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feat(jobs): clean expired sessions, tokens and challenges nightly
Sessions, refresh tokens, access tokens, trusted devices and the second-factor and passkey challenges were never removed after they expired, so the sign-in tables were mostly dead rows. auth-ledger-cleanup deletes a session, token or trusted device 30 days after it expired, which keeps every row the login throttle's 30-day known-address check and refresh reuse detection can still read; a revoked token without an expiry stays listed. Challenges go a day after expiry. Security activity reads the audit log and loses nothing.
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/**
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* Nightly cleanup of the dead rows of the sign-in ledgers.
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*
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* Every sign-in writes a session, every native sign-in and refresh writes a
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* refresh token and an access token, every second-factor prompt and passkey
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* ceremony writes a challenge, and "remember this device" writes a trusted
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* device. Nothing removed them once they expired, so the tables were mostly
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* dead rows: on a long-running instance nine in ten sessions and access
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* tokens had expired.
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*
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* What still reads a dead row decides how long it stays:
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*
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* - Sessions and refresh tokens: the login throttle recognises a source by a
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* session or refresh token created from the same address in the last 30
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* days (`KNOWN_ADDRESS_WINDOW_MS`), and by any refresh token of the device.
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* Reuse detection reads a consumed refresh token until it expires (an
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* expired one is refused before reuse is considered). So a row goes 30 days
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* after it expired: it was created before that, so the address window
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* cannot reach it, and a device that has not signed in for that long is a
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* new source again. A revoked token waits for its expiry like any other.
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* - Access tokens (`api_tokens`): the token list shows revoked and expired
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* tokens so their owner can see what ended. One goes 30 days after it
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* expired; a revoked token without an expiry stays, since nothing records
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* when it was revoked. Connector tokens have their own sweep
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* (`mcp-token-cleanup`).
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* - Second-factor and passkey challenges: nothing reads one past its expiry.
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* A day of slack keeps a ceremony in flight at midnight out of the way.
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* - Trusted devices: an expired one no longer skips the second factor and is
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* not listed; it goes 30 days after it expired.
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*
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* Security activity is read from the audit log, never from these tables, so
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* it loses nothing. Each table is deleted in bounded batches.
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*/
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import type { Job } from "pg-boss";
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import type { PrismaClient } from "@/generated/prisma/client";
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import { jobDone, type JobOutcome } from "@/lib/jobs/job-outcome";
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import { PURGE_BATCH_SIZE, PURGE_MAX_BATCHES } from "@/lib/jobs/purge-batch";
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import { getWorkerPrisma } from "@/lib/jobs/reminder/shared";
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import { withBackgroundEvent } from "@/lib/logging/background";
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export const AUTH_LEDGER_CLEANUP_QUEUE = "auth-ledger-cleanup";
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/** Daily at 03:35 Europe/Berlin, inside the 03:xx maintenance window. */
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export const AUTH_LEDGER_CLEANUP_CRON = "35 3 * * *";
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const DAY_MS = 86_400_000;
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/** Days an expired session, token or trusted device is kept. */
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export const AUTH_LEDGER_EXPIRED_GRACE_DAYS = 30;
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/** Days an expired challenge is kept. */
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export const AUTH_CHALLENGE_GRACE_DAYS = 1;
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export interface AuthLedgerCleanupPayload {
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triggeredAt?: string;
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}
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/**
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* The tables and the column each one expires by. Literals, spliced into the
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* delete; `api_tokens.expires_at` is nullable and a null never matches.
