diff --git a/src/app/api/admin/central-codex/device-poll/route.ts b/src/app/api/admin/central-codex/device-poll/route.ts
index b5e77028f..86aab4eed 100644
--- a/src/app/api/admin/central-codex/device-poll/route.ts
+++ b/src/app/api/admin/central-codex/device-poll/route.ts
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
 import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit";
 import { getClientIp, apiSuccess, apiError } from "@/lib/api-response";
 import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
+import { forgetProviderHealth } from "@/lib/ai/provider-health-ledger";
 
 /**
  * Operator-shared central Codex — device-code poll (admin only).
@@ -91,6 +92,9 @@ export const POST = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
   });
 
   cookieStore.delete("central_codex_device");
+  // A new central sign-in: every account's ledger rows describe the refused
+  // one, and the central connection is one credential shared by all of them.
+  await forgetProviderHealth({ providerType: "admin-codex" });
 
   await auditLog("admin.central-codex.connected", {
     userId: user.id,
diff --git a/src/app/api/auth/codex/device-poll/route.ts b/src/app/api/auth/codex/device-poll/route.ts
index 1853de300..47f9987b0 100644
--- a/src/app/api/auth/codex/device-poll/route.ts
+++ b/src/app/api/auth/codex/device-poll/route.ts
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import { auditLog } from "@/lib/auth/audit";
 import { getClientIp, apiSuccess, apiError } from "@/lib/api-response";
 import { annotate } from "@/lib/logging/context";
 import { INSIGHTS_CACHE_CLEARED } from "@/lib/insights/cached-text-cipher";
+import { forgetProviderHealth } from "@/lib/ai/provider-health-ledger";
 
 /**
  * v1.4.7.1: Device-code flow polling endpoint.
@@ -88,6 +89,9 @@ export const POST = apiHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
   });
 
   cookieStore.delete("codex_device");
+  // A new sign-in: whatever the ledger held against the old one no longer
+  // describes this credential.
+  await forgetProviderHealth({ userId: user.id, providerType: "codex" });
 
   await auditLog("codex.oauth.connected", {
     userId: user.id,
diff --git a/src/lib/ai/provider-health-ledger.ts b/src/lib/ai/provider-health-ledger.ts
index 1ffbb461c..b6e25a4b6 100644
--- a/src/lib/ai/provider-health-ledger.ts
+++ b/src/lib/ai/provider-health-ledger.ts
@@ -266,6 +266,33 @@ export const postgresProviderHealthLedger: ProviderHealthLedger = {
   },
 };
 
+/**
+ * Drop the recorded outcomes of a credential that has just been replaced.
+ *
+ * The ledger describes a credential, not a provider slot: once the person
+ * (or, for `admin-codex`, the operator) signs in again, the `auth_failed`
+ * row of the refused credential would otherwise keep the fresh one at the
+ * tail of the chain and reported as expired for the rest of its cooldown.
+ * Without `userId` the rows of every account are dropped — the operator's
+ * central connection is one credential shared by all of them. Best effort,
+ * like every ledger write.
+ */
+export async function forgetProviderHealth(target: {
+  providerType: ProviderChainType;
+  userId?: string;
+}): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    await prisma.providerHealth.deleteMany({
+      where: {
+        providerType: target.providerType,
+        ...(target.userId ? { userId: target.userId } : {}),
+      },
+    });
+  } catch {
+    // A stale row only deprioritises; it never blocks.
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * Providers whose credential is currently known-bad (auth-class failure
  * inside the cooldown window) for a user. Drives the proactive
diff --git a/src/lib/ai/provider.ts b/src/lib/ai/provider.ts
index 51f99b5c6..e05758bed 100644
--- a/src/lib/ai/provider.ts
+++ b/src/lib/ai/provider.ts
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ import {
   type ProviderWorkAuthority,
 } from "@/lib/sharing/provider-work-authority";
 import { memoizePerRequest } from "@/lib/request-cache";
+import { emitSignal } from "@/lib/logging/signal";
 import type { AiModality } from "@/lib/ai/capabilities/types";
 import type {
   ProviderEntryPresence,
@@ -42,6 +43,93 @@ import {
 
 const TOKEN_REFRESH_BUFFER_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5 minutes
 
