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fix(auth): ask for a fresh proof before the record or a credential to it leaves
Exporting the whole record, making a clinician share link, minting a token, and the admin backup download, upload and restore, data wipe and password reset ran on a live session alone. The plaintext full backup did, while the encrypted one beside it asked for a second factor. Whoever held a stolen session could take the record, or leave behind a credential that outlives the session. These now go through one gate, requireRecentProof (assertRecentCookieProof for the routes that resolve their caller themselves). A browser session passes after a sign-in or re-proof within five minutes: a second factor on an account that has one, otherwise the password or a passkey. The refusal is 401 auth.reproof.required with meta.methods, and the web opens the re-proof dialog, posts the proof to the new POST /api/auth/reproof and retries. A password proof stamps the new Session.reproofAt (migration 0359), never mfaVerifiedAt, so it cannot stand in for a second factor anywhere. On Bearer, the full backup asks for an X-Step-Up elevation; the encrypted export asks for a second-factor elevation on an account that has one. Share links and connector tokens keep taking the token alone, because the shipped app calls them without an elevation and reads a 401 there as a dead session; the guard test names them. Key rotation keeps its stricter second-factor gate.
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@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
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import type { User } from "@/generated/prisma/client";
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import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
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import { apiError } from "@/lib/api-response";
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import { REPROOF_REQUIRED_CODE } from "@/lib/api-errors";
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import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit";
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import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
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import { checkRateLimit, rateLimitHeaders } from "@/lib/rate-limit";
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@@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ export async function recordReproofFailure(
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}
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/** No proof was presented, and the session carries none recent enough. */
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export const REPROOF_REQUIRED_CODE = "auth.reproof.required";
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export { REPROOF_REQUIRED_CODE };
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/** A proof was presented and did not verify. The session is untouched. */
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export const REPROOF_FAILED_CODE = "auth.reproof.failed";
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@@ -188,6 +189,9 @@ export const RECENT_PROOF_MAX_AGE_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
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*
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* - the session completed a second factor or passkey sign-in within the last
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* five minutes (`Session.mfaVerifiedAt`);
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* - the session re-proved a credential at `POST /api/auth/reproof` within
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* the last five minutes (`Session.reproofAt`), which accepts the same
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* proofs this gate takes in the body;
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* - the session itself was created by a sign-in within the last five
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* minutes (`Session.createdAt`, which no later write touches) — this is
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* also what lets an SSO-only account with nothing else to re-prove enroll
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@@ -210,12 +214,16 @@ export async function checkCookieEnrollmentProof(args: {
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const row = await prisma.session.findUnique({
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where: { id: sessionId },
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select: { mfaVerifiedAt: true, createdAt: true },
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select: { mfaVerifiedAt: true, createdAt: true, reproofAt: true },
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});
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const now = Date.now();
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const recent = (d: Date | null | undefined) =>
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d != null && now - d.getTime() <= RECENT_PROOF_MAX_AGE_MS;
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if (recent(row?.mfaVerifiedAt) || recent(row?.createdAt)) {
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if (
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recent(row?.mfaVerifiedAt) ||
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recent(row?.createdAt) ||
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recent(row?.reproofAt)
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) {
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annotate({ meta: { enrollment_proof: "recent_session" } });
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return null;
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}
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@@ -316,12 +324,17 @@ export async function authorizeSensitiveChange(args: {
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if (cookieSessionId) {
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const row = await prisma.session.findUnique({
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where: { id: cookieSessionId },
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select: { mfaVerifiedAt: true, createdAt: true },
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select: { mfaVerifiedAt: true, createdAt: true, reproofAt: true },
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});
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const now = Date.now();
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const recent = (d: Date | null | undefined) =>
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d != null && now - d.getTime() <= RECENT_PROOF_MAX_AGE_MS;
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if (recent(row?.mfaVerifiedAt) || recent(row?.createdAt)) return "ok";
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if (
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recent(row?.mfaVerifiedAt) ||
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recent(row?.createdAt) ||
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recent(row?.reproofAt)
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)
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return "ok";
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}
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if (!currentPassword) return "required";
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