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*/
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const LEDGERS = [
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{
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key: "sessions",
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table: "sessions",
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graceDays: AUTH_LEDGER_EXPIRED_GRACE_DAYS,
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},
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{
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key: "refresh_tokens",
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table: "refresh_tokens",
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graceDays: AUTH_LEDGER_EXPIRED_GRACE_DAYS,
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},
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{
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key: "api_tokens",
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table: "api_tokens",
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graceDays: AUTH_LEDGER_EXPIRED_GRACE_DAYS,
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},
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{
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key: "trusted_devices",
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table: "trusted_devices",
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graceDays: AUTH_LEDGER_EXPIRED_GRACE_DAYS,
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},
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{
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key: "mfa_challenges",
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table: "mfa_challenges",
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graceDays: AUTH_CHALLENGE_GRACE_DAYS,
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},
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{
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key: "auth_challenges",
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table: "auth_challenges",
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graceDays: AUTH_CHALLENGE_GRACE_DAYS,
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},
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] as const;
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export type AuthLedger = (typeof LEDGERS)[number]["key"];
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export interface AuthLedgerCleanupResult {
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deleted: Record<AuthLedger, number>;
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/** False when a table stopped at the batch cap with rows left. */
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drained: boolean;
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}
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export async function cleanupAuthLedgers(
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prisma: PrismaClient,
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now: Date = new Date(),
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{ batchSize = PURGE_BATCH_SIZE, maxBatches = PURGE_MAX_BATCHES } = {},
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): Promise<AuthLedgerCleanupResult> {
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const deleted = {} as Record<AuthLedger, number>;
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let drained = true;
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for (const ledger of LEDGERS) {
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const cutoff = new Date(now.getTime() - ledger.graceDays * DAY_MS);
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let total = 0;
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let finished = false;
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for (let batch = 0; batch < maxBatches; batch++) {
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// `ledger.table` is one of the literals above, never input.
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const removed = await prisma.$executeRawUnsafe(
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`DELETE FROM "${ledger.table}" WHERE "id" IN (
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SELECT "id" FROM "${ledger.table}"
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WHERE "expires_at" < $1 LIMIT $2)`,
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cutoff,
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batchSize,
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);
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total += removed;
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if (removed < batchSize) {
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finished = true;
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break;
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}
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}
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deleted[ledger.key] = total;
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if (!finished) drained = false;
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}
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return { deleted, drained };
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}
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export async function handleAuthLedgerCleanup(
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jobs: Job<AuthLedgerCleanupPayload>[],
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): Promise<JobOutcome> {
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void jobs;
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return withBackgroundEvent("job.auth_ledger_cleanup", async (evt) => {
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try {
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const { deleted, drained } = await cleanupAuthLedgers(getWorkerPrisma());
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for (const [key, count] of Object.entries(deleted)) {
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evt.addMeta(`auth_ledger_cleanup_${key}`, count);
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}
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evt.addMeta("auth_ledger_cleanup_drained", drained);
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if (!drained) {
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evt.addWarning(
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"auth-ledger-cleanup stopped at the batch cap; a backlog remains for the next run",
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);
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}
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return jobDone({
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sessions_deleted: deleted.sessions,
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refresh_tokens_deleted: deleted.refresh_tokens,
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access_tokens_deleted: deleted.api_tokens,
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trusted_devices_deleted: deleted.trusted_devices,
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challenges_deleted: deleted.mfa_challenges + deleted.auth_challenges,
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drained,
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});
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} catch (err) {
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evt.addWarning(`auth-ledger-cleanup failed: ${err}`);
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throw err;
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}
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});
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}
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@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ export const JOB_FACT_ALLOWLIST: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
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"budget_blocked",
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"cached",
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"candidates_scanned",
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// The nightly sign-in ledger cleanup (`auth-ledger-cleanup`).
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"challenges_deleted",
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"connect_tickets_deleted",
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"connections_deleted",
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"considered",
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@@ -208,6 +210,7 @@ export const JOB_FACT_ALLOWLIST: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
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"records_oversized",
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"records_read",
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"refreshed",
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"refresh_tokens_deleted",
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"refused",
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"reminders_due",
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"removed",
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@@ -251,6 +254,7 @@ export const JOB_FACT_ALLOWLIST: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
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"scheduled",
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"sent",
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"served",
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"sessions_deleted",
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"side_effects_migrated",
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// v1.42.4 — integration watchdog: sources newly flagged as silent.