+/**
+ * Whether a failed Codex refresh proves the sign-in dead: the issuer refused
+ * the grant itself (`CodexRefreshError.credentialExpired`), as opposed to a
+ * 429, a 5xx or a network error, which say nothing about the credential.
+ * Read by shape rather than `instanceof` so a mocked `codex-oauth` module
+ * classifies the same way.
+ */
+function isDeadCodexSignIn(error: unknown): boolean {
+  return (
+    (error as { credentialExpired?: unknown } | null)?.credentialExpired ===
+    true
+  );
+}
+
+function oauthErrorOf(error: unknown): string | null {
+  const code = (error as { oauthError?: unknown } | null)?.oauthError;
+  return typeof code === "string" ? code : null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Park a Codex connection whose sign-in the issuer has refused for good.
+ *
+ * Retrying a dead refresh token cannot succeed; until this existed every
+ * generation of every card of every run asked the issuer again, failed with
+ * the same 401, and logged it. Parking flips the connection to the existing
+ * `expired` state — the one Settings already renders as "reconnect ChatGPT" —
+ * so the chain, the presence probe and with it every AI capability stop
+ * counting it, and nothing is sent until the person signs in again (the
+ * device-code flow writes `connected`).
+ *
+ * Compare-and-set on the refresh token that was refused: a reconnect that
+ * landed in between wrote a different one and is left alone, and of several
+ * workers failing at once exactly one flips the row, so the transition is
+ * signalled once and never again per run.
+ */
+async function parkUserCodex(
+  userId: string,
+  refusedRefreshEncrypted: string,
+  error: unknown,
+): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const parked = await prisma.user.updateMany({
+      where: {
+        id: userId,
+        codexConnectionStatus: "connected",
+        codexRefreshTokenEncrypted: refusedRefreshEncrypted,
+      },
+      data: { codexConnectionStatus: "expired" },
+    });
+    if (parked.count === 1) {
+      emitSignal({
+        action: "ai.credential.expired",
+        level: "warn",
+        meta: { provider: "codex", oauth_error: oauthErrorOf(error) },
+      });
+    }
+  } catch {
+    // Best effort: an unparked connection is retried exactly as before.
+  }
+}
+
+/** The operator's central Codex, parked the same way. */
+async function parkCentralCodex(
+  refusedRefreshEncrypted: string,
+  error: unknown,
+): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const parked = await prisma.appSettings.updateMany({
+      where: {
+        id: "singleton",
+        adminCodexConnectionStatus: "connected",
+        adminCodexRefreshTokenEncrypted: refusedRefreshEncrypted,
+      },
+      data: { adminCodexConnectionStatus: "expired" },
+    });
+    if (parked.count === 1) {
+      emitSignal({
+        action: "ai.credential.expired",
+        level: "warn",
+        meta: { provider: "admin-codex", oauth_error: oauthErrorOf(error) },
+      });
+    }
+  } catch {
+    // Best effort, as above.
+  }
+}
+
 class NoProvider implements AIProvider {
   readonly type = "none" as const;
 
@@ -308,9 +396,15 @@ async function resolveCodexProvider(
           codexTokenExpiresAt: fresh.expiresAt,
         },
       });
-    } catch {
-      // Fall through — CodexClient will trigger an on-401 refresh
-      // and persist there.
+    } catch (error) {
+      // A refused grant parks the connection and drops it from this chain:
+      // calling Codex with the expired access token could only 401 into a
+      // second refusal. Anything else falls through — CodexClient will
+      // trigger an on-401 refresh and persist there.
+      if (isDeadCodexSignIn(error)) {
+        await parkUserCodex(userId, user.codexRefreshTokenEncrypted, error);
+        return null;
+      }
     }
   }
 
