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fix(crypto): rotate the backup blob and stop keying the registry on names
`DataBackup.data` holds every weekly disaster-recovery snapshot and every uploaded pack, AES-256-GCM at rest like everything else, under a column called `data`. The rotation registry was keyed on the `*Encrypted` naming convention, so the script never read a backup, reported zero rows remaining, and the runbook read that zero as permission to retire the previous key. Following the documented procedure destroyed every stored backup — the copy an operator reaches for precisely when nothing else works. Register it, and register the idempotent-replay response cache the same sweep turned up. The backup column walks in bounded batches (one row is a whole compressed account) and re-seals the ciphertext without reading the plaintext, so both stored envelopes come back byte-identical and so will any later one. The cache is marked disposable: a row it cannot read is dropped rather than counted as an error, because keeping it only guarantees the next replay gets a body it cannot parse. Running the script against a seeded database rather than reading it turned up two more. It died on the mood day-context note, whose table is keyed on the entry rather than on an `id`, and abandoned every column after it — the backups included. And the document index's verbatim text rotated without ever being named in the summary. Make the naming assumption stop carrying weight. A new guard traces the encryption helpers through their wrappers, walks every Prisma write payload, and fails when a column receives ciphertext without being registered. It asserts an anchored, non-zero match count so a matcher that stops matching fails instead of passing. A second check pins each model's primary key against the schema. The script now ends by naming the registered columns it did NOT walk and exiting non-zero when any is missing: a zero that means "nothing left" and a zero that means "never looked" must not print the same. The runbook's retire-the-key step was rewritten around that signal, and tells an operator who already rotated on an older release how to get their backups back.
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@@ -41,35 +41,76 @@ under `v1` (the synthetic id assigned to the existing `ENCRYPTION_KEY`).
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Restart the app. New writes are now encrypted under `v2`; existing
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`v1`-keyed and legacy bare rows still decrypt because the `v1` entry is
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retained.
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3. **Run the rotation script** to re-encrypt every existing encrypted column
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3. **Run the rotation script** to re-encrypt every registered encrypted column
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under the new active key:
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```
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pnpm dlx tsx scripts/rotate-encryption-key.ts v2
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```
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The script is idempotent — running it again is a no-op for rows already
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prefixed with `v2.`. It rotates every registered encrypted column across
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all models, plus the two non-`*Encrypted` members:
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`IntegrationStatus.lastError` and `CoachMessage.encryptedContent`
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(Bytes). The canonical registry lives in
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`src/lib/crypto/encrypted-columns.ts`; a guard test fails CI if any
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`*Encrypted` column in the schema is missing from the registry or not
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referenced by the script. The summary line at the
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end shows `scanned`, `rotated`, and `errors` per table+field; treat
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`errors > 0` as a hard failure and re-run after fixing the cause.
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4. **Drop the old key (optional, recommended).** Once the script has run
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cleanly:
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prefixed with `v2.`. It rotates every column in the canonical registry
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(`src/lib/crypto/encrypted-columns.ts`), which covers the `*Encrypted`
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columns plus the ones whose names say nothing about their contents:
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`IntegrationStatus.lastError`, `CoachMessage.encryptedContent`,
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`NotificationChannel.config`, the OAuth `accessToken` / `refreshToken`
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columns, the web-push `p256dh` / `auth` secrets, the idempotent-replay
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`IdempotencyKey.responseBody`, and `DataBackup.data` — the whole-account
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backup blob.
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Read three things off the output before going further:
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- the per-column line, `scanned` / `rotated` / `errors` / `dropped`. Treat
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`errors > 0` as a hard failure and re-run after fixing the cause. A
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`dropped` count is only ever a cache row the run could not read and
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deleted rather than leave unreadable.
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- `Columns walked: N/M registered`. The two numbers must match.
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- a `NOT WALKED` block, if one appears. It lists registered columns this
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run skipped, and the run exits non-zero. Rotation is incomplete; do not
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go on to step 4.
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Two guard tests keep the registry honest in CI: one scans the schema for
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`*Encrypted` columns, the other derives the ciphertext-bearing columns from
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the Prisma write payloads, which is what catches a column that holds
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ciphertext under an ordinary name.
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4. **Confirm nothing is left on the old key, THEN drop it.** This is the step
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that destroys data if it is taken on a bad signal, so check the corpus
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rather than the absence of complaints. Either re-run the script — a clean
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second pass reports `rotated=0`, `errors=0` and a full `Columns walked`
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line — or open **Admin → Encryption** and confirm the status view reports
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zero rows outside the active key. Both read the same registry the rotation
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walks.
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A zero only means "nothing left" when the run also says it walked every
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registered column. A zero from a run that skipped columns means "never
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looked", and dropping the old key on it makes those rows permanently
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undecryptable — `decrypt()` is fail-closed and there is no recovery path.
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Only once the corpus reads clean:
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```
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ENCRYPTION_KEYS='{"v2":"<new key>"}'
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ENCRYPTION_ACTIVE_KEY_ID="v2"
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# ENCRYPTION_KEY can now be removed
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```
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Restart. The legacy single-key fallback is now disconnected; only `v2`
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exists.
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> **Backups are covered, and were not always.** `DataBackup.data` holds every
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> weekly disaster-recovery snapshot and every uploaded pack, encrypted like
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> everything else but under a column called `data`. It was outside the
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> registry until v1.38.6, so a rotation before that release reported zero
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> rows remaining without ever reading a backup. If you rotated on an older
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> release and dropped the previous key, the stored backups are encrypted
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> under the key you removed: put that key back into `ENCRYPTION_KEYS` and
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> re-run the rotation on this release before removing it again.
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## Adding a third key (v2 → v3)
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Same procedure, just shift the labels — keep `v2` in the map until the
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script reports zero `v2.`-prefixed rows remaining.
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Same procedure, just shift the labels — keep `v2` in the map until a full
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run (every registered column walked) reports zero `v2.`-prefixed rows
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remaining.
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```
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ENCRYPTION_KEYS='{"v2":"<old>","v3":"<new>"}'
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