release: v1.4.2 — resurrect v1.4.1 work + bug-fix triple (#152)

* Revert "revert: roll source tree back to v1.4.0 to restore production"

This reverts commit e444a90b10.

* fix(v1.4.2): summaries.WEIGHT + medications array guards + healthcheck IPv4

Three production bugs surfaced after the v1.4.0 deploy stabilized:

1. `TypeError: undefined is not an object (evaluating 'E?.summaries.WEIGHT')`
   on /dashboard and /insights for users without weight readings —
   the optional chain stopped at `data` when it needed to also cover
   `data.summaries`. Fixed: `data?.summaries?.WEIGHT` (one level deeper).

2. `TypeError: y?.filter is not a function` on /medications — the
   medications query value was non-array (likely a stale
   service-worker response from an older API shape). Replaced with
   `Array.isArray(medications) ? medications : []` so the page is
   immune to any future shape drift.

3. Healthcheck-induced 503 outage (already in 1.4.1 — included here
   so 1.4.2 is the single coherent release). The docker-compose
   healthcheck used `localhost` which busybox-wget resolves to IPv6
   ::1; Next.js standalone listens on IPv4 0.0.0.0 only. Pinned
   to 127.0.0.1.

This release also includes everything from v1.4.1 (which never
published a clean GHCR tag): the per-section admin extraction, the
testcontainers integration suite, the Playwright + axe-core E2E
foundation, the moodLog SSRF fix, the central error-redaction in
WideEventBuilder + Glitchtip, the medical-citation drift fixes
(ESH 2023, Saint-Maurice attribution, steps source), and the docs
sync.

