auth: let a token prove a second factor for erasure

Account deletion and the record wipe both demand a fresh second-factor
proof once a factor is enrolled, and that proof lived on the session row.
A native client has no session row, so an account with TOTP or a security
key could not delete itself from the app on any request it could build:
requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled fell through to requireFreshMfa, which resolves
via getSession and answers 401 to a perfectly valid token. App Store
guideline 5.1.1(v) asks for exactly that deletion.

Add requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled beside the cookie-only sibling
rather than softening it. Its cookie arm is the sibling's, unchanged;
its Bearer arm takes the single-use elevation the second-factor
management routes already accept, with the fresh-factor rule pinned on,
so a password-proved elevation cannot erase an account any more than a
password login satisfies the gate on the web. No factor rides the request
body: one mint surface, one redemption path. Scope stays fail-closed, so
a narrow token is refused before the header is read.

The elevation is spent immediately before the erasure, after the typed
confirmation and the last-admin check, so a rejected request does not
burn a proof against a 5-per-15-minute mint ceiling. The Bearer branch
of requireMfaManagementAuth moves into a shared helper so both gates read
and claim in the same place.

The elevation guard grows a section naming the two routes, because the
set of surfaces an elevation can unlock only stays small if adding to it
is a visible edit.
This commit is contained in:
Marc-André Bombeck committed 2026-09-02 11:51:09 +02:00
1 parent ad0a055fdc
commit 5856b2a547
6 files changed
+897 -26

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+24 -2
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { apiSuccess, apiError, getClientIp } from "@/lib/api-response";
import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
import {
apiHandler,
requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled,
requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled,
MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
} from "@/lib/api-handler";
import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
@@ -23,9 +23,20 @@ export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
* step-up (within MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS) in addition to the typed
* confirmation, so a hijacked live session cannot erase the record. Accounts
* without MFA are unaffected and keep the typed-confirmation-only contract.
*
* Over Bearer the fresh step-up is a single-use elevation from
* `POST /api/auth/step-up` in the `X-Step-Up` header, minted against a TOTP,
* security-key, or passkey proof — a password proof is refused. App Store
* guideline 5.1.1(v) requires in-app deletion, and until this arm existed an
* MFA-enrolled account could not delete itself from the native app at all.
* The elevation is spent immediately before the erasure, after every cheap
* refusal, so a bad confirmation does not burn it.
*/
export const DELETE = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
const { user } = await requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS);
const auth = await requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(
MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
);
const { user } = auth;
let confirm = "";
try {
@@ -57,6 +68,17 @@ export const DELETE = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
const userId = user.id;
const username = user.username;
// Every refusal that costs nothing has passed; spend the Bearer elevation
// now (a no-op on the cookie path). A lost claim throws the same 401 as a
// missing one, so a concurrent redemption still has exactly one winner.
//
// One refusal can still land after this: the last-Guardian 409, which is
// decided under the record lock inside the lifecycle transaction and has no
// cheap pre-check. That caller spends a proof on a refusal and has to mint
// another. Moving the spend past the transaction would be the worse trade —
// the elevation would stay redeemable while the erasure was already running.
await auth.commitElevation();
try {
await deleteGuardianAccountWithLifecycle(userId, async (tx) => {
// The invariant has now passed, so this success event cannot survive a
+12 -3
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { apiSuccess, apiError, getClientIp } from "@/lib/api-response";
import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
import {
apiHandler,
requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled,
requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled,
MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
} from "@/lib/api-handler";
import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
@@ -47,10 +47,15 @@ const WIPE_TRANSACTION_MAX_WAIT_MS = 15_000;
*
* v1.23 — gated by a fresh step-up for MFA-enrolled accounts (see the account
* deletion route); single-factor accounts keep the typed-confirmation-only
* contract.
* contract. Over Bearer the step-up is a fresh-factor elevation in the
* `X-Step-Up` header, spent right before the transaction — the same arm the
* account deletion route carries, for the same App Store reason.
*/
export const DELETE = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
const { user } = await requireFreshMfaIfEnrolled(MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS);
const auth = await requireFreshMfaOrElevationIfEnrolled(
MFA_STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
);
const { user } = auth;
let confirm = "";
try {
@@ -70,6 +75,10 @@ export const DELETE = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
const userId = user.id;
// The confirmation has passed; spend the Bearer elevation before the wipe
// (a no-op on the cookie path).
await auth.commitElevation();
let counts: Record<string, number>;
try {
counts = await prisma.$transaction(