From 1920a763bec4c3b70a9e3ee3045cfba4203244ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Marc-Andr=C3=A9=20Bombeck?= <mbombeck@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 16 May 2026 02:35:36 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] fix(api): rate-limit and validate the web-vitals beacon
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The public POST surface lacked an origin gate, a rate-limit, and a
schema — a peer could flood the wide-event log with arbitrary text
under the `name` slot. Tighten the route:

- Same-origin Referer check when `NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL` is set.
- Per-IP `checkRateLimit` (60/min) matching the deploy-webhook shape.
- Zod schema locks `name` to the six documented web-vitals
  identifiers; `id` capped at 50 chars; `value`/`delta` must be
  finite. Only validated fields enter the log envelope — the raw
  payload is never observed by the wide-event pipeline.

204 No Content on a successful enqueue keeps the `sendBeacon`
contract intact; 400 on schema reject; 429 on rate-limit overflow.
---
 .../web-vitals/__tests__/route.test.ts        | 151 ++++++++++++++++++
 src/app/api/internal/web-vitals/route.ts      | 133 ++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 247 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 src/app/api/internal/web-vitals/__tests__/route.test.ts

diff --git a/src/app/api/internal/web-vitals/__tests__/route.test.ts b/src/app/api/internal/web-vitals/__tests__/route.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..47418b0bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/app/api/internal/web-vitals/__tests__/route.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
+import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
+
+/**
+ * v1.4.28 R4-CODE-C3 / Security H-1 / SD-C2 — the web-vitals beacon
+ * is unauthenticated by design (browser fires before any session) but
+ * MUST gate the surface so a peer cannot flood the wide-event log nor
+ * inject arbitrary strings.
+ *
+ * Contract:
+ *
+ *   - Zod schema rejects unknown `name`, non-finite `value`, oversized
+ *     `id` → 400. Raw body never enters the log.
+ *   - Per-IP rate-limit (60/min) → 429 with `X-RateLimit-*` headers on
+ *     overflow.
+ *   - Valid payload → 204 No Content (sendBeacon shape — never retry).
+ */
+
+vi.mock("@/lib/rate-limit", () => ({
+  checkRateLimit: vi.fn(),
+  rateLimitHeaders: () => ({}),
+}));
+
+vi.mock("@/lib/logging/transports", () => ({ emitIfSampled: vi.fn() }));
+
+vi.mock("next/headers", () => ({
+  headers: vi.fn(async () => ({ get: () => null })),
+  cookies: vi.fn(async () => ({
+    get: () => undefined,
+    set: () => {},
+    delete: () => {},
+  })),
+}));
+
+import { POST } from "../route";
+import { checkRateLimit } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
+
+function postRequest(body: unknown, init?: { referer?: string }): NextRequest {
+  return new NextRequest("http://localhost/api/internal/web-vitals", {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers: {
+      "content-type": "application/json",
+      ...(init?.referer ? { referer: init.referer } : {}),
+    },
+    body: typeof body === "string" ? body : JSON.stringify(body),
+  });
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  vi.resetAllMocks();
+  vi.mocked(checkRateLimit).mockResolvedValue({
+    allowed: true,
+    remaining: 59,
+    resetAt: Date.now() + 60_000,
+  });
+  // NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL unset in the unit harness — the same-origin
+  // gate is skipped (dev-friendly default).
+  delete process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL;
+});
+
+describe("POST /api/internal/web-vitals", () => {
+  it("returns 204 on a valid payload", async () => {
+    const res = await POST(
+      postRequest({
+        name: "LCP",
+        value: 1234.5,
+        id: "v1-1700000000-7",
+        delta: 12.3,
+        rating: "good",
+        navigationType: "navigate",
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(204);
+  });
+
+  it("returns 400 when the name is not in the documented set", async () => {
+    const res = await POST(
+      postRequest({
+        name: "ARBITRARY_LOG_STRING",
+        value: 0,
+        id: "x",
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it("returns 400 when value is non-finite", async () => {
+    const res = await POST(
+      postRequest({
+        name: "CLS",
+        value: Number.NaN,
+        id: "x",
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it("returns 400 when id exceeds the 50-char cap", async () => {
+    const res = await POST(
+      postRequest({
+        name: "INP",
+        value: 12,
+        id: "a".repeat(51),
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it("returns 400 on malformed JSON without logging the raw payload", async () => {
