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fix(oidc): sign-in no longer fails on a duplicated service-worker callback
A browser SSO sign-in landed on /auth/login?error=oidc_failed even though it had succeeded. Two layers conspired: - The service worker enables navigation preload, but its fetch handler returned early for /api/ paths without calling event.respondWith(). For the OIDC login/callback navigations that left the preload unconsumed, so the browser also ran its own default fetch and the callback was requested twice. The first request redeemed the single-use authorization code and set the session; the second tried to redeem the now-consumed code, failed at the IdP token endpoint, and that 307 to the error page is what the user saw. - Even with the double request gone, a legitimate retry (proxy, double navigation) hit the same wall on the server. Fix both layers: - The worker settles /api/auth/* navigations itself, consuming the preload response (or fetching once when there is none), so exactly one request reaches the server. These responses are never cached. - The callback is idempotent. When the single-use state cookie is already consumed but the request carries a database-validated, unexpired session, the callback treats it as a duplicate of a completed login and redirects into the app instead of surfacing an error. The authorization code is never exchanged on this branch, and a consumed/forged/expired state from a caller with no valid session still fails closed with the unchanged oidc_state error. Refs #600
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@@ -38,7 +38,11 @@ vi.mock("@/lib/db", () => ({
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}));
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vi.mock("@/lib/auth/audit", () => ({ auditLog: vi.fn() }));
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vi.mock("@/lib/auth/session", () => ({ createSession: vi.fn() }));
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vi.mock("@/lib/auth/session", () => ({
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createSession: vi.fn(),
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validateSessionFromCookieValue: vi.fn(),
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SESSION_COOKIE_NAME: "healthlog_session",
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}));
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vi.mock("@/lib/auth/login-alert", () => ({ recordSignInDevice: vi.fn() }));
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vi.mock("@/lib/auth/mfa/challenge", () => ({
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createMfaChallenge: vi.fn(async () => ({
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@@ -84,7 +88,10 @@ import { GET } from "../route";
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import { checkAuthSurfaceRateLimit } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
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import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
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import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit";
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import { createSession } from "@/lib/auth/session";
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import {
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createSession,
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validateSessionFromCookieValue,
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} from "@/lib/auth/session";
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import { createMfaChallenge } from "@/lib/auth/mfa/challenge";
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import {
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getOidcConfig,
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@@ -591,6 +598,52 @@ describe("GET /api/auth/oidc/callback", () => {
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});
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});
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describe("GET /api/auth/oidc/callback — duplicate-callback idempotency", () => {
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// A duplicated callback for the SAME sign-in: the first callback already
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// redeemed the single-use code, set the session cookie, and deleted the
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// single-use state cookie — so the duplicate arrives with a live `code` +
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// `state` in the query but NO state cookie. Whether it also fails closed
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// turns entirely on whether a VALIDATED session is present.
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function duplicateRequest(withSession: boolean): NextRequest {
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const req = new NextRequest(
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"http://localhost/api/auth/oidc/callback?code=abc&state=STATE",
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);
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if (withSession) req.cookies.set("healthlog_session", "hls_valid_secret");
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return req;
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}
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it("redirects a duplicate into the app when a valid session is present, WITHOUT re-redeeming the code", async () => {
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vi.mocked(validateSessionFromCookieValue).mockResolvedValue({
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session: { id: "sess-1", expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 1_000_000) },
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user: userRow() as never,
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} as never);
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const res = await GET(duplicateRequest(true));
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const location = res.headers.get("location")!;
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// Lands in the app, not on the error page.
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expect(location).not.toContain("error=");
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expect(new URL(location).pathname).toBe("/");
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// The now-consumed authorization code is NEVER exchanged again, and no
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// second session is minted — the redirect is inert.
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expect(exchangeCodeForTokens).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(createSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("still fails closed (oidc_state) for a consumed/forged state with NO valid session", async () => {
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// The security assertion: a caller who presents a real-looking callback
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// but holds no valid session gets the unchanged error and the code is
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// never redeemed. This must stay red if the fail-closed path is weakened.
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vi.mocked(validateSessionFromCookieValue).mockResolvedValue(null);
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const res = await GET(duplicateRequest(false));
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expect(res.headers.get("location")).toContain("error=oidc_state");
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expect(exchangeCodeForTokens).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(createSession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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});
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describe("GET /api/auth/oidc/callback — native branch", () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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vi.mocked(checkAuthSurfaceRateLimit).mockResolvedValue({
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@@ -6,7 +6,11 @@ import { checkAuthSurfaceRateLimit } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
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import { decrypt } from "@/lib/crypto";
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import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
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import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit";
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import { createSession } from "@/lib/auth/session";
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import {
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createSession,
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validateSessionFromCookieValue,
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SESSION_COOKIE_NAME,
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} from "@/lib/auth/session";
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import { recordSignInDevice } from "@/lib/auth/login-alert";
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import {
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deriveUniqueUsername,
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@@ -195,7 +199,39 @@ export const GET = apiHandler(async (req: NextRequest) => {
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// and there is nothing safe to hand the app (spec §1 web-fallback).
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if (!code || !state) return errorRedirect("oidc_state");
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if (!stored) return errorRedirect("oidc_state");
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if (!stored) {
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// Defence-in-depth idempotency for a duplicated callback. The single-use
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// state cookie is set with `path: "/api/auth/oidc"` and DELETED by the
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// first callback the moment it succeeds. A second callback for the same
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// sign-in (a client/proxy retry, a double navigation, or the
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// service-worker double-request this release also fixes) therefore arrives
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// with the state cookie already gone — `stored` is null — and, because the
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// first callback set the session, it carries a live session cookie.
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// Redeeming the now-consumed authorization code again fails at the IdP and
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// surfaces `?error=oidc_failed` on a sign-in that actually succeeded. So
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// when a VALIDATED session is present, treat this as a duplicate of a
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// completed login and send the user into the app instead of erroring.
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//
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// Fail-closed is preserved for the real attack case: the code is NEVER
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// exchanged on this branch, and the session is resolved against the
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// database + its expiry (not merely "a cookie is present"). A forged,
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// replayed, or expired state from a caller with no valid session gets the
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// unchanged `oidc_state` error; a caller who already holds their own valid
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// session gains nothing here but a redirect to a page they could already
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// reach — no code redemption, no session mint, no identity change.
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const existingSession = await validateSessionFromCookieValue(
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req.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME)?.value,
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);
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if (existingSession) {
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annotate({ meta: { reason: "duplicate_callback_authenticated" } });
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const response = NextResponse.redirect(oidcAppUrl("/"));
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// The state cookie is already consumed; delete defensively so a stray
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// blob can never outlive this response.
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deleteStateCookie(response);
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return response;
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}
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return errorRedirect("oidc_state");
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}
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// CSRF check — timing-safe, byte-for-byte, mirroring the Withings callback.
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if (
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