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"silences_flagged",
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@@ -277,6 +281,7 @@ export const JOB_FACT_ALLOWLIST: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
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"tls_pin_monitor_known_count",
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"tls_pin_monitor_outcome",
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"total",
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"trusted_devices_deleted",
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"unchanged",
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"updated",
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"users",
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@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@ export const QUEUE_RUNTIME: Readonly<Record<string, QueueRuntime>> = {
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"soft-delete-purge": short(
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"At most 40 batches of 5 000 rows per table, over a few small tables.",
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),
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"auth-ledger-cleanup": short("At most 40 batches of 5 000 rows per table."),
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"document-summary-reaper": short("One updateMany."),
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"cycle-prediction-refresh": short(
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"Arithmetic per eligible account, no provider call.",
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@@ -296,6 +296,12 @@ import {
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handleSoftDeletePurge,
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type SoftDeletePurgePayload,
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} from "@/lib/jobs/soft-delete-purge";
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import {
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AUTH_LEDGER_CLEANUP_QUEUE,
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AUTH_LEDGER_CLEANUP_CRON,
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handleAuthLedgerCleanup,
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type AuthLedgerCleanupPayload,
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} from "@/lib/jobs/auth-ledger-cleanup";
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import {
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DOCUMENT_SUMMARY_REAPER_QUEUE,
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DOCUMENT_SUMMARY_REAPER_CRON,
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@@ -589,6 +595,9 @@ const allQueues = [
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// Nightly purge of expired tombstones for every soft-delete model the
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// retention register hands to it (`soft-delete-retention.ts`).
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SOFT_DELETE_PURGE_QUEUE,
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// Nightly removal of expired sessions, tokens, challenges and trusted
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// devices.
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AUTH_LEDGER_CLEANUP_QUEUE,
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// Document vault — hourly reaper for summary rows stuck on PENDING (a
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// job dead past its retry budget). Without this entry the schedule
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// silently no-ops and a dead "wird generiert" claim never converges to
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@@ -791,6 +800,8 @@ const schedules: ScheduleEntry[] = [
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// Daily 03:42 Europe/Berlin, after the sync-domain tombstone cleanup. The
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// next night is the retry: the purge picks up whatever a failed run left.
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[SOFT_DELETE_PURGE_QUEUE, SOFT_DELETE_PURGE_CRON, cronIsTheRetry],
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// Daily 03:35 Europe/Berlin. Same: the next night deletes what is left.
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[AUTH_LEDGER_CLEANUP_QUEUE, AUTH_LEDGER_CLEANUP_CRON, cronIsTheRetry],
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// Document vault — hourly heal of summary rows stuck on PENDING. The next
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// tick is the retry: the updateMany is idempotent and the TTL predicate
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// re-selects anything a failed tick left behind.
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@@ -1160,6 +1171,12 @@ export async function registerMaintenanceQueues(
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{ localConcurrency: 1 },
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handleSoftDeletePurge,
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);
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await createAndWork<AuthLedgerCleanupPayload>(
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boss,
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AUTH_LEDGER_CLEANUP_QUEUE,
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{ localConcurrency: 1 },
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handleAuthLedgerCleanup,
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);
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// v1.40 — background document AI runs. Each job is one run, under the lock
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// `lockedPass` takes per run id, so a redelivery never reads beside the
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// first delivery; the claim inside is conditional as well.
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@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ const subsystemSurface = {
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"achievement-unlock-sweep": { audience: "system" },
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"measurement-tombstone-cleanup": { audience: "system" },
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"soft-delete-purge": { audience: "system" },
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"auth-ledger-cleanup": { audience: "system" },
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"coach-message-cleanup": { audience: "system" },
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"workout-insight-claim-cleanup": { audience: "system" },
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"note-encryption-backfill": { audience: "system" },
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