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https://github.com/MBombeck/HealthLog.git
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fix(api): narrow swallowed database errors and redact the incident URL
The incident forwarder stripped the query string but not path-segment secrets from the reported URL; route it through the same redaction the message and stack already use. Several delete-and-swallow paths caught every error as the expected unique/absent-row case, masking real failures on security-notification, logout, and integration-disconnect paths and the Telegram reply-consume guard; narrow each to the specific Prisma code and let real failures surface.
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@@ -340,9 +340,11 @@ export async function requireAuth(
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*
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* The validation itself lives in the transport-agnostic `resolveBearerToken`
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* (`./auth/bearer`) — the single source of truth shared with the MCP wire. This
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* wrapper adds the HTTP-edge concerns: the `auth.bearer.*` audit trail for both
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* outcomes and the Wide-Event `auth_method: "bearer"` annotation, then maps the
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* result onto the `AuthContext` contract (`session.id` carries the token id).
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* wrapper adds the HTTP-edge concerns: the `auth.bearer.failure` audit trail
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* (only the failure path writes a durable audit row — the success row was
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* intentionally dropped for perf) and the Wide-Event `auth_method: "bearer"`
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* annotation, then maps the result onto the `AuthContext` contract
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* (`session.id` carries the token id).
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*
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* Authorisation contract (unchanged): a route that declares no
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* `requiredPermission` accepts any valid token; one that declares a scope
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@@ -648,7 +650,12 @@ async function reportToGlitchtip(
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level: "error",
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type: err.name || "Error",
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stack: redactOptional(err.stack),
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url: scrubbedUrl,
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// Query string is already stripped above, but path-segment secrets
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// (e.g. `/api/withings/webhook/<secret>`, `/api/whoop/webhook/<secret>`)
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// survive that strip. Run the same `redactSecrets` pass that guards the
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// message/stack so a `PATH_SECRET_PATHS`-registered secret cannot reach
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// the external incident UI.
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url: redactSecrets(scrubbedUrl),
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sourceTag: "healthlog-api-handler",
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requestId: evt.getRequestId(),
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},
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@@ -117,10 +117,10 @@ describe("recordSignInDevice — new-device dedupe", () => {
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expect(dispatchNotification).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("a unique-index race on create does not double-alert", async () => {
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it("a unique-index race (P2002) on create does not double-alert", async () => {
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vi.mocked(prisma.userKnownDevice.findUnique).mockResolvedValue(null);
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vi.mocked(prisma.userKnownDevice.create).mockRejectedValue(
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new Error("unique violation"),
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Object.assign(new Error("unique violation"), { code: "P2002" }),
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);
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const res = await recordSignInDevice({
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@@ -133,6 +133,27 @@ describe("recordSignInDevice — new-device dedupe", () => {
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expect(dispatchNotification).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("a non-P2002 create failure is NOT masked as a known device", async () => {
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// A real DB fault must not be misclassified as "device already known" —
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// that would silently skip the SECURITY_ALERT + audit row. The narrowed
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// catch rethrows it to the outer handler, which records the failure and
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// returns the safe `{ known: false, alerted: false }` verdict without
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// dispatching a bogus alert.
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vi.mocked(prisma.userKnownDevice.findUnique).mockResolvedValue(null);
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vi.mocked(prisma.userKnownDevice.create).mockRejectedValue(
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Object.assign(new Error("connection reset"), { code: "P1001" }),
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);
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const res = await recordSignInDevice({
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userId: "u1",
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ip: "203.0.113.9",
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userAgent: UA,
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});
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expect(res).toEqual({ known: false, alerted: false });
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expect(dispatchNotification).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("never persists the raw User-Agent — only the salted hash + coarse label", async () => {
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vi.mocked(prisma.userKnownDevice.findUnique).mockResolvedValue(null);
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vi.mocked(prisma.userKnownDevice.create).mockResolvedValue({} as never);
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@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ vi.mock("@/lib/db", () => ({
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prisma: {
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session: {
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findUnique: vi.fn(),
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delete: vi.fn(),
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deleteMany: vi.fn(),
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update: vi.fn(),
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},
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@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ vi.mock("next/headers", () => ({
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}));
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import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
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import { getSession, destroyAllSessions } from "../session";
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import { getSession, destroyAllSessions, destroySession } from "../session";
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beforeEach(() => {
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vi.resetAllMocks();
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@@ -74,6 +75,32 @@ describe("getSession", () => {
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});
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});
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describe("destroySession", () => {
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it("treats an already-deleted session row (P2025) as an idempotent logout", async () => {
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cookieState.sessionId = "sess-gone";
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vi.mocked(prisma.session.delete).mockRejectedValue(
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Object.assign(new Error("record not found"), { code: "P2025" }) as never,