Co-Authored-By: Marc-André Bombeck <mbombeck@gmail.com>

docs/ops/v141-followup-issues.md

@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+# v1.4.x follow-up issues
+
+Items identified by the v1.4.1 audit pass that warrant deeper work
+than a hardening release should land. Each one carries enough context
+that a future contributor can pick it up without re-running the audit.
+
+## Security — deferred
+
+### S-FOLLOW-1 — Idempotency-Key concurrent duplicate side-effects (HIGH)
+
+Audit reference: `~/infra/reports/v14-security-audit.md` H1.
+
+The `withIdempotency()` wrapper currently does
+`findCached → handler → persistCached`. Two requests with the same
+`Idempotency-Key` arriving in parallel both miss the SELECT, both
+execute the handler (duplicate measurements / intake events), and
+one INSERT loses on the unique constraint silently. The CLAUDE.md
+contract ("retries with the same Idempotency-Key … replay the
+original response — no second side-effect") is therefore violated
+whenever a flaky mobile client double-sends.
+
+**Fix shape**: acquire the slot before the handler runs.
+`INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING RETURNING id` reserving the
+`(userId, key, method, path)` row with a sentinel
+`responseStatus = 0`, then UPDATE on completion; concurrent losers
+SELECT-loop with backoff for the row to be filled. Or wrap the
+whole request in a Postgres advisory lock keyed by hash(userId, key)
+via `pg_advisory_xact_lock`.
+
+Why deferred: needs a careful integration test against the new
+testcontainers suite (two concurrent inserts → exactly one handler
+invocation) and a public-API contract check that the
+sentinel-status row never bleeds into a 2xx replay. Fits a v1.4.2
+PR scope on its own.
+
+---
+
+### S-FOLLOW-2 — Encryption key fallback NODE_ENV gate (MEDIUM)
+
+Audit reference: `~/infra/reports/v14-security-audit.md` M1.
+
+`src/lib/crypto.ts:61-74` only requires the 64-hex production key
+when `process.env.NODE_ENV === "production"`. A fresh Docker run
+that forgets to set `NODE_ENV=production` (raw `node …` invocations,
+some operator setups) silently accepts a 32-character key and pads
+it deterministically with a SHA-256 of itself, halving the entropy
+and making the resulting key recoverable from any leaked partial.
+
+**Fix shape**: invert the gate to `NODE_ENV !== "development" &&
+NODE_ENV !== "test"` — fail-closed by default — or require an
+explicit `ALLOW_WEAK_DEV_KEYS=1` opt-in.
+
+Why deferred: needs a migration note for self-hosters whose `.env`
+files lack `NODE_ENV` (default Coolify deploys do set it; bespoke
+setups may not). Worth a release note + .env.example call-out.
+
+---
+
+### S-FOLLOW-3 — Refresh-token reuse-detection serialisation (MEDIUM)
+
+Audit reference: `~/infra/reports/v14-security-audit.md` M2.
+
+`src/lib/auth/refresh-token.ts` reuse-detection is a `findUnique`
+followed by a non-transactional `findMany + updateMany`. Concurrent
+first-time refreshes can briefly have both clients holding
+unrevoked access tokens before the loser's are revoked, and a
+parallel reuse attempt doubles the audit-log noise.
+
+**Fix shape**: wrap the rotation in a single `prisma.$transaction`
+with `Serializable` isolation, OR reorder to "claim first, mint
+second": `prisma.refreshToken.update({ where: { id, usedAt: null } })`
+fails atomically if the row was already consumed; only after the
+update succeeds, call `issueAccessAndRefresh`.
+
+Why deferred: needs an integration test that fires N parallel
+refreshes for the same token and asserts exactly one new pair is
+issued. The testcontainers suite is the right home; v1.4.2 PR.
+
+---
+
+### S-FOLLOW-4 — moodLog webhook HMAC lookup column (MEDIUM)
+
+Audit reference: `~/infra/reports/v14-security-audit.md` M3.
+
+`src/app/api/integrations/moodlog/webhook/route.ts` performs an
+O(n) AES-GCM decrypt sweep across all enabled users for every
+webhook hit. Side-channels: timing oracle for ordering, DoS
+amplification (30/min IP rate-limit × n decrypts).
+
+**Fix shape**: add a `moodLogWebhookSecretLookupHash` column on
+`User` (HMAC-SHA-256 keyed by `API_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY`, populated
+alongside the encrypted secret on every write). Webhook does a
+single indexed `findUnique` on the lookup hash, bypassing the
+candidate iteration. The encryption stays as defence-in-depth.
+
+Why deferred: schema migration required. Backfill needs a one-off
+script that decrypts every existing row and writes the lookup
+hash. Owners need to approve the migration window. v1.4.2 or
+v1.5.
+
+---
+
+### S-FOLLOW-5 — moodLog `readMoodLogSecret` legacy fallback (MEDIUM)
+
+Audit reference: `~/infra/reports/v14-security-audit.md` M4.
+
+If `decrypt()` throws inside `src/lib/moodlog-secret.ts:27-37`, the
+function returns the stored value as-is. Intent: legacy plaintext
+rows keep working. Side effect: an attacker with read access to
+the DB obtains the ciphertext blob and can submit it as the literal
+webhook secret.
+
+**Fix shape**: detect "looks like a v1.4 envelope"
+(`/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,32}\..+$/`) and refuse the legacy fallback for
+envelope-shaped values. Log a metric so the rotation-on-write
+contract can be verified to drain.
+
+Why deferred: needs a small data-audit run to confirm no production
+row has a non-envelope value before the strict check goes live.
