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feat(02-12.1): refuse a record request whose context has moved
- both record resolvers check the fence after authentication and before the carrier, off the one session row that also decides the scope - POST /api/account/switch takes an optional expectedEpoch and writes conditionally, so concurrent switchers resolve to one outcome - GET /api/auth/me publishes the context a browser bootstraps from - every response that resolved a record scope echoes it back - regenerate the API contract
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@@ -151,10 +151,16 @@ function user(
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/**
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* Sign the delegate in over the cookie transport.
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*
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* `recordEpoch` defaults to 0, which is the record-session fence's exemption:
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* a session that has never been pointed at another record is served without a
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* fence header, so every pre-fence case in this file keeps meaning what it
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* meant. Cases that want the fence live pass an epoch explicitly.
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* v1.37.0 — this also attaches a TRUTHFUL record-session assertion, because
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* that is what the shipped browser client does on every same-origin request.
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* Without it every switched case in this file would be testing the fence's
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* pre-fence-bundle arm rather than the resolver arm it was written for: a
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* session pointed at a record is fenced, and a request carrying no assertion at
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* all is refused with 403 before the resolver decides anything.
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*
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* `recordEpoch` defaults to 0. A session at 0 pointed at its own record is the
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* fence's exemption, so the un-switched cases are byte-for-byte what they were.
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* Cases that want a stale or absent assertion override the headers themselves.
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*/
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function signedInCookie(
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actingAsUserId: string | null = null,
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@@ -170,6 +176,8 @@ function signedInCookie(
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},
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user: user(DELEGATE, role) as never,
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});
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headerJar.set("x-healthlog-record-epoch", String(recordEpoch));
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headerJar.set("x-healthlog-record-scope", actingAsUserId ?? "self");
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}
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/** Sign the delegate in over the Bearer transport. */
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@@ -906,3 +914,115 @@ describe("the guardian resolver gates on the marker, not the grant", () => {
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expect(fencedBody).not.toContain("managed");
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});
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});
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/**
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* v1.37.0 — the record-session fence, from the resolver's side.
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*
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* The integration file proves the refusal against a real database with the
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* `lastUsedAt` / `sharing.record.accessed` instrument. What this adds is the
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* cheapest falsifiable statement of the same property: the grant query is not
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* issued at all.
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*
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* The instrument is `prisma.accountGrant.findFirst`, not a mocked
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* `findActiveGrant`. This file deliberately does not mock `@/lib/sharing/grants`
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* — the resolver consuming that module's own idea of "active" is a property
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* under test here, and a mocked predicate would report it working while it was
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* broken. The Prisma spy is one layer lower, is honest about the same fact, and
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* costs nothing.
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*/
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describe("the record-session fence, above the grant lookup", () => {
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it("issues no grant query when the asserted epoch is behind", async () => {
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signedInCookie(OWNER, "USER", 4);
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liveGrant();
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headerJar.set("x-healthlog-record-epoch", "3");
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headerJar.set("x-healthlog-record-scope", OWNER);
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const res = await route(() => requireRecordAuth("read", "measurements"))();
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expect(res.status).toBe(409);
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expect((await res.json()).meta.errorCode).toBe("sharing.session.changed");
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// The whole point: nothing was asked of the grant table.
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expect(prisma.accountGrant.findFirst).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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// And nothing was stamped on it either.
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expect(touched).toEqual([]);
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});
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it("issues no grant query when the client sent no assertion at all", async () => {
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signedInCookie(OWNER, "USER", 4);
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liveGrant();
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// A bundle that predates the fence: no assertion on the wire at all.
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headerJar.delete("x-healthlog-record-epoch");
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headerJar.delete("x-healthlog-record-scope");
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const res = await route(() => requireRecordAuth("read", "measurements"))();
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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expect((await res.json()).meta.errorCode).toBe("sharing.access.denied");
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expect(prisma.accountGrant.findFirst).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("POSITIVE CONTROL: a matching assertion does reach the grant query", async () => {
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// Without this the test above would pass for a resolver that never queried
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// the grant table at all.
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signedInCookie(OWNER, "USER", 4);
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liveGrant();
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headerJar.set("x-healthlog-record-epoch", "4");
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headerJar.set("x-healthlog-record-scope", OWNER);
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const ctx = await resolveInRoute(() =>
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requireRecordAuth("read", "measurements"),
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);
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expect(ctx.user.id).toBe(OWNER);
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expect(prisma.accountGrant.findFirst).toHaveBeenCalled();
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expect(touched).toEqual(["grant-1"]);
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});
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it("guards the guardian resolver the same way", async () => {
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signedInCookie(OWNER, "USER", 2);
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userRows.set(OWNER, user(OWNER, "USER", new Date()));
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liveGrant({ access: "MANAGE" });
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headerJar.set("x-healthlog-record-epoch", "1");
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headerJar.set("x-healthlog-record-scope", OWNER);
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const res = await route(() => requireGuardianAuth())();
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expect(res.status).toBe(409);
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expect(prisma.accountGrant.findFirst).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("leaves a never-switched session alone, header or no header", async () => {
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// The exemption. A session at epoch 0 pointed at its own record is served
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// byte-for-byte as it was before the fence existed.
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signedInCookie(null, "USER", 0);
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headerJar.delete("x-healthlog-record-epoch");
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headerJar.delete("x-healthlog-record-scope");
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const ctx = await resolveInRoute(() =>
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requireRecordAuth("read", "measurements"),
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);
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expect(ctx.user.id).toBe(DELEGATE);
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expect(prisma.accountGrant.findFirst).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("echoes the context it served under, and only when it resolved one", async () => {
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signedInCookie(OWNER, "USER", 4);
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liveGrant();
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headerJar.set("x-healthlog-record-epoch", "4");
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headerJar.set("x-healthlog-record-scope", OWNER);
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const served = await route(() =>
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requireRecordAuth("read", "measurements"),
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)();
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expect(served.headers.get("x-healthlog-record-epoch")).toBe("4");
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expect(served.headers.get("x-healthlog-record-scope")).toBe(OWNER);
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// An actor surface decides nothing about a record and therefore echoes
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// nothing. A client that discarded on ABSENCE would throw this away, and
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// with it the public `/api/version` poll.
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headerJar.clear();
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signedInCookie(null, "USER", 0);
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const actor = await route(() => requireActorAuth())();
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expect(actor.status).toBe(200);
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expect(actor.headers.get("x-healthlog-record-epoch")).toBeNull();
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expect(actor.headers.get("x-healthlog-record-scope")).toBeNull();
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});
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});
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