fix(auth): ask for a fresh proof before the record or a credential to it leaves

Exporting the whole record, making a clinician share link, minting a token,
and the admin backup download, upload and restore, data wipe and password
reset ran on a live session alone. The plaintext full backup did, while the
encrypted one beside it asked for a second factor. Whoever held a stolen
session could take the record, or leave behind a credential that outlives
the session.

These now go through one gate, requireRecentProof (assertRecentCookieProof
for the routes that resolve their caller themselves). A browser session
passes after a sign-in or re-proof within five minutes: a second factor on
an account that has one, otherwise the password or a passkey. The refusal is
401 auth.reproof.required with meta.methods, and the web opens the re-proof
dialog, posts the proof to the new POST /api/auth/reproof and retries. A
password proof stamps the new Session.reproofAt (migration 0359), never
mfaVerifiedAt, so it cannot stand in for a second factor anywhere.

On Bearer, the full backup asks for an X-Step-Up elevation; the encrypted
export asks for a second-factor elevation on an account that has one. Share
links and connector tokens keep taking the token alone, because the shipped
app calls them without an elevation and reads a 401 there as a dead
session; the guard test names them.

Key rotation keeps its stricter second-factor gate.
This commit is contained in:
Marc-André Bombeck committed 2026-09-26 19:54:38 +02:00
1 parent a7f66b8519
commit 0fc83cb0a1
56 files changed
+2028 -235

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@@ -10,6 +10,15 @@ vi.mock("@/lib/db", () => ({
prisma: {
apiToken: { findMany: vi.fn() },
auditLog: { create: vi.fn() },
session: {
findUnique: vi.fn(async () => ({
createdAt: new Date(),
mfaVerifiedAt: null,
reproofAt: null,
})),
},
webauthnMfaCredential: { count: vi.fn(async () => 0) },
passkey: { count: vi.fn(async () => 0) },
},
}));
vi.mock("@/lib/auth/session", () => ({ getSession: vi.fn() }));
@@ -29,6 +38,7 @@ vi.mock("next/headers", () => ({
import { POST } from "../route";
import { getSession } from "@/lib/auth/session";
import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
import { isApiGloballyEnabled } from "@/lib/app-settings";
import { issueApiToken } from "@/lib/auth/issue-token";
@@ -57,6 +67,20 @@ beforeEach(() => {
} as never);
});
describe("POST /api/mcp/tokens — fresh proof", () => {
it("refuses a browser session with no recent sign-in or re-proof", async () => {
vi.mocked(prisma.session.findUnique).mockResolvedValueOnce({
createdAt: new Date(Date.now() - 60 * 60 * 1000),
mfaVerifiedAt: null,
reproofAt: null,
} as never);
const res = await POST(postReq({ name: "laptop" }));
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
expect((await res.json()).meta.errorCode).toBe("auth.reproof.required");
expect(issueApiToken).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe("POST /api/mcp/tokens — scope minting", () => {
it("defaults to read-only [health:read]", async () => {
const res = await POST(postReq({ name: "laptop" }));
+6 -2
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
*/
import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
import { apiHandler, requireAuth } from "@/lib/api-handler";
import { apiHandler, requireAuth, requireRecentProof } from "@/lib/api-handler";
import {
apiError,
apiSuccess,
@@ -71,7 +71,11 @@ export const GET = apiHandler(async () => {
});
export const POST = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
const { user } = await requireAuth();
// A connector token outlives the session that mints it, so the cookie path
// needs a fresh proof. The shipped app mints these on its token without an
// elevation and reads a 401 here as a dead session, so the Bearer arm stays
// on the token until it sends one (see the iOS note).
const { user } = await requireRecentProof({ bearer: "token" });
annotate({ action: { name: "mcp.tokens.create" } });
if (!(await isApiGloballyEnabled())) {