@@ -336,9 +430,27 @@ async function resolveCodexProvider(
         refreshEncrypted: freshUser.codexRefreshTokenEncrypted,
       });
       if (!decoded) {
-        throw codexReconnectRequired("token storage corrupt");
+        const error = codexReconnectRequired("token storage corrupt");
+        await parkUserCodex(
+          userId,
+          freshUser.codexRefreshTokenEncrypted,
+          error,
+        );
+        throw error;
+      }
+      let fresh;
+      try {
+        fresh = await refreshDeviceTokens(decoded.refreshToken);
+      } catch (error) {
+        if (isDeadCodexSignIn(error)) {
+          await parkUserCodex(
+            userId,
+            freshUser.codexRefreshTokenEncrypted,
+            error,
+          );
+        }
+        throw error;
       }
-      const fresh = await refreshDeviceTokens(decoded.refreshToken);
       const enc = encryptCodexCreds(fresh);
       await prisma.user.update({
         where: { id: userId },
@@ -421,9 +533,14 @@ async function resolveAdminCodexProvider(): Promise<AIProvider | null> {
           adminCodexTokenExpiresAt: enc.expiresAt,
         },
       });
-    } catch {
-      // Fall through — CodexClient triggers an on-401 refresh and persists via
-      // the callback below.
+    } catch (error) {
+      // A refused grant parks the central connection (see `parkUserCodex`);
+      // anything else falls through — CodexClient triggers an on-401 refresh
+      // and persists via the callback below.
+      if (isDeadCodexSignIn(error)) {
+        await parkCentralCodex(settings.adminCodexRefreshTokenEncrypted, error);
+        return null;
+      }
     }
   }
 