+    const res = await POST(postRequest("not-json"));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it("returns 429 when the rate-limit fires", async () => {
+    vi.mocked(checkRateLimit).mockResolvedValue({
+      allowed: false,
+      remaining: 0,
+      resetAt: Date.now() + 60_000,
+    });
+    const res = await POST(
+      postRequest({ name: "CLS", value: 0.1, id: "x" }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(429);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a cross-origin Referer when NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL is configured", async () => {
+    process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL = "https://healthlog.example.com";
+    const res = await POST(
+      postRequest(
+        { name: "LCP", value: 1000, id: "x" },
+        { referer: "https://malicious.example.org/probe" },
+      ),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(204);
+    // The beacon was silently dropped (no log line); the rate-limiter
+    // was never even consulted for a cross-site request.
+    expect(checkRateLimit).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("accepts a same-origin Referer when NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL is configured", async () => {
+    process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL = "https://healthlog.example.com";
+    const res = await POST(
+      postRequest(
+        { name: "LCP", value: 1000, id: "x" },
+        { referer: "https://healthlog.example.com/insights" },
+      ),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(204);
+    expect(checkRateLimit).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+});
diff --git a/src/app/api/internal/web-vitals/route.ts b/src/app/api/internal/web-vitals/route.ts
index 9b5470f48..7abe172bf 100644
--- a/src/app/api/internal/web-vitals/route.ts
+++ b/src/app/api/internal/web-vitals/route.ts
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 /**
  * v1.4.28 R3d — Web Vitals beacon.
  *
- * Next 16 exposes `reportWebVitals` from the root layout; we wire the
- * client to POST every measurement to this internal route, which logs
- * to the shared wide-event pipeline so ops can see CLS / FCP / FID /
- * LCP / TTFB / INP histograms in the same place the rest of the
+ * Next 16 exposes `reportWebVitals` from the root layout; the client
+ * POSTs every measurement to this internal route, which logs to the
+ * shared wide-event pipeline so ops can see CLS / FCP / FID / LCP /
+ * TTFB / INP / FCP histograms in the same place the rest of the
  * request flow surfaces.
  *
  * Why a route + not the front-end alone:
@@ -16,61 +16,120 @@
  *   - Persisting elsewhere (Postgres, S3) would be a wasted spend —
  *     this is a beacon. We log and forget.
  *
- * Authentication: none (the route is internal-only by name; CSP +
- * same-origin policy keep cross-site reporting out). The dispatch is
- * idempotent — a duplicate beacon is at worst one extra log line.
+ * Authentication: none. Web Vitals fire from the document lifecycle
+ * (including the very first navigation that pre-dates auth), so an
+ * auth gate would silently drop the most informative samples. The
+ * route compensates by gating on:
  *
- * Rate-limit: deliberately none. Web Vitals emit one report per metric
- * per page load (max 6 per session). A bot trying to flood the route
- * is cheaper to drop at the edge.
+ *   1. Same-origin Referer header (when `NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL` is
+ *      configured) — fails closed on cross-site dispatch.
+ *   2. Per-IP `checkRateLimit` (60 req / minute) — same shape as the
+ *      deploy-webhook. A real client sends ≤ 7 beacons per page;
+ *      anything past 60 is a flood.
+ *   3. Zod schema — `name` is locked to the documented web-vitals
+ *      identifier set; `value` / `delta` / `id` are size-bounded.
+ *      Only validated fields enter the wide-event meta — the raw
+ *      payload is NEVER logged, so a hostile client cannot inject
+ *      arbitrary text into the observability sink.
  *
- * Payload shape: matches `web-vitals`' `Metric` interface — `id`,
- * `name`, `value`, `delta`, `rating`. We log the lot; if a future
- * client adds fields we'll see them in the event meta.
+ * Always returns 204 No Content on a successful enqueue (no body so
+ * `sendBeacon` never retries). 400 on schema reject; 429 on rate-limit
+ * hit. The client never reads either — the beacon is fire-and-forget.
  */
 import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import { z } from "zod/v4";
 
 import { apiHandler } from "@/lib/api-handler";
 import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
+import { getClientIp } from "@/lib/api-response";
+import { checkRateLimit, rateLimitHeaders } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
 
