test:integration  10 / 10 (untouched)
  pnpm lint              0 errors
This commit is contained in:
Marc-André Bombeck authored and GitHub committed 2026-05-08 16:30:37 +02:00
1 parent ea032c8857
commit 70353882eb
15 files changed
+229 -30

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+58
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@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { redactSecrets, redactOptional } from "../redact";
describe("redactSecrets", () => {
it("redacts Bearer tokens", () => {
expect(redactSecrets("Authorization: Bearer hlk_abc123def456")).toBe(
"Authorization: Bearer [REDACTED]",
);
expect(redactSecrets("auth=Bearer whitespace_token")).toBe(
"auth=Bearer [REDACTED]",
);
});
it("redacts Telegram bot tokens in path-style URLs", () => {
expect(
redactSecrets(
"fetch failed: https://api.telegram.org/bot1234567890:AAEhBP-w-secret/sendMessage",
),
).toBe("fetch failed: https://api.telegram.org/bot[REDACTED]/sendMessage");
});
it("redacts query-string secrets", () => {
expect(redactSecrets("Withings webhook ?secret=abc123 failed")).toBe(
"Withings webhook ?secret=[REDACTED] failed",
);
expect(redactSecrets("OAuth ?code=xyz&state=abc")).toBe(
"OAuth ?code=[REDACTED]&state=abc",
);
expect(redactSecrets("api?api_key=secret")).toBe("api?api_key=[REDACTED]");
});
it("leaves non-secret-shaped strings alone", () => {
expect(redactSecrets("HTTP 503 from upstream")).toBe(
"HTTP 503 from upstream",
);
expect(redactSecrets("user-7 measurement saved")).toBe(
"user-7 measurement saved",
);
});
it("handles multiple secrets in one string", () => {
// Bearer matches `\S+` so it greedily consumes `hlk_x;` — that's
// safe (over-redaction is fine when the alternative is leaking).
expect(redactSecrets("Bearer hlk_x bot999:tok ?code=abc123")).toBe(
"Bearer [REDACTED] bot[REDACTED] ?code=[REDACTED]",
);
});
});
describe("redactOptional", () => {
it("returns undefined for undefined input", () => {
expect(redactOptional(undefined)).toBeUndefined();
});
it("redacts when present", () => {
expect(redactOptional("Bearer x")).toBe("Bearer [REDACTED]");
});
});
+6 -4
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@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import type { WideEvent, LogLevel, EventKind } from "./types";
import { LOG_LEVEL_PRIORITY } from "./types";
import { getDeployContext } from "./config";
import { redactOptional, redactSecrets } from "./redact";
/**
* Baut ein Wide Event Schritt fuer Schritt auf.
@@ -61,14 +62,14 @@ export class WideEventBuilder {
if (err instanceof Error) {
this.event.error = {
type: err.constructor.name,
message: err.message,
stack: err.stack,
message: redactSecrets(err.message),
stack: redactOptional(err.stack),
code: (err as { statusCode?: number }).statusCode,
};
} else {
this.event.error = {
type: "Unknown",
message: String(err),
message: redactSecrets(String(err)),
};
}
return this;
@@ -88,7 +89,8 @@ export class WideEventBuilder {
}
addDbQuery(durationMs: number): this {
if (!this.event.db) this.event.db = { query_count: 0, query_duration_ms: 0 };
if (!this.event.db)
this.event.db = { query_count: 0, query_duration_ms: 0 };
this.event.db.query_count++;
this.event.db.query_duration_ms += durationMs;
return this;
+35
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@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
/**
* Redact secrets from strings before they leave the process boundary
* (Loki, Glitchtip, console). Applied in `WideEventBuilder.setError()`
* and `reportToGlitchtip()` so every error reaching observability is
* scrubbed once, centrally.
*
* Patterns:
* - `Bearer <token>` — generic API tokens incl. our `hlk_` /
* `hlr_` formats and external OAuth bearers (Withings, AI providers).
* - `bot<digits>:<token>` — Telegram bot URLs embed the token in the
* path: `https://api.telegram.org/bot1234567:ABC-…/sendMessage`.
* If `fetch()` rejects with a `cause` that surfaces the URL (some
* Node runtimes), the token would land in error reports.
* - `?secret=…` and `?code=…` — query-string leaks for legacy
* Withings webhooks and OAuth callbacks (already scrubbed at the
* URL level in `reportToGlitchtip`, but error.message can carry
* the URL too).
*
* The substitution is intentionally generic ([REDACTED]) — we don't
* want partial revelation of token entropy.
*/
export function redactSecrets(input: string): string {
return input
.replace(/Bearer\s+\S+/gi, "Bearer [REDACTED]")
.replace(/bot\d+:[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/g, "bot[REDACTED]")
.replace(
/([?&])(secret|code|token|api[_-]?key)=[^&\s]+/gi,
"$1$2=[REDACTED]",
);
}
/** Apply `redactSecrets` to a possibly-undefined string. */
export function redactOptional(s: string | undefined): string | undefined {
return s === undefined ? undefined : redactSecrets(s);
}