@@ -454,9 +571,19 @@ async function resolveAdminCodexProvider(): Promise<AIProvider | null> {
         expiresAt: fresh.adminCodexTokenExpiresAt,
       });
       if (!decoded) {
-        throw codexReconnectRequired("central token storage corrupt");
+        const error = codexReconnectRequired("central token storage corrupt");
+        await parkCentralCodex(fresh.adminCodexRefreshTokenEncrypted, error);
+        throw error;
+      }
+      let refreshed;
+      try {
+        refreshed = await refreshDeviceTokens(decoded.refreshToken);
+      } catch (error) {
+        if (isDeadCodexSignIn(error)) {
+          await parkCentralCodex(fresh.adminCodexRefreshTokenEncrypted, error);
+        }
+        throw error;
       }
-      const refreshed = await refreshDeviceTokens(decoded.refreshToken);
       const enc = encryptAdminCodexCreds(refreshed);
       await prisma.appSettings.update({
         where: { id: "singleton" },
diff --git a/src/lib/jobs/insight-pregenerate.ts b/src/lib/jobs/insight-pregenerate.ts
index c67b1c929..509551b51 100644
--- a/src/lib/jobs/insight-pregenerate.ts
+++ b/src/lib/jobs/insight-pregenerate.ts
@@ -888,7 +888,8 @@ export async function runInsightPregenerate(
             } else if (generated.credentialExpired) {
               // v1.42 — a dead sign-in (a Codex refresh token the issuer
               // revoked) does not heal in 45 minutes either; the person has
-              // to reconnect, and the ledger already tells them so.
+              // to reconnect. The refusal parked the connection as expired,
+              // which Settings shows, and the next run no longer counts it.
               settle("auth_failed", generated.reason);
             } else {
               settle("failed", generated.reason);
diff --git a/tests/integration/codex-credential-park.test.ts b/tests/integration/codex-credential-park.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..95ea57391
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/integration/codex-credential-park.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+/**
+ * A Codex sign-in the issuer refused is parked until the person signs in
+ * again, against the real rows.
+ *
+ * Before the park, a dead refresh token was asked again on every hop of
+ * every run: the chain resolved Codex, the proactive refresh failed and was
+ * swallowed, the request 401'd, the on-401 refresh failed again, and the
+ * nightly warm repeated that for the briefing and every card. Parking flips
+ * the connection to the `expired` state Settings already renders, so the
+ * chain and the presence probe stop counting it and nothing leaves until a
+ * new sign-in writes `connected`.
+ */
+import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+
+process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY ??=
+  "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
+
+import { cookieJar, headerJar } from "./mock-next-headers";
+import { getPrismaClient, truncateAllTables } from "./setup";
+
+vi.mock("next/headers", async () => {
+  const { cookieJar, headerJar } = await import("./mock-next-headers");
+  return {
+    headers: vi.fn(async () => ({
+      get: (name: string) => headerJar.get(name.toLowerCase()) ?? null,
+    })),
+    cookies: vi.fn(async () => ({
+      get: (name: string) => {
+        const value = cookieJar.get(name);
+        return value ? { name, value } : undefined;
+      },
+      set: (name: string, value: string) => {
+        cookieJar.set(name, value);
+      },
+      delete: (name: string) => {
+        cookieJar.delete(name);
+      },
+    })),
+  };
+});
+
+vi.mock("@/lib/db-compat", () => ({
+  ensureDbCompatibility: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+}));
+
+vi.mock("@/lib/logging/signal", async (importOriginal) => {
+  const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("@/lib/logging/signal")>();
+  return { ...actual, emitSignal: vi.fn(actual.emitSignal) };
+});
+
+// Only the two calls that would leave the machine are replaced; the
+// credential codec stays real so the rows hold genuine ciphertext.
+vi.mock("@/lib/ai/codex-oauth", async (importOriginal) => {
+  const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("@/lib/ai/codex-oauth")>();
+  return {
+    ...actual,
+    refreshDeviceTokens: vi.fn(),
+    pollDeviceCode: vi.fn(),
+  };
+});
+
+import {
+  CodexRefreshError,
+  encryptAdminCodexCreds,
+  encryptCodexCreds,
+  pollDeviceCode,
+  refreshDeviceTokens,
+} from "@/lib/ai/codex-oauth";
+import { encrypt } from "@/lib/crypto";
+import { emitSignal } from "@/lib/logging/signal";
+import { probeProviderChain, resolveProviderChain } from "@/lib/ai/provider";
+import { postgresProviderHealthLedger } from "@/lib/ai/provider-health-ledger";
+
+const prisma = getPrismaClient();
+
+const HOUR_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
+
+function creds(tag: string, expiresInMs: number) {
+  return {
+    accessToken: `access-${tag}`,
+    refreshToken: `refresh-${tag}`,
+    accountId: `account-${tag}`,
+    expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + expiresInMs),
+  };
+}
+
+function parkSignals(provider: string) {
+  return vi
+    .mocked(emitSignal)
+    .mock.calls.filter(
+      ([input]) =>
+        input.action === "ai.credential.expired" &&
+        input.meta?.provider === provider,
+    );
+}
+
+async function seedCodexUser() {
+  // An access token that expired long ago: the state a dead sign-in sits in.
+  const enc = encryptCodexCreds(creds("old", -HOUR_MS));
+  const user = await prisma.user.create({
+    data: {
+      username: "codex-park",
+      email: "codex-park@example.test",
+      aiProviderChain: [{ providerType: "codex", priority: 1, enabled: true }],
+      codexAccessTokenEncrypted: enc.accessEncrypted,
+      codexRefreshTokenEncrypted: enc.refreshEncrypted,