+
+---
+
+### S-FOLLOW-6 — Restore script writes decrypted JSON with default permissions (MEDIUM)
+
+Audit reference: `~/infra/reports/v14-security-audit.md` M5.
+
+`scripts/restore-backup.ts:73-122` writes the decrypted JSON via
+`writeFileSync(out, plaintext, "utf8")` with default mode (0644
+typical). The file contains decrypted PHI for the restored user.
+
+**Fix shape**:
+`writeFileSync(out, plaintext, { encoding: "utf8", mode: 0o600 })`.
+Optional: warn if `out` is in a world-readable directory.
+
+Why deferred: tiny one-line fix; bundling with the next ops-script
+update keeps the PR coherent.
+
+---
+
+## Performance — deferred
+
+### P-FOLLOW-1 — Recharts top-level import on `/insights` (P0)
+
+Audit reference: `~/infra/reports/v14-performance-audit.md` P0.
+
+`src/app/insights/page.tsx:42-50` static-imports
+`{ ScatterChart, Scatter, XAxis, … } from "recharts"` even though
+`HealthChart` and `MoodChart` 8 lines above are already wrapped in
+`dynamic(…, { ssr: false })`. The static import pulls the whole
+recharts bundle into the route's first JS payload, defeating the
+dynamic split.
+
+**Fix shape**: extract the BP-mood scatter into
+`src/components/charts/bp-mood-scatter.tsx` and import it via
+`dynamic(…, { ssr: false })` like the others.
+
+Why deferred: trivial mechanical change but needs a Lighthouse
+before/after to quantify the bundle-size win for the v1.4.2
+release notes.
+
+---
+
+### P-FOLLOW-2 — `/api/insights/targets` unbounded glucose history scan (P0)
+
+Audit reference: `~/infra/reports/v14-performance-audit.md` P0.
+
+`src/app/api/insights/targets/route.ts:600-604` pulls every glucose
+measurement the user ever logged (no `gte: thirtyDaysAgo`) and
+filters in JS. Diabetic users with multi-year history will
+materialise tens of thousands of rows on every targets fetch.
+
+**Fix shape**: split into "latest per context"
+(`distinct: ["glucoseContext"], orderBy: { measuredAt: "desc" }`)
+and a `measuredAt: { gte: thirtyDaysAgo }` window query, mirroring
+the pattern at lines 102-121 for `latestEverByType`.
+
+Why deferred: needs a per-context test asserting the new query
+returns the same payload shape. Pairs nicely with the MoodEntry
+index migration (P-FOLLOW-3).
+
+---
+
+### P-FOLLOW-3 — `MoodEntry @@index` is on `(userId, date)` not `(userId, moodLoggedAt)` (P0)
+
+Audit reference: `~/infra/reports/v14-performance-audit.md` P0.
+
+`prisma/schema.prisma:438` declares `@@index([userId, date])`, but
+active queries sort/filter by `moodLoggedAt`:
+
+- `src/app/api/insights/targets/route.ts:495`
+- `src/app/api/insights/comprehensive/route.ts:52`
+- `src/app/api/export/route.ts:87`
+
+The unique constraint `@@unique([userId, date, moodLoggedAt])` is
+not selectable by Postgres for windowed `moodLoggedAt`-range reads.
+
+**Fix shape**: add `@@index([userId, moodLoggedAt])` (do NOT drop
+the existing index — the unique still serves the moodlog webhook
+upsert path). New migration `0026_moodentry_moodloggedat_index`.
+
+Why deferred: schema migration. Owner approval for the migration
+window.
+
+---
+
+### P-FOLLOW-4 to -7 — P1 / P2 perf items
+
+- N+1 count() per medication on admin reminder-check
+  (`src/app/api/admin/notifications/reminder-check/route.ts:84`).
+  Replace with `groupBy` on `medicationIntakeEvent`.
+- `/api/analytics` 8-parallel full-history scan
+  (`src/app/api/analytics/route.ts:20-40`). Single `findMany` with
+  `type: { in: types }` and JS-side group.
+- `/api/import` sequential `prisma.measurement.create` per row
+  (`src/app/api/import/route.ts:77-96`). Replace with
+  `createMany({ skipDuplicates: true })`.
+- `pairByTimestamp` not used in `/api/analytics` BP correlation
+  (`src/app/api/analytics/route.ts:80-86`). Replace the quadratic
+  loop with the helper from `@/lib/analytics/correlations`.
+
+---
+
+## Test-quality polish (5 minor items)
+
+Audit reference: `~/infra/reports/v14-test-theatre-audit.md`.
+
+- `src/app/api/gamification/__tests__/ios-format.test.ts` L111-112:
+  upgrade `toBeDefined()` to shape predicates.
+- `src/lib/analytics/__tests__/classifications.test.ts` L169-170:
+  add `toMatch(/60/)` body-content assertion to compliance-alert tests.
+- `src/lib/__tests__/idempotency.test.ts` L145: upgrade bare
+  `toHaveBeenCalled()` to `toHaveBeenCalledWith({ where: …key… })`.
+- `src/app/api/telegram/webhook/__tests__/route.test.ts` L457: same
+  shape — upgrade or drop.
+
+---
+
+## i18n hardcoded strings
+
+Audit reference: `~/infra/reports/v14-i18n-drift-audit.md`.
+
+35+ hardcoded strings in `src/components/settings/ai-section.tsx`
+need to be moved into `messages/{en,de}.json` keys. The settings
+section was extracted in #143 with strings inline as a known
+follow-up; this is the cleanup PR.
+
+Why deferred: low blast-radius (only the AI provider settings page
+shows English to a German user; the dashboard, dialogs, and
+critical UX paths all flow through `t(…)`). v1.4.x or v1.5.
+
+---
+
+## Notes
+
+These are the items the v1.4.1 audit identified that the hardening
+release deliberately did NOT take. The audit also found 0 hallucinated
+medical claims, 0 i18n key-parity gaps, and the test theatre rate
+across the entire codebase was low (5 minor patterns). The codebase
+is in healthy shape; this list is the punch-list for the next
+proactive iteration, not a backlog of bugs we know about and ignore.