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);
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await expect(destroySession()).resolves.toBeUndefined();
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expect(prisma.session.delete).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
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where: { id: "sess-gone" },
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});
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expect(cookieState.delete).toHaveBeenCalledWith("healthlog_session");
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expect(cookieState.delete).toHaveBeenCalledWith("hl_onboarding");
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});
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it("propagates a real delete failure instead of reporting a false logout", async () => {
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cookieState.sessionId = "sess-live";
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vi.mocked(prisma.session.delete).mockRejectedValue(
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Object.assign(new Error("connection reset"), { code: "P1001" }) as never,
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);
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await expect(destroySession()).rejects.toThrow(/connection reset/);
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});
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});
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describe("destroyAllSessions", () => {
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it("revokes web sessions, API tokens, and refresh tokens for the user", async () => {
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vi.mocked(prisma.session.deleteMany).mockResolvedValue({
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@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import { dispatchNotification } from "@/lib/notifications/dispatcher";
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import { getServerTranslator } from "@/lib/i18n/server-translator";
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import { defaultLocale, type Locale } from "@/lib/i18n/config";
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import { getEvent } from "@/lib/logging/context";
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import { isP2002 } from "@/lib/prisma-errors";
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function isLocale(value: string | null | undefined): value is Locale {
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return (
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@@ -105,8 +106,15 @@ export async function recordSignInDevice(params: {
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await prisma.userKnownDevice.create({
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data: { userId, deviceHash, label: storedLabel },
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});
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} catch {
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return { known: true, alerted: false };
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} catch (err) {
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// ONLY the unique-index race (a concurrent first-login inserting the
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// same (userId, deviceHash)) is a legitimate "already known" outcome —
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// swallow it and skip the alert so we never double-alert. Any other
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// failure (a real DB fault) must NOT be silently classified as a known
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// device, which would suppress the SECURITY_ALERT + audit row: rethrow
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// so the outer catch records it via `addWarning`.
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if (isP2002(err)) return { known: true, alerted: false };
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throw err;
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}
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if (!alertOnNew || isBaseline) return { known: false, alerted: false };
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import type { User } from "@/generated/prisma/client";
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import { ensureDbCompatibility } from "@/lib/db-compat";
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import { getEvent } from "@/lib/logging/context";
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import { shouldEmitSecureCookie } from "@/lib/auth/secure-cookie";
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import { isP2025 } from "@/lib/prisma-errors";
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const SESSION_COOKIE = "healthlog_session";
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const SESSION_MAX_AGE_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000; // 30 days
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@@ -179,7 +180,13 @@ export async function destroySession(): Promise<void> {
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const cookieStore = await cookies();
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const sessionId = cookieStore.get(SESSION_COOKIE)?.value;
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if (sessionId) {
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await prisma.session.delete({ where: { id: sessionId } }).catch(() => {});
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// Logout is idempotent: a session row that no longer exists (P2025) is a
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// no-op success — the cookie clear below still runs. Any other failure is
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// a real delete error that must NOT be masked as a successful logout, so
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// it propagates rather than being swallowed.
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await prisma.session.delete({ where: { id: sessionId } }).catch((err) => {
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if (!isP2025(err)) throw err;
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});
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}
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cookieStore.delete(SESSION_COOKIE);
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cookieStore.delete(ONBOARDING_COOKIE);
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@@ -13,12 +13,27 @@
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* unique-constraint code.
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*/
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/** Narrow a thrown Prisma error to the P2002 unique-constraint code. */
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export function isP2002(err: unknown): boolean {
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/** Narrow a thrown Prisma error to a specific known-request code. */
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function hasPrismaCode(err: unknown, code: string): boolean {
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return (
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typeof err === "object" &&
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err !== null &&
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"code" in err &&
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(err as { code: unknown }).code === "P2002"
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(err as { code: unknown }).code === code
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);
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}
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/** Narrow a thrown Prisma error to the P2002 unique-constraint code. */
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export function isP2002(err: unknown): boolean {
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return hasPrismaCode(err, "P2002");
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}
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/**
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* Narrow a thrown Prisma error to the P2025 "record not found" code — the
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* error `delete` / `update` raise when the target row no longer exists. Lets
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* an idempotent delete treat "already gone" as success while still surfacing a
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* genuine failure (a real DB fault raises a different code and rethrows).
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*/
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export function isP2025(err: unknown): boolean {
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return hasPrismaCode(err, "P2025");
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}
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