fix(mcp): close OAuth 2.1 resource-server gaps before the remote surface ships

Harden the remote MCP endpoint and the in-repo OAuth bridge against the
adversarial review of the milestone branch. The two ship-blockers made the
"read-only, revocable" promise false; the rest tightened the surface.

Audience binding at the resource server: a token whose only grant is the new
`health:read` scope is the MCP read credential. The REST edge now accepts it on
safe (read) methods and refuses it on writes/deletes with 403, so a connector
token can read over `/mcp` and GET routes but can never POST/DELETE the record
despite a "read-only" consent. The `/mcp` resolver is unaffected.

Revocable, theft-detectable refresh tokens: refresh artifacts now anchor to a
persistent connection row. Revoking a connection stops every future refresh and
kills its access tokens; a replayed (already-rotated) refresh is treated as
theft and revokes the whole connection. Connections surface in settings as the
unit a user can disconnect. The old access token is revoked on rotation.

Also: fail closed on the OAuth/`/mcp` surface when no canonical origin is
configured and mark the discovery documents non-cacheable; honour the global API
kill-switch on `/mcp`, `/token`, `/authorize`, and `/register`; cap the CIMD and
registration body reads while streaming instead of after; show the verified
client origin on consent; validate CIMD redirect-URI schemes; assert same-origin
on the consent POST; and add a daily prune for expired connector tokens.

New migration 0195 adds the connection anchor and links access tokens to it.
This commit is contained in:
Marc-André Bombeck committed 2026-06-27 15:09:11 +02:00
1 parent 06363771ee
commit 22eb9cba0d
39 files changed
+1826 -72

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+19
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@@ -21,7 +21,13 @@
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
// The surface fails closed without a pinned origin (M1); pin it for the suite.
process.env.APP_URL = "http://localhost";
vi.mock("@/lib/logging/transports", () => ({ emitIfSampled: vi.fn() }));
vi.mock("@/lib/app-settings", () => ({
isApiGloballyEnabled: vi.fn(async () => true),
}));
vi.mock("@/lib/auth/bearer", () => ({
resolveBearerToken: vi.fn(),
BearerAuthError: class BearerAuthError extends Error {},
@@ -60,6 +66,7 @@ import { POST, GET } from "../route";
import { resolveBearerToken } from "@/lib/auth/bearer";
import { isModuleEnabled } from "@/lib/modules/gate";
import { checkMcpRateLimit } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
import { isApiGloballyEnabled } from "@/lib/app-settings";
const READ_TOOLS = [
"get_correlations",
@@ -102,6 +109,7 @@ beforeEach(() => {
headersGet.mockReturnValue(null);
// Default happy-path: module on, under budget.
vi.mocked(isModuleEnabled).mockResolvedValue(true);
vi.mocked(isApiGloballyEnabled).mockResolvedValue(true);
vi.mocked(checkMcpRateLimit).mockResolvedValue({
allowed: true,
remaining: 119,
@@ -174,6 +182,17 @@ describe("/mcp — Origin gate (DNS-rebinding defense, spec PR #1439)", () => {
});
});
describe("/mcp — operator kill-switch (M4)", () => {
it("hides the surface (404) when the API is globally disabled", async () => {
validToken();
vi.mocked(isApiGloballyEnabled).mockResolvedValue(false);
const res = await POST(postRpc(TOOLS_LIST));
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
// Fails closed before the token table is consulted.
expect(resolveBearerToken).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe("/mcp — 401 carries the RFC 9728 resource_metadata pointer", () => {
it("includes resource_metadata in the WWW-Authenticate challenge", async () => {
const res = await POST(
+14 -1
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@@ -46,8 +46,12 @@ import { createMcpServer, resolveMcpAuthContext } from "@/lib/mcp";
import { withBackgroundEvent } from "@/lib/logging/background";
import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
import { isModuleEnabled } from "@/lib/modules/gate";
import { isApiGloballyEnabled } from "@/lib/app-settings";
import { checkMcpRateLimit, rateLimitHeaders } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
import { resolveBaseOrigin } from "@/lib/mcp/oauth/config";
import {
isMcpOriginConfigured,
resolveBaseOrigin,
} from "@/lib/mcp/oauth/config";
import { wwwAuthenticateChallenge } from "@/lib/mcp/oauth/metadata";
import type { ModuleKey } from "@/lib/modules/registry";
@@ -131,6 +135,15 @@ async function handleMcp(request: Request): Promise<Response> {
return forbiddenOrigin();
}
// 0a. KILL-SWITCH + ORIGIN CONFIG — M1 fails closed without a pinned
// origin; M4 honours the operator's global API switch. Both answer the
// same invisible 404 as the module-off posture so a disabled instance
// leaks nothing.
if (!isMcpOriginConfigured() || !(await isApiGloballyEnabled())) {
annotate({ action: { name: "mcp.surface.unavailable" } });
return moduleDisabled();
}
// 1. AUTH — Bearer only; a cookie is never consulted (admin unreachable).
const raw = readBearer(request);
if (!raw) {