test(01-01): pin MCP read scope boundaries

- cover health read and wildcard positive capability paths
- reject unrelated scopes before server registration and database reads
This commit is contained in:
Marc-André Bombeck committed 2026-07-29 13:38:41 +02:00
1 parent fb533147d3
commit 6c0f47acad
4 files changed
+229 -8

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+34 -7
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@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ beforeEach(() => {
});
describe("resolveMcpAuthContext", () => {
it("binds the session to <userId>:<tokenId> (REQ-SEC-11) via the canonical Bearer path", async () => {
it("binds a health:read session to <userId>:<tokenId> via the canonical Bearer path", async () => {
vi.mocked(resolveBearerToken).mockResolvedValue({
user: FAKE_USER,
tokenId: "token-9",
@@ -24,11 +24,6 @@ describe("resolveMcpAuthContext", () => {
const ctx = await resolveMcpAuthContext(" hlk_abc ");
// Trimmed token resolved through the shared validator (no requiredPermission for reads).
// `any-valid-token` is the one deliberate fail-open posture in the tree:
// `/mcp` authenticates here and authorises downstream (audience binding +
// `tokenAllowsWrite`). Asserted explicitly so a silent switch to another
// posture — in either direction — shows up as a failing test.
expect(resolveBearerToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith("hlk_abc", {
kind: "any-valid-token",
});
@@ -39,7 +34,19 @@ describe("resolveMcpAuthContext", () => {
expect(ctx.canWrite).toBe(false);
});
it("grants write capability only when the token carries health:write", async () => {
it("admits wildcard read capability and preserves wildcard write capability", async () => {
vi.mocked(resolveBearerToken).mockResolvedValue({
user: FAKE_USER,
tokenId: "token-wild",
permissions: ["*"],
expiresAt: new Date(),
});
const ctx = await resolveMcpAuthContext("hlk_wild");
expect(ctx.canRead).toBe(true);
expect(ctx.canWrite).toBe(true);
});
it("does not infer read capability from health:write", async () => {
vi.mocked(resolveBearerToken).mockResolvedValue({
user: FAKE_USER,
tokenId: "token-w",
@@ -47,9 +54,29 @@ describe("resolveMcpAuthContext", () => {
expiresAt: new Date(),
});
const ctx = await resolveMcpAuthContext("hlk_xyz");
expect(ctx.canRead).toBe(false);
expect(ctx.canWrite).toBe(true);
});
it.each([
["medication ingest", ["medication:ingest"]],
["notification delivery", ["notifications:send"]],
["FHIR read", ["fhir:read"]],
["unrelated", ["profile:read"]],
["empty", []],
])("does not grant MCP reads to a valid %s token", async (_label, scopes) => {
vi.mocked(resolveBearerToken).mockResolvedValue({
user: FAKE_USER,
tokenId: "token-narrow",
permissions: scopes,
expiresAt: new Date(),
});
const ctx = await resolveMcpAuthContext("hlk_narrow");
expect(ctx.canRead).toBe(false);
});
it("rejects an empty token without calling the validator", async () => {
await expect(resolveMcpAuthContext(" ")).rejects.toThrow();
expect(resolveBearerToken).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+22
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@@ -1,12 +1,34 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import {
tokenAllowsRead,
tokenAllowsWrite,
SCOPE_HEALTH_READ,
SCOPE_HEALTH_WRITE,
SCOPE_WILDCARD,
} from "../scopes";
describe("tokenAllowsRead", () => {
it.each([
["health:read", [SCOPE_HEALTH_READ]],
["wildcard", [SCOPE_WILDCARD]],
["read plus write", [SCOPE_HEALTH_READ, SCOPE_HEALTH_WRITE]],
])("admits an explicit %s grant", (_label, permissions) => {
expect(tokenAllowsRead(permissions)).toBe(true);
});
it.each([
["write-only", [SCOPE_HEALTH_WRITE]],
["medication ingest", ["medication:ingest"]],
["notifications", ["notifications:send"]],
["FHIR", ["fhir:read"]],
["unrelated", ["profile:read"]],
["empty", []],
])("refuses a %s scope set", (_label, permissions) => {
expect(tokenAllowsRead(permissions)).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("tokenAllowsWrite", () => {
it("is false for a read-only token", () => {
expect(tokenAllowsWrite([SCOPE_HEALTH_READ])).toBe(false);