+      codexConnectionStatus: "connected",
+      codexConnectedAt: new Date(),
+    },
+  });
+  const session = await prisma.session.create({
+    data: { userId: user.id, expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60_000) },
+  });
+  cookieJar.set("healthlog_session", session.id);
+  return user;
+}
+
+beforeEach(async () => {
+  await truncateAllTables(prisma);
+  cookieJar.clear();
+  headerJar.clear();
+  vi.mocked(emitSignal).mockClear();
+  vi.mocked(refreshDeviceTokens).mockReset();
+  vi.mocked(pollDeviceCode).mockReset();
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  vi.mocked(refreshDeviceTokens).mockReset();
+});
+
+describe("a refused Codex sign-in", () => {
+  it("is parked once, stops being asked, and resumes after a new sign-in", async () => {
+    const user = await seedCodexUser();
+    vi.mocked(refreshDeviceTokens).mockRejectedValue(
+      new CodexRefreshError(400, "invalid_grant"),
+    );
+
+    // Two workers meet the refusal at once: one transition, one signal.
+    const [first, second] = await Promise.all([
+      resolveProviderChain(user.id),
+      resolveProviderChain(user.id),
+    ]);
+    expect(first.map((p) => p.providerType)).not.toContain("codex");
+    expect(second.map((p) => p.providerType)).not.toContain("codex");
+    expect(
+      (
+        await prisma.user.findUniqueOrThrow({
+          where: { id: user.id },
+          select: { codexConnectionStatus: true },
+        })
+      ).codexConnectionStatus,
+    ).toBe("expired");
+    expect(parkSignals("codex")).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(parkSignals("codex")[0][0].meta?.oauth_error).toBe("invalid_grant");
+
+    // Parked: later runs neither ask the issuer nor count Codex as present.
+    const asked = vi.mocked(refreshDeviceTokens).mock.calls.length;
+    for (let i = 0; i < 3; i += 1) {
+      const chain = await resolveProviderChain(user.id);
+      expect(chain.map((p) => p.providerType)).not.toContain("codex");
+    }
+    expect(vi.mocked(refreshDeviceTokens).mock.calls.length).toBe(asked);
+    expect(parkSignals("codex")).toHaveLength(1);
+    const presence = await probeProviderChain(user.id);
+    expect(presence.availableTypes).not.toContain("codex");
+
+    // The hop that met the refusal left an auth_failed row behind.
+    await postgresProviderHealthLedger.recordFailure(user.id, "codex", 401);
+    expect(
+      (await postgresProviderHealthLedger.getSkipHints(user.id)).get("codex")
+        ?.reason,
+    ).toBe("credential_expired");
+
+    // The person signs in again through the device-code flow.
+    vi.mocked(pollDeviceCode).mockResolvedValue({
+      status: "connected",
+      creds: creds("new", 10 * HOUR_MS),
+    } as Awaited<ReturnType<typeof pollDeviceCode>>);
+    cookieJar.set(
+      "codex_device",
+      encrypt(JSON.stringify({ deviceAuthId: "device", userCode: "CODE" })),
+    );
+    const { POST } = await import("@/app/api/auth/codex/device-poll/route");
+    const res = await POST(
+      new NextRequest("http://localhost/api/auth/codex/device-poll", {
+        method: "POST",
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+
+    // Resumed in place: connected, first in the chain, not benched by the
+    // refused credential's ledger row, and the fresh token needs no refresh.
+    const resumed = await resolveProviderChain(user.id);
+    expect(resumed[0]?.providerType).toBe("codex");
+    expect(
+      (await postgresProviderHealthLedger.getSkipHints(user.id)).has("codex"),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(vi.mocked(refreshDeviceTokens).mock.calls.length).toBe(asked);
+  });
+
+  it("is not parked by a refusal that says nothing about the credential", async () => {
+    const user = await seedCodexUser();
+    vi.mocked(refreshDeviceTokens).mockRejectedValue(
+      new CodexRefreshError(503, null),
+    );
+
+    const chain = await resolveProviderChain(user.id);
+
+    // A brown-out at the issuer: the connection stays, the client's own
+    // on-401 path gets its chance, and nothing is signalled.
+    expect(chain.map((p) => p.providerType)).toContain("codex");
+    expect(
+      (
+        await prisma.user.findUniqueOrThrow({
+          where: { id: user.id },
+          select: { codexConnectionStatus: true },
+        })
+      ).codexConnectionStatus,
+    ).toBe("connected");
+    expect(parkSignals("codex")).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
+  it("parks the operator's central connection the same way", async () => {
+    const enc = encryptAdminCodexCreds(creds("central", -HOUR_MS));
+    await prisma.appSettings.create({
+      data: {
+        id: "singleton",
+        adminCodexAccessTokenEncrypted: enc.accessEncrypted,
+        adminCodexRefreshTokenEncrypted: enc.refreshEncrypted,
+        adminCodexAccountIdEncrypted: enc.accountIdEncrypted,
+        adminCodexTokenExpiresAt: enc.expiresAt,
+        adminCodexConnectionStatus: "connected",
+      },
+    });
+    const user = await prisma.user.create({
+      data: {
+        username: "central-park",
+        email: "central-park@example.test",
+        aiProviderChain: [],
+        useCentralCodex: true,
+      },
+    });
+    vi.mocked(refreshDeviceTokens).mockRejectedValue(
+      new CodexRefreshError(401, null),
+    );
+
+    const chain = await resolveProviderChain(user.id);
+    expect(chain.map((p) => p.providerType)).not.toContain("admin-codex");
+    expect(
+      (
+        await prisma.appSettings.findUniqueOrThrow({
+          where: { id: "singleton" },
+          select: { adminCodexConnectionStatus: true },
+        })
+      ).adminCodexConnectionStatus,
+    ).toBe("expired");
+    expect(parkSignals("admin-codex")).toHaveLength(1);
+
+    await resolveProviderChain(user.id);
+    expect(vi.mocked(refreshDeviceTokens)).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+});