-interface WebVitalsBody {
-  id?: unknown;
-  name?: unknown;
-  value?: unknown;
-  delta?: unknown;
-  rating?: unknown;
-  navigationType?: unknown;
+const webVitalsBodySchema = z.object({
+  // Locked to the web-vitals library's documented metric identifiers.
+  // FCP is included for parity with the iOS WebView client; INP super-
+  // sedes FID under the new Core Web Vitals contract.
+  name: z.enum(["CLS", "LCP", "FID", "INP", "TTFB", "FCP"]),
+  value: z.number().finite(),
+  // Web Vitals client builds `id` from `${navigation-uuid}-${index}`
+  // — bounded length keeps a hostile peer from logging arbitrary text
+  // under the identifier slot.
+  id: z.string().max(50),
+  delta: z.number().finite().optional(),
+  rating: z.enum(["good", "needs-improvement", "poor"]).optional(),
+  navigationType: z
+    .enum(["navigate", "reload", "back-forward", "back-forward-cache", "prerender"])
+    .optional(),
+});
+
+function isSameOriginReferer(request: NextRequest): boolean {
+  // When `NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL` is unset (test / unconfigured dev) skip
+  // the check — the rate-limit + schema still bound the surface, and
+  // gating on a missing env would dead-lock the beacon in dev.
+  const expectedOrigin = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL;
+  if (!expectedOrigin) return true;
+
+  const referer = request.headers.get("referer");
+  if (!referer) return false;
+
+  try {
+    const refererOrigin = new URL(referer).origin;
+    const expected = new URL(expectedOrigin).origin;
+    return refererOrigin === expected;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
 }
 
 export const POST = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
-  let body: WebVitalsBody | null = null;
+  // Same-origin gate. Fails closed on cross-site dispatch.
+  if (!isSameOriginReferer(request)) {
+    return new NextResponse(null, { status: 204 });
+  }
+
+  // Per-IP rate-limit. 60 req / minute is well above a real client's
+  // ≤ 7 beacons / page-load and well below a flood. 429 on hit; the
+  // beacon contract still accepts 4xx without retry on the client.
+  const ip = getClientIp(request);
+  const rl = await checkRateLimit(
+    `web-vitals:${ip ?? "unknown"}`,
+    60,
+    60_000,
+  );
+  if (!rl.allowed) {
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: "rate_limited" },
+      { status: 429, headers: rateLimitHeaders(rl) },
+    );
+  }
+
+  let raw: unknown;
   try {
-    body = (await request.json()) as WebVitalsBody;
+    raw = await request.json();
   } catch {
-    // Malformed payload — accept silently so the client doesn't retry.
-    return NextResponse.json({ ok: true });
+    // Malformed payload — 400 so the beacon never retries. Crucially:
+    // we do NOT log the raw body (log-injection defence).
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "invalid_body" }, { status: 400 });
   }
 
-  if (!body || typeof body !== "object") {
-    return NextResponse.json({ ok: true });
+  const parsed = webVitalsBodySchema.safeParse(raw);
+  if (!parsed.success) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "invalid_body" }, { status: 400 });
   }
 
-  const name = typeof body.name === "string" ? body.name : "unknown";
-  const value =
-    typeof body.value === "number" && Number.isFinite(body.value)
-      ? body.value
-      : null;
-  const rating = typeof body.rating === "string" ? body.rating : null;
-
+  // Log only the validated fields. The raw payload never enters the
+  // observability pipeline, so a hostile peer cannot smuggle text
+  // into the wide-event log via unrecognised keys.
+  const { name, value, id, delta, rating, navigationType } = parsed.data;
   annotate({
     meta: {
       "web_vitals.name": name,
       "web_vitals.value": value,
-      "web_vitals.rating": rating,
-      "web_vitals.navigation_type":
-        typeof body.navigationType === "string" ? body.navigationType : null,
+      "web_vitals.id": id,
+      "web_vitals.delta": delta ?? null,
+      "web_vitals.rating": rating ?? null,
+      "web_vitals.navigation_type": navigationType ?? null,
     },
   });
 
-  return NextResponse.json({ ok: true });
+  return new NextResponse(null, { status: 204 });
 });